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A BSTRACT
M u lti-A g en t O p p ortu n ism
by
James H. Lawton
University of New Hampshire, September, 2005
The real world is a complex place, rife with uncertainty, and prone to rapid change.
Agents operating in a real-world domain need to be capable of dealing with the
unexpected events th a t will occur as they carry out their tasks. While unexpected
events are often related to failures in an agent’s plan, or inaccurate knowledge in
an agent’s memory, they can also be opportunities for the agent. For example, an
unexpected event may present the opportunity to achieve a goal th a t was previously
unattainable. Similarly, real-world m ulti-agent systems (MASs) can benefit from the
ability to exploit opportunities. These benefits include the ability for the MAS itself to
better adapt to its changing environment, the ability to ensure agents obtain critical
information in a timely fashion, and improvements in the overall performance of the
system.
In this dissertation we present a framework for multi-agent opportunism th a t is
applicable to open systems of heterogeneous planning agents. The contributions of
our research are both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, we provide an
analysis of the critical issues th a t must be addressed in order to successfully exploit
opportunities in a m ulti-agent system. This analysis can provide MAS designers and
developers im portant guidance to incorporate multi-agent opportunism into their own
systems. It also provides the fundam ental underpinnings of our own specific approach
to multi-agent opportunism .

Xll
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On th e practical side, we have developed, implemented, and evaluated a specific
approach to multi-agent opportunism for a particular class of multi-agent system.
Our evaluation dem onstrates th a t multi-agent opportunism can indeed be effective
in system s of heterogeneous agents even when the am ount of knowledge the agents
share is severely limited. Our evaluation also dem onstrates th a t agents th a t are ca
pable of exploiting opportunities for their own goals are also able, using the same
mechanisms, to recognize and respond to potential opportunities for the goals of
other agents. Further, and perhaps more interesting, we show th a t under some cir
cumstances, multi-agent opportunism can be effective even when th e agents are not
themselves capable of single-agent opportunism.

xni
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C h ap ter 1

In trodu ction
We have developed a framework for multi-agent opportunism for agents operating
in open, real-world multi-agent systems (MASs). Single-agent opportunism is the
ability of an agent to alter its pre-planned course of action to pursue a goal th a t
better achieves the agent’s or its designers’ objectives for its performance, based
upon a change in the environment or in the agent’s internal state— an opportunity
[Francis, 1997; Lawton, 1999, 2003]. M ulti-agent opportunism refers to the ability of
agents operating in an MAS to assist one another by recognizing and responding to
potential opportunities for each oth er’s goals.
Our interest in m ulti-agent opportunism stems from a desire to improve the
system-level performance and coordination of multi-agent systems operating in realworld environments. An MAS is a collection of individual agents operating in a com
mon environment coordinating their activities to enable th e performance of the group
to exceed the capabilities of any individual member [Nwana and Ndumu, 1999]. There
are many real-world problem domains for which multi-agent systems can provide su
perior solutions, including information systems [Shehory et ah, 1999], oceanographic
sampling [Turner and Turner, 2001; C urtin et ah, 1993], distributed sensor networks,
electricity distribution, and personal travel agents [Nwana and Ndumu, 1999]. Most
real-world MASs are necessarily open systems [Hewitt, 1991], in which the structure
of the system itself may change dynamically. The com ponent agents of an open MAS
may not be known in advance, can change over time, and are often heterogeneous
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[Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998].
T he real world is an extremely complex place, rife with uncertainty, and prone to
rapid change. Agents operating in a real-world domain need to be able to cope with
its lack of predictability. Real-world agents need to be capable of dealing with the
unexpected events th a t will occur as they carry out their tasks. While unexpected
events are often related to failures in an agent’s plan, or inaccurate knowledge in
an agent’s memory, they can also be opportunities for the agent. For example, an
unexpected event may present the opportunity to achieve a goal th a t was previously
unattainable. Similarly, real-world MASs can benefit from the ability to exploit op
portunities. These benefits include the ability for the MAS itself to better adapt to
its changing environment, the ability to ensure agents obtain critical information in
a timely fashion, and improvements in the overall performance of th e system.
Taking advantage of an opportunity is a difficult task even for an individual agent.
As summarized in Figure

1- 1 ,

the opportunity must first be recognized, the action

it facilitates m ust be determined, and the agent must decide w hether or not it is
appropriate to pursue the action at the current time [Francis, 1997]. For example,
suppose you happen across a stream while walking in the woods. You would first have
to decide if this event presents an opportunity by determ ining if you had some use for
the stream outside the scope of your current activity. This decision is often based on
the presence of opportunity cues, which are easily identifiable changes or conditions
in the environment th a t indicate a potential opportunity. If you were to recognize
the presence of a stream as an opportunity cue, you would then have to determine
what action the opportunity is related to, such as to quenching your th irst or washing
your hands. Finally, you would have to decide if it is currently appropriate to take
advantage of this opportunity. For example, it would probably not be appropriate to
stop for a drink while being chased by a bear.

Reproduced witfi permission of tfie copyrigfit owner. Furtiier reproduction proiiibited w itiiout permission.

.

Recognize
Potential
Opportunity

,

Recognized
Opportunity Cue
Determine
Facilitated Action

/ " Ignore\
N Opportunity j

None
Found
Decide if Pursuit
is Appropriate

f

Ig n o re\
J

No

N Opportunity

Yes
Respond to
Opportunity

Figure 1-1: Decision Framework for Single-Agent O pportunism

The exploitation of opportunities by agents operating in an MAS is an even more
complicated process. In addition to exploiting opportunities for themselves, agents
in an MAS must also be capable of recognizing if a given event or situation may be
an opportunity for a goal of another agent in the system, or even for a shared group
goal. If an agent believes it has recognized an opportunity for another member of
the MAS, it must first decide w hether it should notify the other agent, or handle the
opportunity itself by taking some action on behalf of the other agent. For example, if
an agent happens across an object it knows another agent is looking for, it can notify
the other agent of the ob ject’s location, or it might be able to acquire the object and
deliver it to the other agent. To avoid conflicts, though, an agent would probably
need to coordinate w ith the other agent before taking action on its behalf.
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To further complicate m atters, it is possible th a t more th an one agent will simulta
neously recognize a potential opportunity. If the agents respond to the opportunity by
simply notifying the interested agent, then the agent receiving this notification must
be capable of handling multiple notifications of the same event or situation. O th
erwise, the response would almost certainly require coordination of actions among
the agents involved. Continuing the above example, suppose two agents each find an
object a third agent is looking for. As long as they each coordinate with the third
agent, th a t agent can decide which should actually acquire and deliver the object.
This approach also works even if the agents find different (but equivalent) objects.
Each of the decisions described above could require agents in an MAS to share
a significant am ount of information about each other. Because of this, our research
has concentrated on addressing the critical knowledge-sharing and decision-making
processes th a t are necessary for multi-agent opportunism .
focused on the question:

In particular, we have

Can multi-agent opportunism he effective in systems of

heterogeneous agents with little or no shared knowledge? T h a t is, can open, real-world
multi-agent systems benefit from being able to recognize and respond to opportunities
for each other’s goals? Or will the lack of shared inform ation be too restrictive to allow
cost-effective opportunistic assistance? We have developed a framework for m ulti
agent opportunism th a t assumes a minimal am ount of shared knowledge.

Based

on experiments using an im plem entation of this framework, we show th a t m ulti
agent opportunism can indeed be effective even when the agents have only limited
information about each other’s capabilities. Further, through the empirical analysis
described in C hapter 7, we quantify the effectiveness of m ulti-agent opportunism , as
well as the lim itation on the shared inform ation, in the context of a specific class of

MAS.
A second, related question th a t we have explored is: Are agents that are capable

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

o / eipZoztmg opporfüMÜzeg /o r

ako capoble, üamg f/ie aame mec/ianwrna,

0 / recogMîzmg 0M(f reapomdmg to oppoTfu7i%f%ea /o r otAer ogenta, gwem f/iot f/iey /tore

adequate knowledge of each other? Our framework for m ulti-agent opportunism de
scribed in this dissertation supports this conjecture. It provides agents with these
capabilities, and, based on it, we are able define “adequate knowledge.” Further, we
have determ ined th a t under some circumstances, we can obtain multi-agent oppor
tunism even when the agents are not capable of single-agent opportunism.
The contributions of this research are both theoretical and practical.

On the

theoretical side, our framework for multi-agent opportunism provides the basis for an
analysis of the critical issues th a t must be addressed in order to successfully exploit
opportunities in a multi-agent system.

These critical issues involve the type and

degree of knowledge the agents must share, as well as the decision-making capabilities
they m ust possess. This analysis can provide MAS designers and developers im portant
guidance to incorporate multi-agent opportunism into their own systems.

It also

provides the fundam ental underpinnings of our own specific approach to multi-agent
opportunism.
On the practical side, we have developed, im plem ented and evaluated a specific ap
proach to multi-agent opportunism for a particular class of m ulti-agent system. Our
approach enables systems of planning agents coordinated through a middle agent
(e.g., a matchmaker or a broker) [Klusch and Sycara, 2001] to opportunistically assist
one another achieve their goals, thus improving the overall system performance. We
have achieved this by combining a particular form of single-agent opportunism known
as predictive encoding [Patalano et ah, 1991] w ith an approxim ate decision-theoretic
planning mechanism th a t allows the agents to make critical inform ation-sharing de
cisions. The planning mechanism uses a new abstract plan representation, Partial
Order Plan Graphs (PO PG s), th a t we developed specifically to support multi-agent
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opportunism . While the PO PG representation was designed for this research project,
it is still general enough to represent the features of most (if not all) techniques used
in the area of classical (i.e., STRIPS-based [Pikes and Nilsson, 1971]) AI domainindependent planning [Smith, 2003].
We believe the contributions made by this approach are im portant for two key
reasons.

First, it should be applicable to many existing MASs.

This is because

we have leveraged well-understood technologies from the fields of AI planning (e.g.,
[Weld, 1999]) and MAS coordination (especially through middle agents) (e.g., [Wong
and Sycara, 2000]), as well as the area of single-agent opportunism (discussed in
Section 3.2). Second, our approach dem onstrates th a t MASs can benefit from m ulti
agent opportunism even when the agents share little or no common knowledge of
such things as plans, goals, and capabilities. This is because we have started from an
assumption th a t the agents will not be homogeneous, in th a t they will possess different
capabilities and th a t it is likely they will have been created by different software
developers. As such, we can make no guarantees on the am ount and type of shared
knowledge the agents possess, so we assume th a t they would possess little or no shared
knowledge at all. Our results thus provide a baseline, dem onstrating th a t performance
improvements can still be achieved even w ith these restrictive assumptions.
The rem ainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. C hapter 2 provides
motivating examples of how opportunities could be exploited in MASs. These exam
ples are used throughout the rest of this dissertation to illustrate various points. In
Chapter 3 we review existing work in opportunism , including well-known approaches
to single-agent opportunism. In the next four chapters, we describe our framework
for multi-agent opportunism .

In C hapter 4 we present an analysis of the critical

information-sharing and decision-making issues th a t m ust be addressed by any ap
proach to exploiting opportunities in an MAS. In C hapters 5 and

6

we describe our
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specific approach to multi-agent opportunism for systems of planning agents.

In

C hapter 7 we present an empirical analysis of the im pact th a t our approach to m ulti
agent opportunism has on the performance of a particular class of MAS. In Chapter
8,

we discuss how our framework could be applied to other classes of MASs. Finally,

in C h ap ter 9 we summarize the results of this research and compare our approach
to other research areas th a t are related to multi-agent opportunism . We conclude by
providing directions for future research for our framework.
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C h ap ter 2

E xam ple Scenarios
In this chapter we present two example scenarios in which the agents are able to
opportunistically assist one another satisfy their goals. These examples are used to
illustrate our points throughout the rest of this dissertation. Note th a t in this chap
ter we only present the domains along with some specific examples of opportunistic
behavior w ithin them. The mechanisms used by the agents to achieve this behavior
will be explained in detail in the remainder of this dissertation.

2.1

E xam ple Scenario 1 - P la n eta ry R overs

Our first example domain is based on the standard planning benchm ark domain
Rovers, inspired by the planning problems for NASA’s M ars Rovers, and used in

International Planning Competition (IPC-2002) [Fox and Long, 2002]. The domain
consists of a collection of agents (rovers) th a t can navigate the surface of a planet,
perform scientific tasks, and communicate inform ation back to a stationary lander.
For this example, consider a scenario in which a group of rovers is performing
various tasks in a working area consisting of 25 waypoints, arranged at the cells of a
5 x 5 grid (see Figure 2-1). Each rover can travel among the waypoints and perform
scientific tasks such as soil sampling, rock sampling, and taking pictures of objects
of interest if they are visible from the rover’s current location. We will assume th a t
rovers can only travel to the 13 waypoints shown in w hite in Figure 2-1 (i.e., the
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Agent-0
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Agent-3
Figure 2-1: Workspace partitioning for Rovers example MAS.
12 grey waypoints are inaccessible). There are thus a to tal of 65 different goals in
this scenario th a t can be assigned to the rovers, namely 13 rock samplings (at the
accessible locations), 13 soil samplings, and 13 objects to be photographed, where
each picture can be taken at three different levels of quality.
In this scenario we will also assume there are four rover agents, A i,. .. , A 4 , with
partially overlapping capabilities. The working area is divided into 4 partially over
lapping regions (see Figure 2-1), one for each agent. Each rover agent can only travel
within its designated 3 x 4 area, and thus can only be assigned goals for waypoints in
this region. The goals th a t can be assigned to a rover Aj constitute its capabilities Q ,
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and these are restricted to the sub-area in which this rover can travel. Each agent is
thus capable of performing some 35 (of the 65) goals. At the beginning of each plan
ning/execution cycle, each agent is assigned a set of goals Gi from its capabilities (i.e.,
Gi Ç Q ) such th a t no goals are assigned to more than one agent (i.e.,

Q = 0).

The agents each plan for their individual sets of goals and then execute th a t plan.
For this example we will assume th a t the agents’ activities are coordinated through
the use of a middle agent, or more specifically a task broker [Klusch and Sycara, 2001],
B. As each agent comes on line, it registers its capabilities w ith the broker B. As
noted above, in this example an agent’s capabilities are descriptions of the goals it
can satisfy. This is used to simplify the decision-making process of the broker. In
this research, we are not concerned with the broker’s actual decision process or the
details of its implementation. In general, however, a capability description language
such as LARKS [Sycara et ah, 1999], CDL [Wickler, 1998], or DAML-S [Ankolekar
et ah,

2 0 0 1 ],

would likely be needed.

As a specific example of how agents could opportunistically assist one another in
this scenario, suppose th a t rover Aq is assigned the goal go = h av e-ro ck -sam p le (WP7),
but is unable to accomplish this goal (perhaps because it has insufficient resources).
If Ao believes th a t there are other rover agents in the area th a t are also capable
of taking this sample, it can ask them to try to satisfy this goal opportunistically.
One way to accomplish this would work as follows; when Aq suspends go, it would
contact the broker, B, and request a list of agents, L, whose capability sets include
h av e-ro ck -sam p le (WP7)h If we assume all of the agents are capable of taking rock
samples, then from Figure 2-1 we can see th a t L = {Ag, A^, A 3 }. Aq would notify
each of these agents (excluding itself, of course) th a t it has suspended its assigned
^W hile c ap a b ilitie s like th ese w ould n o rm ally be re p re se n te d w ith v a ria b le s (e.g., h a v e -r o c k -sa m p le (X )),
we have p ro p o sitio n a liz ed th e m here for sim plicity.

10
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goal qq. Such a notification could be in the form of a message similar to the FIPA
r e q u e s t - i f directive [FIPA, 2002], which in this context would be interpreted by

the receiving agents as a request to incorporate the suspended goal into their current
plans if possible, and satisfy it if an opportunity to do so arises.
Alternatively, if the broker B has been designed to support multi-agent oppor
tunism , Ao could simply notify B th a t it is suspending g^. B would determine which
other agents are capable of satisfying go, and itself notify these other agents of the sus
pended goal as described above. This approach would reduce the number of messages
th a t would be needed to disseminate the request for opportunistic assistance.
Now suppose th a t the goal gi = have-rock-sam ple(W P12) has been assigned to
rover A i. Since Ai will be close to WP7 when it is satisfying g\, if it has sufficient
resources it could adjust its intentions and satisfy go- It might do this by augmenting
its current plan to take a detour to WP7 and take a rock sample there. If and when
Ai does satisfy go, it would notify Aq th a t it has taken action its behalf. Aq would
then notify the other agents in A th a t the suspended goal had been satisfied. Alter
natively, if the broker is being used for indirect notification, B could be informed of
go's satisfaction, requiring it to notify th e other agents.
Note th a t in this example the agents respond to opportunities to accomplish one
another’s suspended goals by simply satisfying them and notifying the original th a t it
has done so. In this domain this is a reasonable response, since redundant satisfaction
of the goals does not cause conflicts. In other domains further coordination may be
required. O ther response options will be discussed in Section 4.2.2.

11
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2.2

E xam p le Scenario 2 - A uton om ou s O ceanographic
Sam pling N etw orks

The second scenario, adapted from examples of Turner and Turner [2001, 1999, 1998]
and C happell et al. [1997], is taken from the domain of autonomous oceanographic
sampling networks (AOSNs) [Curtin et ah, 1993]. AOSNs are m ulti-robot systems
designed to collect data from the ocean over long periods of time. They are com
posed of a variety of Vehicle and Instrum ent Platform s (VIPs), which are mobile
and non-mobile platforms th a t support various data-gathering instrum ents. While
we use examples from this scenario throughout this dissertation, we have not directly
implem ented our framework in this domain. In C hapter

8,

however, we do discuss

the key differences between this domain and the Rovers example, as well as how our
framework for multi-agent opportunism could be applied.
One way of controlling an AOSN is to treat it as an MAS [Turner and Turner,
1998]. We should stress th a t our main interest in this example is the characteristics
of the MAS, which itself is only one particular example of how an MAS could be used
to support an AOSN. We have selected this particular example because it exemplifies
the use of a particular class of MAS in a real-world domain.
For this scenario, assume there is a collection of agents assigned to accomplish
the following tasks: ( 1 ) to characterize the tem perature and salinity of a volume of
water, which we will call the b a c k g r o u n d -su r v e y -ta sk , (2 ) to make a detailed survey
of convective overturns (i.e., CONVEX events [Bub et ah, 1997]) when they occur,
called the CONVEX-task, (3) to characterize the magnetic fields along the bottom
(m a g n e tic -su r v e y -ta sk ), and (4) to collect rocks from areas th a t are unusually

magnetic ( r o c k - c o lle c t io n - t a s k ) .
We will further assume th a t the agents are realized as the hardware and control
software of several VIPs.

These V IPs include two highly maneuverable but slow

12
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Mooring-Baker

Mooring-Charlie
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Mooring-Delta

AUV-1

CONVEX

R ad io , ^
a c o u s tic -lin k

^ D P S , acoustic-linkT
C T D , tra n sit, m anage

c o n v e x -s e n s o r
a c o u s tic -lin k

EAVE-Arista
EAVE-Ariel
C D P S , aco ustic-link,
s u rv e y -m a g n eto m ete r,
C T D , transit, m anage

C D P S , a co u stic -lin k ,
s u rv e y -m a g n e to m e te r
c o lle c t-sa m p le s,
C T D , tra n sit, m anage

Figure 2-2: AOSN-Layout (A dapted from [Turner et al., 1997]).

Experim ental Autonomous Vehicles (EAVEs) [Blidberg and Chappell, 1986], A r i e l
and A r i s t a , one lo n g -ra n g e autonomous underw ater vehicle (AUV), A U V -1, three
navigational moorings. A b l e , B a k e r , and C h a r l i e , one communications mooring,
D e l t a , a n d o n e C O N V E X - m o o r i n g [Bub et ah, 1997]. See Figure 2-2 for more

information.
The CONVEX-task can be further broken down into a CG NV EX -detection-task and
a CONVEX-survey-task. The CONVEX-survey-task can only begin after a CONVEX
event has been detected, and will involve several agents capable of performing a CTDsurvey. The CTD-survey capability means th a t the agent is able to take conductivity
(from which salinity can be determ ined), tem perature and depth (CTD) measure
ments in a volume of water. In the b a c k g r o u n d -su r v e y -ta sk , we will assume th a t
each agent will survey a given volume of water, returning to a communications moor
ing regularly to download the collected data. We will also assume th a t each agent will
13
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perform some simple anomaly detection on the d ata before downloading it. Finally,
the m a g n e tic -s u r v e y -ta s k will require agents capable of taking magnetic readings
with a m agnetom eter in a volume of water (survey-magnetometer capability), while
the r o c k - c o l l e c t i o n - t a s k will require agents w ith both survey-magnetometer and
collect-samples capabilities.
Before the agents actually begin operation, one is selected to generate a plan for
accomplishing the mission (b a ck grou n d -su rvey-task , CONVEX-task, m a g n etics u r v e y -t a s k and r o c k - c o lle c t io n - t a s k ) . The planner agent decomposes the as

signed tasks into subtasks, and uses this information to determine the group’s tasklevel organization (TLO) [Turner and Turner, 2001, 1999, 1998]. The TLO is an
organization of roles with assigned tasks, w ith specific agents assigned to those roles.
The TLO is used by the agents to coordinate their operational activities. In this
example, the TLO is structured as a simple hierarchy, although other organizational
structures are possible. The roles in the TLO are either labor roles, which are as
signed tasks th a t actually do something in the world, or m anagement roles, which are
assigned tasks to manage labor roles or other m anagem ent roles. In the hierarchy,
labor roles occur at the leaves, while the m anagement roles are the interior nodes (or
the root). Figure 2-3 shows a possible TLO structure for our example scenario.
After the planning process, assume th a t the planner has assigned the following
tasks to agents: The CO NV EX -detection-task to the CONVEX-MOORING (leaving
the CONVEX-survey-tasks unassigned); the b a c k g r o u n d -su r v e y -ta sk s to EA V EARIEL, E A V E - A r ist a , and A U V -1; the m a g n e tic -s u r v e y -ta s k is assigned to the
EAVEs, and the r o c k - c o l le c t i o n - t a s k to EAVE-ARIEL.

We will assume th a t

the EAVEs both have survey-magnetometer capabilities, but only E A V E -A riel has
collect-samples capabilities. Also, we will assume th e planner has assigned volumes of
water to the background-survey agents such th a t A U V -1 is surveying the upper 50%

14
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of th e volume, and the EAVEs are each surveying half of the remaining “bottom ”
volume (25% of the total volume each). The planner has also determined (or is told)
th a t two other mission-related tasks are needed: a lo n g - b a s e lin e - n a v ig a t io n a l
(LBL) task, which it assigns to MOORING-Ab l e , M o o r in g - B a k e r , and M o o r in g C h a r l ie , and a c o m m u n ic a tio n s-re la y -ta sk , which it assigns to M o o r in g - D elta .

As a specific example of multi-agent opportunism in this scenario, suppose th a t
E A V E - A r ie l has suspended its r o c k - c o l le c t i o n - t a s k while it is performing its
b a ck g ro u n d -su rv ey -ta sk , and th a t E A V E - ARISTA has begun its m a g n e tic -su r v e y ta sk . If E A V E - A r is ta knows about EAVE-ARIEL'S suspended r o c k - c o l l e c t i o n ta sk , or more directly th a t EAVE-ARIEL has a suspended task th a t is missing knowl

edge ab o u t the locations of unusual magnetic readings, E A V E - A r is ta could notify
EAVE-ARIEL if it discovers any such readings. E A V E - A r ie l would then have to
determ ine if it should suspend its current b a c k g r o u n d -su r v e y -ta sk to take advan
tage of this opportunity, or to cache this knowledge for later. Note th a t in this case
E A V E - A r is ta is unable to collect rock samples on E A V E - A r ie l’s behalf, since it
does not possess the collect-samples capability.

16
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C h ap ter 3

O p p ortu n ism in P lan n in g A gen ts
In this chapter we present background information on opportunism . We first present
various definitions of opportunities and opportunism th a t are generally accepted in
the literature. We then briefly review existing approaches to exploiting opportunism
in agents th a t use plans to achieve their goals.

3.1

D efinitions

Ju st w hat constitutes an opportunity is not always clear. Very few authors have even
attem pted to define opportunities or opportunism , leaving it tacit. From the way it is
used in the literature, we have identified two prominent views of w hat an opportunity
is. We thus claim th a t an opportunity can be defined by one of the following:
1.

A situation or condition favorable for th e attainm ent of a goal, or

2.

An unexpected change in the world th a t requires a response outside the scope
of the current activity [Francis, 1997].

A subtle but key difference between these definitions is th a t the second focuses on
a specific event which changes the current state of the environment, while the first is
only concerned with the state, not how or when it got there. In addition, as the term
is commonly used, opportunities are expected to be positive in nature, and are often
unexpected, leading to a sense of serendipity.
17
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We th u s define opportunism as: The ability to exploit an opportunity by altering a
pre-p/oMned courae 0/ action to pursue a d%_^ereut poaZ, bosed ou some c/toupe m t/ie
environm ent or in the agent’s internal state [Francis, 1997; Lawton, 1999, 2003].
Considering these definitions, there are a number of different views of w hat kinds
of situations or events are actually considered opportunities. From the way they have
been used in the literature, we have identified the following types of opportunities
th a t an agent might encounter. We simply list these types here. We will explain how
each has been exploited in Section 3.2.
• Satisfaction of suspended goals: An event or situation th a t might allow a sus
pended goal to be satisfied [Birnbaum and Collins, 1984; Francis, 1997; Ham
mond et ah, 1993; Patalano et ah, 1991; Simina and Kolodner, 1995; Pryor,
1996; Pryor and Collins, 1992; Simina et ah, 1997, 1998]. A suspended goal is
one th a t cannot be fit into an agent’s current agenda, and is thus postponed
rath er than abandoned [Schank and Abelson, 1977; Patalano et ah, 1991]. It
may also be a goal th a t the agent intends to achieve later in its plan, but can
be satisfied early if an appropriate situation is encountered.
Example: While performing a critical oceanographic sampling mission, an au
tonomous underw ater vehicle’s (AUV) power level drops below a certain
threshold th a t causes a goal for recharging to be activated. The AUV de
cides th at, because the recharging source is too far away, it cannot pursue
the new goal until it finishes the current mission, and so suspends it. D ur
ing the mission, though, a support vessel enters the area where the AUV
is working, presenting an opportunity to recharge before completing the
current mission.
• Execution of standing orders (e.g., repeating goals): An event or situation th a t
allows for the satisfaction of goals th a t can be accomplished repeatedly as condi18
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tions arise [Fasciano, 1996; Fiayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979; Hammond et al.,
1996; Turner and Turner, 1998].
Example: An AUV is told to always take a soil sample when entering a new
port. The AUV enters Boston Harbor, where it has never been before,
presenting an opportunity to take a soil sample in the new port.
Learning from failure: A failure in a plan or action can be an opportunity to
learn [Fasciano, 1996; Hammond et ah, 1996].
Example: An AUV is given a mission to collect samples from a volume of
water where there is a strong current. It plans a sampling p attern th a t
follows the direction of flow of the current. However, th e current carries
the AUV away from the sampling region before it completes its mission. It
recognizes the plan failure, re-plans the mission to collect the samples while
traveling against the current, and takes advantage of this opportunity to
learn by storing the failed and successful plan in its memory.
Learning n ew /b etter m ethod for future goal: An event or situation may point
out a n ew /b etter way to achieve a goal. This type of opportunity applies to
future goals, which may never come up [Simina and Kolodner, 1995; Simina
et al., 1997, 1998].
Example: An AUV successfully completes a mission to take samples in a vol
ume of w ater where there is a strong current, using a sampling p attern
th a t goes against the current. Later, the AUV observes another AUV th a t
performs a similar sampling mission in less time by using a sampling p a t
tern th a t goes across the current. It takes advantage of this opportunity
to learn by storing the new plan in its memory.

19

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

• Searched-for situation: A situation o r condition th a t could lead to the attain 
m ent of some goal th a t occurs while it is specifically being searched for. During
th e search, however, it is not known if the situation or condition actually exists,
or how it will manifest itself [Birnbaum and Collins, 1984; Fasciano, 1996; Fran
cis, 1997; Hammond et al., 1996; Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979; Simina and
Kolodner, 1995; Simina et ah, 1997, 1998].
Example: An AUV is sampling a volume of water th a t is divided by a reef. It
begins by taking samples on one side of the reef, suspending the sampling
on the other side until it finds a way across. While it is taking samples
along the reef, it finds a tunnel, allowing it to pass through the reef and
complete its sampling task.

From these descriptions one can see th a t there are a number of different ways for
an agent to take advantage of certain changes or conditions in its environment. In
the next section we present several m ethods for an agent to exploit the various types
of opportunities described above for its own goals.

3.2

Single-A gent O pportunism

The ability to exploit opportunities can be extremely beneficial to, and possibly even
necessary for, planning agents for their correct functioning [Hammond et al., 1993;
Francis, 1997]. There are a number of different approaches to enable an agent to
recognize and exploit opportunities for its own goals (i.e., single-agent opportunism ).
They can, h o w e v e r, be broken into three general classes: active approaches, passive
approaches, and hybrid active/passive approaches. In this section we discuss these
general approaches, using specific example systems taken from the literature.

20
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3.2 .1

A c tiv e A pproaches

W hen using an active approach to opportunism , some sort of process actively watches
for a situation in which it can achieve its assigned goal or task. Systems employing
an active approach tend to follow the first definition of opportunism given in Section
3.1, focusing primarily on the opportunity recognition problem. Notable examples
of systems using an active approach to opportunism include the blackboard-based
opportunistic planning system of Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth [1979], the active goals
model proposed by Birnbaum and Collins [1984], and the opportunistic learning sys
tem included in MAYOR [Fasciano, 1996; Hammond et al., 1996], a real-time player
of the SimCity simulation game.
The most significant advantage of an active approach to opportunism is th a t it is
capable of recognizing any of the opportunity types described above in Section 3.1, al
though implementations have focused on the searched-for situation opportunity type.
T h at is, instead of watching for changes in th e environment th a t may indicate an op
portunity, the active processes examine th e current state of the environment, watching
for conditions favorable to the satisfaction of pending goals or tasks. However, this
opportunity type can subsume the other types: the active processes may look for
any state or condition desired, be it for the satisfaction of a task or goal (current or
suspended), the execution of standing o rd e rs , or the chance to learn.
Further, agents using an active approach to opportunism are capable of exploiting
execution-time opportunities [Hammond et ah, 1993; Pryor, 1996; Pryor and Collins,
1992; Simina and Kolodner, 1995], as opposed to opportunities th a t occur at planning
time. One way plans are used for controlling an agent’s activity is to separate the
development of a complete plan from th e execution of th a t plan. The first phase
is referred to as planning-time, while the second is known as e x e c u tio n -tim e . The
ability to exploit execution-time opportunities is especially im portant in real-world
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environments, since th a t is when many opportunities will occur. The approaches de
veloped by [Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979] and [Birnbaum and Collins, 1984] did
not include an execution component, and thus only considered planning-time oppor
tunities. However, systems such as MAYOR (above) and IM PROVISOR (discussed
in Section 3.2.3) do use an active approach for noticing and exploiting execution-time
opportunities.
A final im portant capability of systems using an active approach is th a t they may
be able to identify novel opportunities—those th a t may provide nonstandard solu
tions b u t th a t were not specifically predicted [Wills and Kolodner, 1994; Simina and
Kolodner, 1995]—because they need not anticipate every situation for the satisfaction
of pending tasks or goals. To do this, the features being watched for by the active
processes must be described abstractly enough to m atch any condition th a t might
present an opportunity.
The core idea behind the active approaches—th a t active processes continuously
watch the environment for opportunities—has been criticized as being an unlikely ex
planation of hum an opportunity recognition [Hammond et al., 1993; Patalano et al.,
1991]. There are two key arguments behind this criticism. First, the idea is considered
unlikely because of the com putational demands: it is simply not com putationally fea
sible to constantly watch every aspect of the environment looking for opportunities.
This problem is exacerbated when considering novel opportunities, since the compu
tational load would be increased even more if a reasoner would have to make deep
inferences about every observed environm ental feature. Second, the active approach
is not considered cognitively plausible. This is because of the cognitive resources th a t
would be required, as described above, as well as because it does not take into ac
count the fact th a t people regularly fail to recognize potential opportunities. A final,
more subtle, problem with the active approach is th a t it lacks the intuitive sense of
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serendipity generally associated with opportunity recognition in humans.
However, none of these arguments are compelling for artificial systems operating
in real-world domains. It is certainly likely th a t using active processes to continuously
watch th e environment for opportunities would have high com putational demands in
artificial systems, just as it does in people. It is not clear, though, th a t these de
mands would be beyond the capabilities of the computer. In fact the existence of
complex systems such as MAYOR dem onstrate th a t an active approach to oppor
tunism is com putationally feasible under some circumstances. Similarly, cognitive
plausibility and a lack of serendipity are not im portant for artificial systems. Cogni
tive plausibility can be im portant for dealing with poorly understood activities, such
as opportunity recognition, th a t humans are often very good at performing. Under
such circumstances, emulating the way people deal w ith these activities may lead
to an efficient approach for artificial systems. This does not mean, however, th a t a
cognitively plausible approach is necessarily the best approach for a com putational
system. Further, a lack of serendipity may be im portant for explaining models of
opportunism in people (and may not be much more th an an introspective artifact for
th at, either), but is of little im portance to com putational systems.

3.2.2

P a ssiv e A pp roaches

Agents th a t utilize a passive approach to opportunism detect potential opportunities
during the normal course of their processing. They spend few or no com putational
resources looking for opportunities.

This does not mean th a t no com putation to

detect opportunities is performed. R ather, systems using a passive approach pre
determine the environmental cues th a t m ight indicate an opportunity for some goal
or task, and then use an efficient mechanism to detect these cues during the normal
course of processing.

23
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Systems th a t implement a passive approach to opportunism tend to subscribe to
the second definition of opportunism given in Section 3.1, which is the ability to alter
a pre-planned course of action to pursue a new goal, based on some change in the
environment.

As such, they require three particular capabilities for opportunistic

behavior: the ability to recognize an opportunity, the ability to suspend or modify
current goals or tasks to pursue an opportunity, and the ability to decide whether
or not to pursue an opportunity in the current context [Francis, 1997]. T he prim ary
focus of most research, however, has been placed on opportunity recognition, often
treating the latter two aspects incidentally.
Planning agents using a passive approach to opportunism are generally active
planners [Hammond et ah, 1993], which are a class of planners th a t bo th produce a
plan and then actively pursue and alter th a t plan in the face of a changing environ
ment. T h at is, they are planners th a t interleave planning and acting. Because active
planners are confronted with new goals during execution as well as during planning,
complete re-planning is often impossible, or at least undesirable. Instead the new
goals must be addressed by the planning system as they arise. Those goals th a t can
not be fit into the current, on-going agenda of plans are suspended—postponed, but
not abandoned—by the planner [Patalano et al., 1991].
A prominent m ethod of passive opportunism involves the predictive encoding
[Patalano et al., 1991] of suspended goals.

W ith predictive encoding, suspended

goals are associated at the time they are postponed with features of the environm ent
in which goal achievement would likely be possible, and attached to the plan compo
nents th a t may be associated with those features. It is considered predictive because
the features th a t indicate the relevance of a plan are anticipated and used to index
the goal [Patalano et ah, 1991]. W hen this happens, the planner m ust be able to
anticipate the conditions th a t will potentially lead to satisfaction of the suspended

24

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

goals. Thus, at planning time, it must have a clear idea of w hat an execution-time
opportunity will look like [Hammond et al., 1993].
Some notable examples of systems employing passive opportunism include the
UPS-like pickup/ delivery planner TRU CK ER [Hammond et ah, 1993], its followon errand-running planner RUNNER [Hammond et ah, 1996], and the autonomous
underw ater vehicle (AUV) control agent Orca [Turner and Turner, 1998; Lawton
et ah, 1999].
The most significant advantage of the passive approach is its com putational effi
ciency. Since opportunities are recognized through the reasoner’s normal reasoning
processes (e.g., plan execution), little additional run-time processing is required. Fur
ther, features such as plan preconditions and resource requirements can be used as
opportunity cues. As these features are explicitly represented in planning systems,
they are likely to be well defined, or a t least inferable, in the reasoner’s domain, thus
keeping the extra com putation tractable.
Unlike the active approach, we do believe the passive approach is cognitively
plausible. Predictive encoding has been shown to be a reasonable model for hum an
opportunity recognition [Patalano et al., 1991]. Also, unlike the active approach, the
passive approach accounts for missing opportunities, since predicting every feature
th a t could indicate a potential opportunity is a nearly impossible task in any realworld domain. Again, though, cognitive plausibility is an interesting, but not critical
quality in planning agents.
Finally, as with the active approaches, systems using a passive approach can take
advantage of execution-time opportunities.

In fact, since they interleave planning

and acting, these systems will necessarily exploit runtim e opportunities. As we noted
earlier, real-world environments tend to be highly dynamic and unpredictable, and
are likely to be filled with such execution-tim e opportunities. As such, th e ability
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to exploit these opportunities is very im portant for agents operating in this type of
domain.
The biggest drawback to the passive approach to opportunism is th a t the number
of opportunity types it can recognize is limited. In fact, the only opportunity type th a t
has been directly addressed by research into this form of opportunism is for satisfying
suspended goals. However, agents using predictive encoding could be augmented to
recognize the satisfaction of the standing orders opportunity type, by perm anently
suspending a repeating goal. By its nature, though, the passive approach essentially
precludes the recognition of the searched-for situation type opportunities.
A related and similarly im portant problem with this approach is th a t it requires
the reasoner to know in advance w hat th e execution-time opportunity cues might
be. This could require arbitrarily deep inferencing, depending upon the number and
type of possible cues the reasoner wishes to come up with. For example, suppose a
Rover agent has a goal of transm itting d a ta back to the lander, which is suspended on
the unm et precondition of being in line-of-sight with the lander. It might naturally
select locations where it knows it can see the lander as potential opportunity cues to
satisfy this goal. However, if it can reason th a t it could transm it the d ata to another
Rover agent, which could in tu rn relay th e d ata to the lander, it could then include
encountering another agent as an opportunity cue.

This reasoning could be very

com putationally complex, depending on how long the chain of inferences is th a t the
agent attem pts to make. Further, unless the cues are very abstractly specified (which
would make recognition difficult), this all b u t precludes the possibility of recognizing
novel opportunities, since by definition they are those events or conditions th a t could
not be pre-determined.
Finally, in spite of the fact th a t th e passive approach is significantly more compu
tationally efficient th an the active approach, it can, however, still be com putationally
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complex.

As mentioned above, pre-determining opportunity cues can be difficult.

Further, although much of the research has been focused on opportunity recognition,
this is only part of the problem. Once a reasoner determines th a t an event or condi
tion m ay present an opportunity, it must then determine exactly w hat the event or
condition may be an opportunity for, and whether it actually is an opportunity. If
the event or condition is determined to be an actual opportunity, the reasoner must
then determ ine if th a t opportunity should be pursued. Each of these decisions, which
are included naturally in the active approach to opportunism, may themselves require
significant inferencing.

3.2 .3

H yb rid A pp roaches

Systems using the active approach can recognize any type of opportunity, including
novel opportunities, but their com putational demands are not practical. Those using
a passive approach are com putationally efficient, but can only recognize opportunities
th a t have been previously considered.

There have been a num ber of attem pts at

finding a middle ground between th e extremes of these approaches, combining the
best aspects of each along with other unique ideas. In this section we discuss these
hybrid approaches.
IM PROVISER [Simina and Kolodner, 1995; Linda Wills and Janet Kolodner,
1994] is a reasoning system capable of recognizing opportunities in the domain of
creative design. ALEC [Simina et ah, 1997, 1998], essentially an extension of IM
PROVISER, examines long-term problem solving and creative design as modeled
after a case study of Bell’s invention of the telephone. Both systems combine pre
dictive encoding with a limited num ber of active goals in order to recognize both
anticipated and novel opportunities for suspended goals. By limiting the num ber of
active goals th a t are considered, these systems can deeply analyze new events w ith
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respect to just these goals, making the problem tractable.
The domain in which these systems are being applied does, however, simplify
the recognition problem. As such, while the approach may be sound, it might not be
generalizable to other, more complex environments. This is not to say design problems
are not complex. R ather, the simplicity here is in the use of physical objects as the
focus of recognition. Objects in general have well-defined, often easily recognizable
features and characteristics. A bstract situations found in many planning domains
are likely to have much less clearly identifiable features, requiring deeper analogical
reasoning to identify novel opportunities.
PAR ETO [Pryor, 1996; Pryor and Collins, 1992] is a planner for a pickup/ delivery
agent th a t utilizes a filtering mechanism for opportunity recognition for its active
goals. PA R ETO 's filtering mechanism is based on P ryor’s critical factor hypothesis,
which states th a t the presence of a single factor is often crucial for the existence of an
opportunity. The filtering process works by attaching reference features— labels for
general functional properties of objects, such as “sharp,” “absorbent” and “sturdy” —
to the representations of situation elements (objects found in th e environment), and to
pending goals. Pryor claims th a t reference features tend to be stable across situations,
as well as being highly predictive and cheap to recognize. As objects are encountered
in the world, their reference features are matched with those of pending goals. But,
even if the reference features of an object matches those of a pending goal, it does
not guarantee th a t encountering th a t object is an opportunity to satisfy th a t goal.
Thus, more detailed inferences m ust be made to determ ine if th e presence of the new
object does actually constitute an opportunity [Pryor, 1996].
The use of a filtering mechanism appears to be a reasonable approach to dealing
with the com putational complexity of opportunity recognition, especially for novel
opportunities, by reducing the num ber of potential opportunities the agent must
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consider. It is not without its problems, though. The critical factor hypothesis has
yet to be supported by any substantial study—its validity has been taken so far from
anecdotal evidence. Even assuming it is a valid hypothesis, it requires th e a priori
identification of reference features. This is the same lim itation th a t Pryor claims
predictive encoding has—the need for anticipated opportunity cues. If, however, a
generic set of reference features could be identified, it should be more com putationally
efficient th an determining opportunity cues for each goal individually. Further, Like
IM PROVISER and ALEC, P A R E T O ’s problem domain uses the features of physical
objects as its focus of opportunity recognition. The effects of this simplification are
perhaps even more pronounced in PARETO, considering th a t reference features have
been only defined w ith respect to physical objects. Identifying reference features for
abstract situations has not been examined, and could be considerably more difficult.
M OORE is the opportunistic memory subsystem of the memory-based reasoning
system Nicole [Francis, 1997], which is claimed to implement a complete theory of
agency. According to Francis, such a complete system m ust include a memory com
ponent capable of anytime, asynchronous retrieval based on the current context, a
problem solver th a t can integrate new information at any time, and a m eta-controller
th a t can select which task to pursue based upon some measure of th a t ta sk ’s util
ity. Further, in a system th a t implements a complete theory of agency, all reasoning
processes must either be opportunistic themselves, or must be able to participate in
opportunistic activity on the p art of th e agent’s overall reasoning system [Francis,
1997^
MOORE was designed to be a generic, cognitively plausible memory system. Con
text focusing is accomplished through the use of a unified blackboard system for all
reasoning, working memory, perception and action processes. Processing any oppor
tunity begins with a change to the blackboard, and any change in the blackboard.
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from any source, can represent a potential opportunity [Francis, 1997].
T hrough M OORE and Nicole, Francis has certainly addressed a number of key
issues of potential im portance to passive opportunistic systems, including anytime,
asynchronous retrieval, context sensitivity, and the need for both internal and external
retrieval cues. Like Pryor, Francis points out the need for a reasoner to be capable
of determ ining when a potential opportunity should be pursued. One should note,
however, th a t although these issues have not been specifically addressed by systems
like RUNNER and TRUCKER, it would be possible for passive opportunistic systems
to include these capabilities. For example, the reasoners discussed in Section 3.2.2
use a working memory as a repository for both recording external environmental
changes as well as the results of internal com putations. As such, changes to values in
working memory could be used as opportunity cues, in a m anner similar to th a t used
in M OOREs central blackboard.
It should also be noted th a t, while not specifically addressed, these shortcomings
are already handled implicitly by systems using an active approach to opportunism .
Recall th a t in such systems the active processes are constantly watching th e environ
ment for situations or events th a t present opportunities for the achievement of their
given tasks or goals. Any given process can react asynchronously to other processes
in the system. Further, the active processes can watch for any feature internal or
external. For example, the items posted to the central d ata structures in bo th the
Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth model (i.e., the blackboard) and in AIAYOR (i.e., the
agenda) represent external environm ental features as well the results of internal in
ferences. These structures also already represent the operating environment, making
the systems context sensitive as well. Finally, the decision as to when to pursue an
opportunity is also necessarily handled by the active processes; whenever the situa
tion is deemed appropriate by an active process, as determ ined by w hatever criteria
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the process has programmed into it, the corresponding task or goal is pursued.

3.3

M ulti-A gent O pportunism

To the best of our knowledge, there are no other research efforts th a t have studied
or are currently studying m ulti-agent opportunism. There are a few projects th a t
are examining some opportunistic methods in the context of m ulti-agents systems.
There are also a number of projects th a t have studied related problems, as well as
those th a t have inherent opportunistic capabilities, including coalition formation in
m ulti-agent systems, agent coordination through plan merging, and team formation
in systems of agents. We review this related work later in Section 9.2, where we are
able to discuss it in the context of our own approach.

3.4

Sum m ary

In this chapter we have defined the ideas of opportunities and opportunism th a t are
generally accepted in the literature, and we have briefly reviewed existing approaches
to single-agent opportunism in planning agents. In the next chapter, we present our
general model for multi-agent opportunism , including a description of the types of
opportunities th a t might arise in an MAS and a discussion of th e difficult problems
th a t must be addressed to achieve m ulti-agent opportunism .
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C h ap ter 4

M u lti-A g en t O p p ortu n ism
In this chapter we present our general framework for m ulti-agent opportunism. In
particular we discuss the various types of opportunities th a t an agent might encounter
while operating in an MAS th a t would not otherwise be encountered if the agent were
working alone. We also discuss the critical issues at the crux of th e problem; the
information-sharing and decision-making issues th a t the agents m ust address to be
able to provide opportunistic assistance to one another.
We begin our discussion with a set of assumptions about the agents and the m ulti
agent systems for our framework for multi-agent opportunism . These assumptions
are;
1. We are working with an open m ulti-agent system, made up of a collection of
heterogeneous agents, and operating in a real-world domain, th a t is capable of
accomplishing tasks in the given domain. This assum ption is essentially a base
line for the problem, and covers such things as; a task-allocation mechanism
exists, the capabilities of the various individual agents and th e resources avail
able are sufficient for the given tasks, etc. While we are assuming the MAS is
capable of accomplishing the assigned tasks, we are not assuming th a t all such
tasks do indeed get accomplished. T h at is, there may be situations where tasks
are suspended and never completed.
2. The agents are able to communicate effectively w ith one another. This implies
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th a t the agents will understand the tasks, goals, and opportunity cues, etc. th a t
are communicated to them.
3. T he agents in the MAS are cooperative. We are assuming th a t the agents will
cooperate with one another whenever possible, and th a t they will not inten
tionally interfere with one another. However, they are still free to refuse task
requests.
4. T he agents may have little or no knowledge in common about each oth er’s
capabilities, goals, plans, etc. This assumption makes explicit the lack of shared
knowledge implied by assuming an open system of heterogeneous agents (above).
This also represents a significant difference between this model and more formal
teamwork models (e.g., [Tambe, 1997; Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Jennings,
1995; Grosz and Sidner, 1990; Grosz and Kraus, 1996]), which assume th a t the
agents have a great deal of knowledge in common.
5. A subset of the agents in the MAS are capable of single-agent opportunism .
Specifically, we are assuming th a t agents can exploit opportunities for sus
pended goals. This implies th a t at least some of the agents can suspend their
own tasks/goals, recognize opportunities for the accomplishment of these sus
pended tasks/goals, and respond to those opportunities by re-examining and
possibly resuming the suspended tasks/goals. We are not assuming any partic
ular approach to single-agent opportunism , ju st th a t some of the agents have
the capability.

4.1

M ulti-A gent O pportunities

An opportunistic agent working alone needs only to be capable of exploiting op
portunities for its own goals. The traditional approaches to opportunism , such as
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Figure 4-1: Workspace partitioning for Rovers MAS. (R epeated from Fig. 2-1)
opportunistic memory [Hammond et al., 1993] or active goals [Birnbaum and Collins,
1984], specifically address exploiting this type of opportunity. These approaches are
surveyed in Section 3.2 and summarized in Figure 1-1.
Agents operating in multi-agent systems, however, should also be capable of rec
ognizing and responding to opportunities related to the goals of other agents in the
MAS. In order for an agent to recognize this type of opportunity, it has to know
something about w hat the other agents are doing. This presum ably means knowing
about the other agents’ current tasks and goals—both suspended and on-going— or
at least about the cues th a t m ight identify an opportunity for th e other agents’ tasks
and goals.
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For example, consider the planetary rovers scenario from Section 2.1. Suppose
rover Aq is assigned the goal go = h ave-rock -sam p le (WPll) (i.e., obtain a rock
sample from waypoint

1 1 ),

but is unable to accomplish this goal (perhaps because it

has insufficient resources). Further suppose th a t rover A% has been assigned the goal
Qi = h ave-rock-sam p le(W P 12) . Since Ai will be close to WPll when it is satisfying
gi (see Figure 4-1), i f i t knows th a t A q has suspended go, and if it has sufficient

resources, it could adjust its intentions and satisfy

go.

Similarly in the AOSN scenario, suppose th a t E A V E -A r ie l is given the goals
of performing the tem perature and salinity background survey as well as taking rock
samples in areas with unusual magnetic readings. If E A V E -A r ie l decides to work on
the su rvey g o a l, the rock sam pling g o a l will get suspended. If, however, EA V EARISTA knows about E A V E -A r ie l’s suspended rock sampling goal, then EA V EA r i s t a can also be looking for unusual magnetic readings. If it detects any, it can

notify E A V E -A r ie l of the location, and th a t agent can decide w hether or not to
pursue the opportunity.
There may be, however, suspended goals th a t an agent does not need to tell any
other agent about. For example, consider the following situation: after collecting
d ata for some time, one of the EAVEs enters a reduced-power state, causing a lowpriority goal, g^, to recharge its batteries to be generated.

Because this is not a

critical condition, g^ is suspended and the EAVE continues w ith its survey. Suppose,
though, th a t sometime later the EAVE is ordered to retu rn to M o o r in g - D elt A,
perhaps because the survey mission has been canceled. It can take advantage of this
opportunity—unexpectedly being at the mooring—to recharge its batteries (satisfying
gr), returning it to a normal power state.

There is no point in the EAVE telling

the other agents about its low-priority goal to recharge its batteries, since in this
example the only help they could provide is the location of the mooring (which we
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can assume the EAVE already knows). This implies th a t each agent would not just
want to arbitrarily broadcast knowledge about all of its goals to every other agents—a
selection process would have to occur. Making this decision could be very difficult
for an agent, however, since it may not have sufficient knowledge of w hat help the
other agents could provide (e.g., how would the EAVE know th a t no other agent can
assist it w ith g^?)- Designing a domain-independent selection process could thus be
difficult.
In addition, for the agents to be able to recognize all possible opportunities for
each other, it may not be sufficient for the agents to only know about each other’s
suspended goals. An agent might also need to know about another agent’s active
goals. An active goal is one an agent is currently making an effort to satisfy. There
are situations where other agents can provide opportunistic assistance w ith an active
goal, such as when an agent is searching for some object or environm ental condition.
For example, we know a C O N V E X

m o o ring

has as its prim ary (if not only) goal the

detection of convective overturns. But suppose an agent doing the background survey
detects a CONVEX event. T h at agent could notify the C O N V E X

m o o r in g ’s

task

manager about the event, which could make the normal response of redirecting some
agents to make a detailed survey of th a t region. As w ith suspended goals, a selection
process is needed to determ ine which active goals might benefit from opportunistic
assistance from other agents.
Finally, an agent operating in an MAS may also encounter a th ird type of oppor
tunity. This is an opportunity th a t relates to the satisfaction of a shared goal— one
th a t a subset of the agents are working together cooperatively to satisfy. For exam
ple, suppose a group of agents has been tasked with fixing up a playground, which
specifically involves picking up trash and painting a fence. Suppose further th a t the
paint for the fence has not yet arrived. The agents will all begin picking up trash.
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Figure 4-2: Decision Framework for M ulti-Agent O pportunism

suspending the fence painting until the paint is delivered. Picking up trash and paint
ing the fence are goals shared by the group. Suppose, however, th a t while picking up
trash around a storage shed one of the agents discovers some paint left over from a
previous job. This opportunity—the unexpected availability of paint— may allow the
suspended fence painting shared goal to be resumed earlier th an expected.
We believe th a t agents in a MAS can address opportunities for shared goals just as
they would address opportunities for some other agent’s goals, as long as at least one
of the agents has an explicit representation of the shared goal. We do not, however,
directly address opportunities for shared goals in this research.

4,2

Framework for M u lti-A gen t O pportunism

Our general framework for m ulti-agent opportunism is sum m arized in Figure 4-2. It
presents a natural extension of the framework for single-agent opportunism summa-
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rized in Figure 1-1, described in Chapter 1. We will presume th a t we are working
with a system of agents th a t meets the assumptions described at the beginning of
this chapter. Thus, to enable these agents to assist one another in the opportunis
tic achievement of their goals and tasks, our framework requires the addition of the
following two key capabilities:
1. The ability for one agent to recognize an opportunity for another agent’s task s/
goals. Just as with single-agent opportunism, the first step in exploiting an
opportunity is recognizing it.

The key to providing this ability in a multi

agent environment lies in providing a m ethod for the agents to obtain sufhcient
inform ation about each other’s goals, or at least w hat is im peding those goals.
2. The ability for an agent to respond to a recognized opportunity for another
agent’s goal. The key to providing this capability lies in endowing the agents
w ith appropriate decision-making processes so th a t they can determine when
and how to respond to recognized opportunities. The responses th a t we consider
are to simply notify one or more agents of the potential opportunity, or to take
some action on behalf of another agent in response to the opportunity.
Examining ways to provide these capabilities in m ulti-agent environments has
been central to this research. In the remainder of this chapter, we provide further
details on these capabilities, as well as describe the specific issues th a t would have to
be addressed by any approach to providing them. In C hapter

6

we present one such

approach, along with a description of how we addressed these key issues.

4.2.1

M u lti-A g en t O p p o rtu n ity R eco g n itio n

To enable agents to recognize potential opportunities for one another, we m ust provide
a mechanism th a t will to allow them to recognize opportunity cues for other agents.
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Recall th a t opportunity cues are easily identifiable changes or conditions in the en
vironm ent th a t indicate a potential opportunity. The agents could infer information
about th e goals and tasks (or conceivably even the opportunity cues themselves) of
other agents, and determine opportunity cues based on this inferred information.
Alternatively, the agents could explicitly share opportunity-related information with
one another. We will discuss each of these possibilities in turn.
One way the agents could infer opportunity-related inform ation would be if they
possess a great deal of shared knowledge about each other (e.g., their capabilities,
goals, plans, etc.). As discussed in Section 3.3, the agents might possess this degree
of shared knowledge if they are organized using a model of teamwork [Tambe, 1997;
Jennings, 1995; Grosz and Kraus, 1996]. Since each agent would know w hat every
other agent is doing, they could watch for opportunities for other agents. Similarly,
agents could infer missing inform ation about other agents by assuming they are ho
mogeneous and using information about their own capabilities, goals, plans, etc. We
do not, however, believe th a t either of these types of inference is realistic in an open,
real-world MAS because the agents are likely to be heterogeneous and would probably
not have sufficient knowledge in common about each other.
The agents could also infer information about each o th er’s goals and tasks using
a plan recognition mechanism. Generally speaking, agents using such a mechanism
could monitor each oth er’s activities and infer their plans and goals. Using this in
ferred information, one agent could then predict another agent’s needs for supporting
the goals it is pursuing, and assist in meeting those needs when possible. Further,
every agent in the MAS does not need to do the plan and goal inference. There may
be a small number of agents, such as middle agents, which naturally have access to
information about the activities of other agents in the MAS th a t can be exploited.
This information could be used to infer the plans and goals of th e various agents,
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with th e inferred information being distributed to other agents as appropriate. This
type of plan recognition is, of course, itself not a simple problem.
The alternative to inferring opportunity-related information would be for the
agents to explicitly share it with one another.

We believe th a t this represents a

more general and practical approach for open, real-world MASs. As such, in our
study of multi-agent opportunity recognition, we have focused on the critical issues
involved in the explicit sharing of opportunity-related information.

These critical

issues are:
• W hen (for which tasks or goals) should an agent request opportunistic assistance
from other agents?
• Exactly w hat opportunity-related information should the agents share?
• How should an agent determine which other agents to share its opportunityrelated information with?

W h ich task s or goals?
The first issue to be considered involves when an agent should request opportunistic
assistance from other agents. Since we do not want agents simply broadcasting all
information about their current active and suspended goals, a selection process should
be used to limit requests to only those tasks and goals th a t other agents are likely
to be able to provide help with.

In this research, we have focused on requesting

opportunistic assistance for suspended goals, using the reasons th e agent is suspending
the goal (e.g., unm et preconditions or missing resources) to select the opportunity
cues. We believe the same mechanisms discussed here should also be applicable to
providing opportunistic assistance w ith active goals.
The reasons for suspending goals may also be used to further lim it when to request
opportunistic assistance. T hat is, we would prefer to have the agents only request
40
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opportunistic assistance for goals suspended on reasons it believe other agents in the
MAS can help with.

For example, when a Rover agent suspends a soil sampling

task because it no longer has sufhcient energy to go to the assigned location, it can
notify other Rovers in the vicinity in the hope one of those agents can obtain the
sample. If, however, the Rover suspends the task of transm itting d ata back to the
Lander because the Lander is currently out of range, it should not request assistance

from the other Rovers. Exactly how the agents can differentiate when other agents
can provide help is is likely to require domain-specific knowledge, making a general
approach difficult.
The agent must also decide when it is likely to be cost effective to request op
portunistic assistance from other agents. This decision could be made using a utility
function th a t takes into account the costs and benefits of receiving help in opportunis
tically accomplishing a task. If the agent only considers its own costs and benefits,
then it may come to the conclusion th a t obtaining opportunistic assistance for every
goal is the rational thing to do. T h at is, if the agent believes th a t it can get another
agent to satisfy one of its assigned goal w ithout expending its own resources, then it
is reasonable to expect th a t agent to request opportunistic assistance for th a t goal.
While this may be b etter for the individual agent, it could be catastrophic for the
MAS as a whole, especially if no agent satisfies its assigned goals.
Since we are assuming a collection of cooperative (or at least benevolent) agents,
we would prefer th a t the agents consider the im pact of m ulti-agent opportunism on
the overall system.

To do this, they should limit their requests for opportunistic

assistance to just those goals th a t are likely to be satisfied by some other agent with
as little im pact as possible on the system ’s (aggregate) resources. As such, an agent’s
decision should take into account the costs and benefits of receiving opportunistic help
for itself as well as for other agents. The costs may include processing the request
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for assistance, watching for opportunity cues, and communication overhead. Benefits
may include simply accomplishing the task early, accomplishing it at all, or meeting
the preconditions of future tasks of this or other agents. Of course, while computing
its own potential costs and benefits may not be difficult for an agent, determining
the potential costs and benefits to other agents and to the system as a whole may be
much more complicated. This is because in our heterogeneous environment, agents
may not have sufficient information about one another to com pute accurate values,
making these decisions difficult.

W h a t o p p o rtu n ity -rela ted in form ation to share?
Once an agent decides it can use opportunistic assistance from other agents, it must
next determ ine exactly w hat information should be shared. The ultim ate objective
is to allow one agent to recognize opportunity cues for another agent. In general the
more one agent knows about w hat the other agents are doing, the more help it can
provide. However, since we are assuming the agents are heterogeneous, and th a t they
may not even know about all of the other agents in the MAS, the real question is just
how little knowledge the agents can share to still be helpful to each other.
There are three possibilities for explicitly sharing opportunity-related information:
cue sharing, for which the task-owning agent determines and distributes th e oppor
tu n ity cues to the other agents; goal sharing, where the task-owning agent notifies
the other agents of the tasks and goals for which it could use assistance; or some
combination of these two, which we will call mixed sharing. We will examine each
of these in turn. Recall th a t we are assuming the agents are able to communicate
effectively with one another, which implies th a t the agents will understand the tasks,
goals, and opportunity cues th a t are sent to them.
When using cue sharing, each agent determines the cues th a t m ight indicate an
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opportunity for one of its goals or tasks, and distributes these cues to the other agents.
Often these cues are the unm et preconditions or missing resources of the m ethod the
agent is using to accomplish the goal or task. We use preconditions and resources as
cues because they are often easily identifiable in a given domain and, as discussed in
C hapter 3, they are often explicitly represented in most planning systems, making it
possible to reason about them. The main advantage of cue sharing is th a t the agent
selecting the cues is able to use contextual information about hovy it is planning to
satisfy th a t goal. For example, the top-level manager of a group of AU Vs might
select contingency organizations to fit anticipated situations (e.g., a CONVEX event
is observed). This may be the only agent th a t can take advantage of the processing
done in th e organization selection process to determine opportunity cues.
Using this approach, however, may limit the novelty of th e opportunities th a t
could be exploited. This is prim arily because it is difficult for th e task-owning agent to
determ ine the appropriate level of abstraction to use for opportunity cues. A remote
agent may have different abilities and experiences th a t would allow it to recognize
ways in which a suspended task could be satisfied th a t th e task-owning agent would
not have considered. For example, if one agent has a task of cutting a rope and asks
other agents to help it find a knife (because th a t is w hat its plan says to use), another
agent may not know th a t the pair of scissors it possesses m ight do the job, since it
does not know why the knife is needed.
When using goal sharing, knowledge of the goals for which agents could use oppor
tunistic assistance is distributed to other agents, leaving each agent to determine cues
on its own. If the remote agent computes the opportunity cues, th e original contex
tual information is likely to be lost, but it will be able to use its own local knowledge
of the world to select cues. Since we are assuming heterogeneous agents, it is possible
th a t the remote agent could come up with and recognize a cue th a t the owning agent
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could n o t have. The above scissors-for-rope-cutting example dem onstrates one such
scenario. The task-owning agent would have to verify the novel opportunities (i.e.,
th a t it can actually use the scissors to cut the rope). But, verifying potential oppor
tunities is a normal part of the second step in exploiting opportunities, determining
the facilitated action (see Figure 4-2).
However, the use of goal sharing assumes th a t the remote agents are able to
determ ine opportunity cues on their own, which may not be realistic in all MASs.
We have assumed th at, for multi-agent opportunism to be possible, at least some of
the agents in the MAS are capable of single-agent opportunism . This implies th a t at
least some of the agents are capable of both determining and detecting opportunity
cues. However, it does not imply th a t they all can. It is possible for an MAS to
contain agents th a t are capable of recognizing opportunity cues, b u t are not capable
of coming up with the cues themselves (e.g., they may have the appropriate sensors,
but no planning capabilities). Using strict goal sharing could thus leave out some
agents th a t otherwise might be able to recognize potential opportunities.
Also, goal sharing may place a significant burden on the rem ote agents, since they
must now compute a plan for satisfying the goal, determ ine the opportunity cues for
themselves, and then watch for them. This is in contrast to the com putational burden
th a t cue sharing would impose, where the sending agent does the processing for the
cue determ ination. In fact, even when using goal sharing, the originating agent must
also compute opportunity cues for itself. This com putation is not utilized by any
other agent, and thus may result in wasteful redundancy.
It is possible th a t some combination of cue sharing and goal sharing may allow us to
minimize the com putational burden placed on the remote agents while maximizing the
recognition of potential opportunities. One possible mixed sharing approach would
require the task-owning agent to distribute bo th its opportunity cues and the goal
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to which they apply. This would allow the remote agents to examine the cues in the
context of the related goal, which could enable them to recognize novel opportunities.
It could also allow agents who cannot determine opportunity cues on their own to
just use the ones sent to them, further increasing the possibility of noticing potential
opportunities.

W h ich o th er agen ts?
Once an agent determines what opportunity-related inform ation it will share, it must
select th e other agents in the MAS to share it with. Here there are three possibilities:
the agent could tell every other agent in the MAS, it could tell only the specific agents
th a t it believes are best suited to assist it in recognizing opportunities, or it could
defer th e selection process to another agent, such as a m anager or a broker. Note
th a t the opportunity-related information may also be tailored for the selected agents,
based upon their capabilities.
Telling every other agent would certainly maximize the potential for recognizing
an opportunity. It may also be a cost effective approach when th e number of agents
in the MAS is small, or when the normal communication mechanism broadcasts mes
sages to all agents anyway. However, when the communication mechanism performs a
broadcast by sending many messages (e.g., one message to every agent), the commu
nication cost would likely be prohibitive for all but small groups of agents. Further,
every agent would receive the request, including those th a t could not recognize or
respond to potential opportunities for the request. Each of these agents would have
to examine the request and determine if it could provide opportunistic assistance,
increasing the overall processing cost. This processing would be wasteful if only a
few of the agents were capable of providing opportunistic assistance for the request,
as well as distracting the agents away from tasks they could be working on.
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A potentially more cost-effective approach would be to have an agent select only
those other agents th a t it believes would be able to recognize and respond to oppor
tunities based on the opportunity-related information it provides. Since this informa
tion contains descriptions of goals and tasks, or specific opportunity cues derived from
those goals and tasks, the selection process would use knowledge of the capabilities
and available resources of the agents in order to determine which to request oppor
tunistic assistance from. For example, a Rover agent w ith a suspended soil-sampling
goal would only notify agents th a t can also take soil samples.
The difficult p art of this selection process involves how an agent knows about
the capabilities and resources of the other agents in the MAS. B ut this is the same
inform ation the agents need for delegating tasks to other agents in the MAS th a t they
cannot do themselves. As such we can exploit the task allocation support mechanisms
th a t are available for the particular coordination mechanism being used. Naturally,
the details of how an agent would obtain the required inform ation would depend upon
the specific coordination mechanism in use (e.g., a m atchm aker would be queried
when using middle agents, a request for bids from agents w ith th e needed capabilities
would be issued when contract nets [Smith, 1980] are being used, etc.). It is also
likely th a t obtaining this information would be more difficult using some coordination
mechanisms th an w ith others. But, by using th e existing coordination mechanism, we
can take advantage of the existing infrastructure and the processing th a t is already
being done w ith a little additional burden on the agents.
Similarly, an agent could tell one other agent, or perhaps a small number of other
agents, about its opportunity-related information. The chosen agent or agents would

in tu rn select the other agents to distribute the this inform ation to and forward this
information. This might be desirable if a few agents in th e MAS already possess
knowledge of the capabilities and resources of the other agents in the MAS, reducing
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the need for the individual agents to conduct the selection process.

Such agents

would include m atchmakers and brokers in MASs coordinated using middle agents,
or m anager agents in hierarchical organizations. Examples of b o th of these approaches
to using a middle agent to find agents with particular capabilities are given in Section
2.1. Further, this type of deferred notification would be particularly suitable in open
MASs, where the structure of the system is not known by every agent, and the
organizational knowledge is likely to be m aintained by only a few agents.

These

agents will be in the best position to get the opportunity-related information to the
agents w ith the right capabilities, even if the structure of the MAS changes.

4 .2 .2

M u lti-A g en t O p p o rtu n ity R esp o n se

After the opportunity-related inform ation has been distributed to the appropriate
agents, those agents can watch for potential opportunities to satisfy the opportunity
requests. As we have previously noted, we are assuming th a t at least some of the
agents are capable of recognizing opportunities for suspended goals, and thus we in
tend to exploit this ability. For those agents th a t can potentially provide opportunistic
assistance, there are two critical issues th a t must be considered:
• How can an agent decide if it should provide opportunistic assistance?
• How should an agent respond to a recognized opportunity?

Should th e agen t resp on d ?
Even if an agent is capable of providing opportunistic assistance, it may not be
appropriate to do so. The agents m ust have a way to decide if supporting the goals
of other agents would interfere w ith the achievement of their own goals, and if so, if
the other goals are somehow more im portant.
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The agents could conceivably employ a negotiation mechanism to attem pt to find
a globally optimal (or near optimal) re-allocation of the goals requiring opportunistic
assistance, such as coalition restructuring [Shehory and Kraus, 1998] and multi-agent
Markov decision processes (MMDP) [Boutilier, 1999; Goldman and Zilberstein, 2003].
While these methods will produce an allocation of goals among th a t agents th a t should
lead to improved system performance, in general they require either a centralized
mechanism to analyze the planned actions of th e agents involved or an exchange of
large am ounts of plan-related information. Further, these m ethods are often very
com putationally complex, requiring an analysis of many thousands of actions and
states even for simple coordination problems [Boutilier, 1999]. As such this approach
is unlikely to be practical given our assum ption of heterogeneous MASs w ith limited
shared information.
The decision process an agent uses should, instead, utilize local knowledge almost
exclusively, and be as com putationally efficient as possible. T h at is, the decision itself
should be opportunistic, in th a t the agent should analyze its current intentions (i.e.,
the actions it is currently planning to execute to satisfy its own goals) to determine
if providing opportunistic assistance is feasible. As with the optim ization approaches
mentioned above, such a decision process should have to take into account the costs
and benefits of helping satisfy some other agent’s goal, possibly at the expense of
not satisfying its own goals, but based on th e agent’s local knowledge. Because of
its decision theoretic nature, even with the local restrictions a general approach to
this issue could easily become intractable, so care m ust be taken when considering
these decision processes. Limiting the decision to an analysis of current intentions,
and avoiding re-planning, should help keep this tractable.
This decision process would likely be similar to the one used when an agent decides
if it would be cost effective to request opportunistic assistance (Section 4.2.1). In fact
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these decision processes are more related th an our presentation would indicate, in th a t
knowing how an agent would decide if it should provide opportunistic assistance is
likely to influence the decision of when opportunistic assistance should be requested.
T h at is, if an agent knows what costs and benefits are considered by agents when
they receive requests for opportunistic assistance, it can b etter decide when (for
which goals) to make those requests, as well as to wTich other agents.

H ow to respond?
After an agent decides th a t it should provide opportunistic assistance for a particular
goal, it can begin “watching for” potential opportunities using its existing opportunity
recognition capabilities (recall th a t we are assuming th a t an agent th a t decides it
can provide assistance is capable of single-agent opportunism ).

Once a potential

opportunity is noticed, the agent must then decide how to respond. There are three
general responses an agent can take: it can ignore the potential opportunity, it can
simply notify the interested agent or agents of the opportunity, or it can take some
action on behalf of the interested agent in response to the recognized opportunity.
W hen the response is to notify the interested agent or agents, the recognizing
agent must determ ine which agents might be interested in the recognized opportu
nity. The obvious choice is to notify the agent th a t made the request for opportunistic
assistance. B ut there may be other agents also interested in knowing about occur
rence of the opportunity. Just as when an agent decides which other agents to share
its opportunity-related information w ith (Section 4.2.1), the recognizing agent could
notify every other agent in the MAS, or notify just a select set based upon their
known capabilities. Similarly, a middle agent could be used bo th to find agent w ith
particular capabilities, or as a means of indirect notification.
Under some circumstances, however, the agent th a t recognizes the opportunity
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may also provide further help by taking some action on behalf of the requesting
agent. Continuing our rope cutting example from above, if one agent knows th at
another agent is looking for a knife so th a t it may cut a rope, and the agent has a
pair of scissors (and knows how to use them), it may be able to cut the rope for the
other agent and notify it th a t its rope-cutting task has been accomplished.
To avoid undesired side-effects, the goal-owning agent may need to include re
stricting conditions as part of the opportunity-related information th a t it shares (see
Section 4.2.1). For instance, the goal-owning agent may want to specify th a t the end
of the rope should not be damaged, preventing another agent from considering using
a more drastic cutting tool, like a chain saw.
As mentioned in C hapter

1,

the most straightforward way for an agent to deter

mine if it should take some action on behalf of another agent in response to a potential
opportunity is to coordinate with th a t other agent. This coordination could be car
ried out through a simple “standard operating procedure” (e.g., always take an action
if the cost is less th an X), or through an agreed upon communication protocol. For
example, the recognizing agent could notify the goal-owning agent of the potential
opportunity. The notification message could also include a description of the recog
nizing agent’s capabilities as registered with the middle agent (thus avoiding the need
to query the middle agent). If the recognizing agent has the appropriate capabilities,
the goal-owning agent could then request the recognizing agent to carry out some
action through the normal task request mechanism. As an added benefit, in the case
where more than one agent simultaneously recognizes a potential opportunity for an
agent’s suspended goal, this approach would allow the goal owning agent to decide
which, if any, of the agents should take some action.
There may be situations, however, where it is not possible for the recognizing
agent to coordinate w ith the goal-owning agent. U nfortunately there is no simple
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dom ain-independent way for an agent to decide on its own when it should satisfy
another agent’s task. It would have to consider such things as the costs and benefits
of performing the task, to both itself and the other agents. It would also have to
consider if it would be appropriate to accomplish the task, as there may be side
effects th a t it does not know about. Further, w ithout coordination, multiple agents
may end up taking action in response to a recognized opportunity, potentially causing
conflict among the agents. Thus, when coordination is not possible, the best option
is likely to be notification.

4.3

Sum m ary

In this chapter we have presented our general framework for m ulti-agent opportunism ,
focusing on the the critical information-sharing and decision-making issues th a t must
be addressed by any approach to providing this capability to an MAS. These key
issues can be divided according to how they are used for supporting how agents can
recognize and respond to potential opportunities. To enable agents to recognize op
portunities for one another’s goals, the following questions must be answered: When
ghould an apent regueat opportuniatzc aaawtance

other ogenta? Fliact/ÿ what

opportunity-related information should the agents share? and How should an agent
determme which other agenta to ahare ita opportanitg-retated in/ormation withP Similarly, for an agent to be able to respond to a potential opportunity for another agent,
the following questions must be addressed: How can an agent decide if it should
provide opportaniatic aaaiatancef and Row ahoatd an agent reapond to a recognized
opportunity? In the next two chapters we describe a specific approach to incorpo
rating multi-agent opportunism into a system of planning agents, paying particular
attention to how we address these critical issues.
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C h ap ter 5

P lan n in g and E x ecu tio n

The previous chapter describes a general framework for m ulti-agent opportunism,
focusing on the critical knowledge-sharing and decision-making issues th a t would have
to be addressed by any specific approach. While this general framework does provide
im portant guidance, it is too abstract to be of practical use in a real-world MAS.
In the next two chapters we describe a specific plan-based approach to multi-agent
opportunism th a t should be applicable in most systems of agents th a t are capable of
performing non-trivial planning tasks. The planning and execution scheme, described
in this chapter, was developed especially to support opportunistic behavior of agents
in various settings of shared knowledge. To preserve generality, this scheme does not
assume th a t the agents are using any particular, or even the same, planning m ethod
ology. This is achieved by using a generic form of plan representation, w ith which
we can represent characteristics of most (if not all) techniques used in th e area of
classical (i.e., STRIPS-based) AI domain-independent planning [Smith, 2003]. Fur
ther, the selected planning and execution scheme readily supports a com putationally
efficient form of opportunism based on predictive encoding [Patalano et ah, 1993],
in which potential opportunities are pre-com puted and associated w ith existing plan
elements. We present this model of multi-agent opportunism in C hapter

6.

P o rtio n s of th e c o n te n t of th is c h a p te r have b e en p u b lish e d in [L aw ton a n d D o m sh la k , 2003, 2004a; D om shlak
a n d L aw ton, 2003, 2004].
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5.1

A ssu m p tion s and M otivations

Our prim ary motivation for developing our plan-based approach to multi-agent op
portunism was to find a way to make it easy for a collection of heterogeneous agents
to share information with one another about potential opportunities for their goals.
We also wanted to facilitate the decision processes agents use related to pursuing
potential opportunities. In order to understand how these motivations led to the
approach described in this and the following chapter, however, we m ust first review
the assumptions we are making about the agents and the world they operate in. We
start w ith the assumptions described in the beginning of C hapter 4:
1. We are working with an open m ulti-agent system, made up of a collection of
heterogeneous agents, and operating in a real-world domain, th a t is capable of
accomplishing tasks in the given domain.
2. The agents are able to communicate effectively w ith one another.
3. The agents in the MAS are cooperative.
4. The agents may have little or no knowledge in common about each o th er’s
capabilities, goals, plans, etc.
5. A subset of the agents in the MAS are capable of single-agent opportunism.
We will further assume th a t we are working w ith planning agents, and th a t the
agents will have insufficient resources to satisfy all of their goals. The resource lim
itation assumption has been included to produce situations where the agents must
decide which goals they should attem p t to satisfy and which they should ignore. This
naturally leads to situations where an agent can attem p t to get other agents to help
it satisfy the goals it is not pursuing. This is not an unrealistic assumption. Real-
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world domains, such as the Rovers domain from Section 2.1, often contain agents
with severe resource restrictions.
Given these assumptions, we decided to exploit the information contained in the
agents’ plans to support multi-agent opportunism. We did not, however, want to
require th a t the agents use any particular—or even the same— planning mechanism.
Consequently, we needed to limit our assumptions about the plans these agents would
use.

To support this requirement, we determined th a t we needed to develop an

abstract plan representation, as well as a mechanism for executing the represented
plans.
The abstract plan representation had to serve two purposes. First, it would have
to be able to represent plans generated by actual planners. We decided to focus on
classical AI domain-independent planners, both because of their simple, yet power
ful, capabilities, and because of the wide availability of existing planning systems
[Smith, 2003]. This decision required th a t our plan abstraction be able to represent
partially-ordered plan actions. Second, the plan representation would have to explic
itly represent the information needed for reasoning about potential opportunities. As
discussed in Section 4.2, for our model this m eant th a t the plan abstraction would
have to explicitly represent the preconditions, effects, and resource requirements of a
plan’s actions.
We also needed to develop an execution mechanism for our plan representation
th a t would allow an agent to select a course of action th a t best uses its limited
resources, and allows it to reason about potential opportunities at runtim e. As men
tioned above, an agent may not have sufficient resources to satisfy all of its goals.
However, when the agent generates a plan to accomplish these goals, it ignores this
fact. Further, since we are assuming the agent is operating in a dynam ic environment,
the resources used by the individual plan actions may differ from w hat was expected.
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This m eans th a t there may be fewer (or more) resources for the remainder of the
plan. Similarly, as opportunities arise to provide assistance to other agents with their
suspended goals, the value of some of the goals in an agent’s plan may change. An
agent m ust be able select a course of action to take during the execution of its plan
th a t satisfies the most valuable goals with its limited— and changing—resources. In
a partially-ordered plan, this course of action is a particular to tal order among the
various partial orders of the plan’s actions. So as to impose as few restrictions on
the agents as possible, we did not assume th a t the agents would be able to re-plan
during execution. Thus the agents must be able to decide on the best course of action
within their current plans without changing them. To make this possible, we needed
to develop an execution mechanism for our plan representation th a t would enable an
agent to select the next action at execution tim e th a t would m ost likely lead to the
accomplishment of the most im portant goals.
The execution mechanism th a t we developed allows an agent to select a course
of action in an approxim ate decision-theoretic way, using th e expected action costs
(described in term s of resource needs) and the externally assigned values of each goal.
If during plan execution the agent realizes th a t it does not have the resources to
accomplish all of its goals, our mechanism allows it to select th e actions th a t will
lead to the satisfaction of the most valuable goals. The mechanism is “approxim ate”
in th a t th a t it does not consider all possible courses of action w ithin a given plan.
Rather, the analysis is limited to the average-cost, successful courses of action. As we
discuss in the next section, w ithout this restriction, the analysis would be intractable
even for the simplest plans
To support multi-agent opportunism , our plan abstraction allows an agent to
predictively encode extra goals th a t have not been assigned to it, but th a t may be
suspended by other agents. This is a form of predictive encoding because the agent
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is pre-com puting the opportunity cues and incorporating them into its plan, allowing
the norm al runtim e execution mechanism to recognize and respond to potential op
portunities. Initially, these extra goals would have no value in the agent’s plan, thus
our plan execution mechanism will allow the agent to ignore them. If, however, at
runtim e another agent requests opportunistic assistance on one of these extra goals,
an agent th a t has the goal already encoded in its current plan need only increase the
goal’s value. The execution mechanism will autom atically allow the agent to deter
mine th e best course of action. This provides an agent a consistent (and transparent)
way to decide whether it should apply its resources toward one of its own goals or
one of another agent th a t has been predictively encoded in the plan.
In th e remainder of this chapter we present the details of our plan representation
and execution mechanism. In the next chapter (C hapter

6 ),

we will describe how

our plan-based approach can be used to support both single-agent and multi-agent
opportunism , including an explanation of how the approach addresses the key issues
presented in Section 4.2. We begin our discussion with a detailed description of the
assumptions we are making about the agents and the environm ent they operate in.

5.2

A bstract M odel of M u lti-A gent P lan n in g and E xecu tion

To represent an abstract m ulti-agent system, we have defined a model th a t both is
based on models generally accepted in the MAS com munity and satisfies the assump
tions described in the previous section. The model we are using is very similar to
those used by Shehory and Kraus [1996] and Ogston and Vassiliadis [2001], but has
been extended to express opportunistic behavior.
We model a multi-agent system as a collection of benevolent agents {Ai, • • ■ , A„},
where each agent A, is associated w ith a set of capabilities Q = {c*^, • ■■ , Q,}, and
a set of resources R =

■■■ ,

Each r* . indicates th e am ount of the resource
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class Yj (e.g., time, energy, etc.) th a t agent A, currently has. We currently only
model consumable resources in this way, using plan conditions for reusable resources.
For example, o n -b o a rd (c a m e ra i, Ag) would indicate th a t A 2 currently possesses
the reusable resource camerai.
In th e related models mentioned above, the difference between th e capabilities and
the resources is not very clear. To clarify this point, in our model the capabilities of
(m agent

coTregpond to tfie goak tfiat con be oaatgned to A^. For example, consider

a team of three planetary rovers Ai, Ag and A3, where both A% and Ag are equipped
with cameras, while A 3 is not. In this group, the goal “have picture of location L I”
is in b o th capabilities sets Ci and Cg, but not in C3. For any given domain, we
will let C be the (possibly infinite) set of all goals th a t can be accomplished in the
domain—i.e., the set of all possible capabilities. Thus for each agent A,, Q C C.
The definition of capabilities in term s of a possibly infinite set of goals may at
first appear to make our model intractable. To address this issue we assume th a t we
are working w ith discrete, finite domains. For example, in the R overs domain, we
identify a finite, discrete set of locations for the various sampling and imaging goals.
Most real-world domains can be made finite in this way. More im portant, in C hapter
7

we show th a t this assumption is only necessary for one case of our approach to

multi-agent opportunism , where the shared knowledge among th e agents is limited to
just capabilities.
In addition to the acting agents {Ai, ■■■ , A„}, we assume there is an agent B acting
as a task broker [Klusch and Sycara, 2001]. We use B to simplify th e description of
the information flow in the system: The prim ary job of B is simply to dispatch the
goals of the system to the various agents. B ’s decision process and im plem entation
are not im portant for our work. The only thing we assume about B is th a t it will
assign goal g to agent A, only if g € Q .
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Given a set of goals G, =

,gi^} Ç Q , agent A, plans for this set of

goals, an d begins the execution of the generated plan V. To b etter support more
realistic domains, we assume th a t each goal g is annotated w ith its value Vg (which
may be param eterized by various features such as deadlines, energy remaining after
completion, etc.), and th a t the planning process takes these value functions into
account. Goal value functions will be explained in more detail in later Section 5.3.1.
Further, each plan action is assumed to have its resource consum ption associated with
it. In m ost realistic domains, resource consumption will not be certain and thus will
likely be represented using a probability distribution.
During the execution of a plan V by some agent A,, several aspects of the world
could change, im pacting the relative attractiveness of V. For instance, any of the
following may occur:
• Ai is assigned an additional goal

by B.

• The value Vg for some g G Gi changes (positively or negatively).
• Some of the goals in G* becomes unreachable w ith respect to V.
• The current resource levels are not as expected after executing some part of V.
This may be due to such things as the resource consum ption by the part of V
executed so far has been significantly different (positively or negatively) from
what was expected during planning, the unexpected addition of new resources,
etc.
In such cases. A, should revisit its current course of action, possibly updating its set
of active goals, and suspending goals it determines are no longer feasible. Normally,
these suspended goals would be returned to the broker for redistribution to other
agents in the multi-agent system, or possibly abandoned completely. In our model,
though, Ai may attem p t to satisfy these goals opportunistically by fitting them into
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some o th er p art of its current plan, or into the current plan of another agent in the
m ulti-agent system, w ithout re-planning. Our approach to this is discussed in the
following sections.

5.3

B asic M odel for P lanning and E xecution

As we introduced in Section 5.1, our aim is to develop an abstract plan represen
tatio n and corresponding execution mechanism th a t supports flexible, opportunistic
behavior w ithout execution-time re-planning. Instead of re-planning, we would like
the agents to adapt to potential opportunities by reasoning about their current plans.
Our approach, described in this section, was significantly inspired by the work on con
tingency planning for planetary rovers [Dearden et al., 2002]. Our main motivation
for adopting this formalism was to stay as close to real-world domains as possible.

5.3.1

P la n n in g

Following Dearden et al. [2002], we assume th a t there are two parts of a planning prob
lem, qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative p art of th e problem is described
using the prepositional STRIPS formalism in which bo th positive and negative pre
conditions are allowed^ [Bylander, 1994]. By using a prepositional formalism, we can
be sure th a t our example planning domains will have a discrete, finite set of goals,
meeting our assum ption discussed in the previous section. Each agent is associated
with a description of its state (represented as a conjunct of valid propositions), a set of
goal propositions to be achieved, and set of possible actions, each of which is charac
terized by its preconditions and effects. In w hat follows, we denote the preconditions
and effects of action A by prec(A) and effects (A), respectively.
The quantitative p art of the problem is described by the resource consumptions
'■This is also e x a c tly th e form alism used for th e first level of p la n n in g c o m p e titio n [Fox a n d L ong, 2002].
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of th e actions and the values associated with each goal. Resource consumption is
modeled using consumption probability distributions associated with each action.
Goal values represent the contribution to the system of achieving the goal (i.e., its
“global” value), and not just to the individual agent. Again following Dearden et al.
[2002], we use a very general representation for goal values. They are modeled as
functions of the resources available after achieving these goals. For example, suppose
r is the only resource used by an agent. It may represent such things as the amount

of energy the agent has, or the amount time remaining before some deadline. If the
value function Vg( r ) of goal g is;
r < 0

10.
then the value of g is

10

r> 0

if we can achieve g with some am ount of

r

remaining (i.e.,

the agent h asn’t expended all of its energy, a key deadline hasn’t passed, etc), and
0, otherwise. Of course, this representation may be unnecessary in many domains,
thus goal values may also simply be constant functions (e.g.,
independent of

V g (r )

=

10)

th a t are

r.

As with Dearden et al. [2002], in the planning stage we ignore the quantitative
part of the problem, solving the STRIPS-based problem as if there is no resource
consumption or difference in the im portance of the goals. However, th e difference
between our model of planning and th a t used by D earden et al. [2002] is th a t their
model corresponds to the first stage of the G raphplan algorithm [Blum and Furst,
1997], resulting in a planning graph, while we are interested in a stru ctu re th a t has
properties of both a planning graph and a partial order plan [McAllester and Rosenblitt, 1991]), w ithout tying us to a specific formalism. In order to introduce the plan
representation structure used in our framework, we will first briefly describe partial
order plans and planning graphs. Note th a t we are not interested here in th e planning
60
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SampleRock(p)
PRE CO N D IT IO N S: lo c a tio n (p ) A At(p)
EFFECTS: h s ( p )

T akeP icture(p)
P R E C O N D IT IO N S: lo c a tio n (p ) A At(p)
EFFECTS: h p (p )

N avigate(p, q)
P R E C O N D IT IO N S: lo c a tio n (p ) A lo c a tio n (q ) A At(p)
E F F E C T S : -iAt(p) A At(q)

Figure 5-1: O perators for Rovers example.

process itself, but rather the representation of the plan created as a result of planning.
A partial order plan is a tuple { A , 0 , C ) , where A is a set of actions, O is a
set of ordering constraints over A , and £ is a set of causal links. For example, if
A = {Ai, A 2 , A 3 } then O might be the set {Ai < A 3 , A 2 < A 3 }. These constraints
specify a plan in which A 3 is necessarily the last operator, b u t do not commit to a
particular order on Ai and A 2 . Naturally, the set of ordering constraints must be
consistent, i.e., there m ust exist some to tal order satisfying them . A causal link has
the form A,

Aj, where A, and A j are actions and g is a proposition. Such a causal

link denotes the fact th a t A, produces (i.e., has the effect) q which is required by Aj
(i.e., used to satisfy a precondition of A j ) . Ordering constraints are imposed among
the actions to ensure th a t other actions do not th reaten the causal links.
For example, consider a simple problem th a t is based on th e R overs dom ain used
in the recent planning com petition [Fox and Long, 2002]. Three of the operators
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S am p leR o ck (L l)

S ta rt

N a v ig a te ( L l, L2)

-At (LI).

— At(L2)-

S am pleR ock(L 2)

hs(L2 )-

G o al

At(Ll)

T a k e P ic tu r e ( L l)

_____

ip(Ll)-

Figure 5-2: P artial order plan for the Rovers example.

available to an agent (simplified for ease of presentation) are shown in Figure 5-1,
where th e propositions hs(p) and hp(p) stand for “have rock sample” and “have
picture” from location p, respectively. The relevant p art of th e initial state of the
agent is At(Ll) A -ihs(L l) A -ihp(Ll) A -ihs(L2), while the goals are h s(L l), hp(Ll),
and hs(L2). Figure 5-2 presents the relevant part of a possible partial order plan
for this problem, where the solid edges represent the causal links (labeled with the
corresponding propositions), and the dashed edges represent the ordering constraints
th a t are not trivially entailed by the causal links^. It is easy to see th a t there are two
totally ordered plans consistent w ith this partial order plan, and the only difference
between them is the relative positions of SampleRock(Ll) and T a k e P ic tu re (L l).
In contrast, a planning graph is a directed graph arranged into alternating levels
of proposition nodes and action nodes. To be precise, in w hat follows we describe
a solved planning graph, which is the representation of a plan resulting from the
G raphPlan algorithm. As we are only interested in this end product, we will omit
some details (e.g., m utual exclusion relations) th a t are only relevant during plan
generation.
Level 0 of a planning graph contains all of th e relevant proposition nodes th a t are
^ S t a r t a n d G o a ls n odes a re d u m m y a ctio n s a c tin g as a p ro d u c e r o f th e in itia lly v alid p ro p o sitio n s a n d
th e consum er of th e goal p ro p o sitio n s, respectively.
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At(Ll)

hs(L2)

SampleRock(Ll)

hs(Ll)

hs(Ll)

TakePicture(Ll)

hP(Ll)

hP(Ll)

At(Ll)

Figure 5-3: Solved Planning G raph for the Rovers example.

valid in the initial state. Nodes at level 1 are actions whose preconditions are met
in the initial state. An edge in a planning graph th a t connects a proposition node q
in level i to an action node A in level i + 1 represents a precondition link. Similarly,
edges from an action node A in level j to proposition nodes in level j + 1 represent
the effects of A. A p ath from action Ai at level k to action A j at level k-\-2 through
proposition q at level A; +

1

is equivalent to a causal link A^

Aj in a partial order

plan.
The levels of a planning graph are used to impose ordering constraints between
the actions. An action A at level i cannot be executed until all actions at level i — 2
have been executed. Actions at the same level may be executed in any order. NO-OP
actions are used to carry unchanged proposition nodes forward in the graph.
Continuing with the Rovers example described above, Figure 5-3 presents the
relevant part of the solved planning graph for this problem. Bullets (e.g “• ” ) are used
to represent NO-OP actions. Notice th a t even though planning graphs make explicit
which actions may be executed “in parallel” at a given time, like partial order plans
they only describe a partial ordering of these actions. Executing a planning graph
still involves finding a valid to tal ordering of the actions.
To achieve a higher degree of flexibility for supporting plan-based multi-agent
opportunism, we have merged characteristics of bo th p artial order plans and planning
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.s(Ll)

S am p leR o ck (L l)

N a v ig a te ( L l,L 2 )

,t(L l)

T a k e P ic tu r e ( L l)

Sam pleR ock(L 2)

.s(L2)

ip(L l)

Figure 5-4: P artial order plan graph (POPG ) for the R overs example.

graphs into a structure th a t we refer to as a partial order plan graph (POPG ). A
P O P G may be viewed as a partial order plan where the preconditions and effects
are explicitly represented as propositions nodes. The action nodes are exactly the
nodes of the original partial order plan (excluding the dumm y sta rt and goal nodes),
while each proposition node is created by contracting the causal links corresponding
to effectively the same proposition. Similarly, a PO PG may be viewed as a solved
planning graph where the levels have been collapsed. Like a planning graph, a PO PG
contains two types of nodes: proposition nodes and action nodes. However, in contrast
to planning graphs, a PO PG is not a leveled graph, and the alternative schedules of
the plan are captured by explicit ordering constraints. The P O P G for the running
example is depicted in Figure 5-4.
Now th a t we have described our abstract plan representation, we can return to
the discussion on our model of planning. We assume th a t the qualitative part of
the actual plan for a given problem instance is generated by an external planner and
converted into a PO PG , creating to a “skeleton” plan. This plan structure is then
augmented w ith the quantitative aspects of the problem: The actions are annotated
with their resource consumption distributions and the goal nodes are annotated with
their value functions. The resulting structure is ready to be used in the execution
stage.
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5.3.2

E x ecu tio n

Given an initial state, a set of resources, and a PO PG representation of the plan
enriched by the quantitative information about resource consumption and values of
the different goals, the agent can begin to execute its plan. At each interm ediate
state s during the execution, the agent must make a decision about the next action
to perform. As the agent is provided with a partially-ordered plan, there may be
more th a n one action applicable in the state s, given the current set of resources. For
instance, in the initial state of the running example, both actions SampleRock(Ll) and
T a k eP ictu re(L l) are consistent with the plan represented by the PO PG in Figure 5-

4. In addition, however, observe th a t if we ignore the ordering links for the moment,
the action N a v ig a te(L l, L2) can be performed in the initial state as well. Clearly,
if the agent has sufficient resources to accomplish all of its goals, performing this
action will be irrational since the agent will lose its ability to achieve the goals hs(L l)
and hp(Ll). On the other hand, if resources are limited and the goal lis(L2) is very
im portant, it might be the case th a t the right thing to do is to forget about h s(L l)
and hp(Ll), and to perform N a v ig a te(L l, L2), trying to achieve hs(L2) w ith as little
risk as possible.
In general, deciding upon which course of action to take when there are several
alternatives requires an estim ate of how much value could be gained by each. Com
puting these values exactly is intractable, as it requires taking into account not only
the uncertain resource consumption of each action to be executed in the future, but
also capturing in the model all possible results of potential future failures. However,
adopting the m ethod in which the resource consum ption distributions are abstracted
by Dearden et al. [2002], we outline an approxim ation m ethod for such a value esti
mation.
An agent executes its plan by repeatedly selecting and executing one of its plan
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actions, A, th a t can be executed in the current state, s, with the current resources,
p. Executing A updates state s, creating the new (intermediate) state a {s,A ), and
reduces the resources p appropriately. For ease of presentation, in what follows we
assume th a t there is only one resource, and p is the am ount of this resource available
when th e agent is selecting its next action, A. W hen estim ating the value of perform
ing a given action, instead of taking into account the precise resource consumption
distributions, each action A is annotated with (i) its expected consumption p(A) and
(ii) the minimal resource level min(A) required to allow A to be executed. This way,
if p > min(A), then A can be executed, its execution is assumed to be successful, and
its resource consumption is expected to be p(A). Otherwise, if p < min(A), then the
action is not executable, due to the risk associated w ith its failure. Note th at, while
p(A) is defined purely by the resource consumption distribution of A, min(A) must
be specified explicitly as part of the problem specification.
Let actions(T’, s, p) (specified by Eq. 5.1) be the set of actions in the plan repre
sented by PO PG P th a t are executable in state s with p am ount of resource available.
actions('P, s, p) = { A ^ V \ prec(A) e s A p > min(A)}

(5.1)

The value U{ V, s , p) represents our estim ate of how much value could be gained by
executing plan V w ith p am ount of resource, starting at the state s. As is specified
by Eq. 5.2, the value U( V, s , p) is computed by finding the m aximum expected value
th a t could be obtained by selecting each action A G actions(T’, s, p) as the next action
to be executed. T h at is, for any action A G actions(T’, s, p), executing A in s with
p will produce several valid to tal orders of the partially-ordered actions in V. Each
total order will result in some value being obtained through th e satisfaction of some
or all of the goals in V. The maximum expected value th a t could be obtained by
executing A is thus the maximum of the values obtained by th e various total orders
starting with A. Similarly, the maximum of the expected values of executing each
66
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action A G actions(7^, s, p) is the expected value of the plan, U( V, s , p) .

(7 (0 , g,p) = 0
(5.2)

(^('P,'S,p)=

max

[ a C P ,A ,s ,p )+ /3 (A ,p )]

a e a c tio n s (P ,s ,p )

a ( P , A, s, p) = (7 (Refine(P, A, g), (r(g. A), p - p(^4))
l^{A,p)—

^

(5.3)

Vg{p - p{A) )

g e e ffe c ts (A )

As specified in Eq. 5.2, the expected value of each action A G actions(P , s, p)
is com puted as the sum of two components. The /3-component is simply the value
of the goals achieved directly by executing A.

The cr-component is the value of

the remaining plan th a t the agent will have after performing A. T h at is, it is the
maximum of the expected values obtained by the various to tal orders of V starting
with, b u t not including, A.
The a- and /3-components are specified in Eq. 5.3 by a{V, A, s, p) and /3(A, p),
respectively. The /3-component is com puted by /3(A, p) in the obvious way; by com
puting the sum of the values of each goal g,

V g { p ) ,

th a t are satisfied as a direct result

of performing action A (i.e., g G effects (A)) w ith resource p. The «-component is
computed by a { V , A , s,p) by recursively finding th e value of the p art of the plan V
(i.e., the subgraph of P O P G V) remaining after performing action A in state s. This

sub-plan is constructed by the procedure Refine('P, A, s), which appears in Figure 5-5.
Refine essentially simulates performing action A in state s producing state a{s, A),

and removes the p arts of V th a t would no longer be reachable from a{s, A).

E x ecu tio n E x a m p le 1
To illustrate the process, we will first present an example where there are adequate
resources to accomplish all of a p lan’s goals.

Consider the P O P G of the running
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R e fin e (P , A , s)

1. C o m p u te

ct( s , A).

2. R em o v e A from P , to g e th e r w ith all its o u tg o in g edges.
3. U n til no m o re n odes can be rem oved, ite ra tiv e ly remove:
• A ll th e p ro p o sitio n nodes p (to g eth er w ith th e ir o u tg o in g edges), such t h a t p 0
a ( s , A) , a n d th e n o d e p h a s no incom ing edges, and
• A ll th e a c tio n nodes A ', such t h a t for a t lea st one of th e p re c o n d itio n s q E prec(A ')
th e re is no p ro p o sitio n n o d e a sso ciated w ith q a n d h a v in g a n o u tg o in g edge to A '.
4. R e tu r n th e u p d a te d p lan V.

Figure 5-5: Procedure for updating PO PG V after performing action A.

example (Figure 5-6), which we will call Vi. Let the th e value functions of the goals
be the constant functions:

K s (li)

=

2,

Kp(Li) = 2 , and 14 s ( l 2) =

10,

and the resource

consumptions of the actions be abstracted as follows (w ith the expected resource use,
/i(A), equal to the minimum resource level, min(A), for ease of presentation):
A

m ( A)

= m in(A )

SampleRock(Ll)

3

T a k e P ic tu r e(L l)

2

N a v ig a te (L l,L 2 )

10

SampleRock(L2)

5

For this example, suppose th a t the initial resource level pi = 20, and the initial
state is simply si = (A t(L l))}, as shown in Figure 5-6.

To begin executing this

plan, the agent must select the first action to be performed. It would accomplish this
by first computing the estim ated value of V\ using (/("Pi, Si, pi) as specified in Eq.
5.2, and then selecting the action A E actions(Pi, S i,p i) th a t achieves th a t estim ated

value. The com putation of (7(P i,

Pi) begins by determ ining th e available actions.
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S a m p le R o c k (H )

.s(L l)

N a v ig a te ( L l, L2)

It (L I)

T a k e P ic tu r e ( L l)

Lt(L2)

Sam pleR ock(L 2)

.g(L2)

ip(Ll)

Figure 5-6: Vv- POPG for the Rovers example (repeated from Fig. 5-4).

which in this example are:
actions('Pi, Si, pi) = {SampleRock(Ll), T ak eP icture(L l), N avigate(L l, L2)}
Thus, the initial call to U { V \ , s i,p i) will be computed as:

« ( 7 ^1 , SampleRock(Ll), Si, pi) -P /3(SampleRock(Ll), pi)
=max<

o;(Pi, Tak eP icture(L l), Si, pi) + /3(TakePicture(Ll), pi)

(5-4)

« ( P i, N avigate(L l, L2), s i, pi) + /3(N avigate(L l, L2), pi)

The algorithm will consider these actions one at a time, beginning with Sam pleRock(Ll).
Since SampleRock(Ll) satisfies the goal hs ( L I ) , /?(SampleRock(Ll), pi) = 4hs(Li) = 2.
For the computation of « ( P i, SampleRock(Ll), Si, pi), we will call:
S 2 = cj(si, SampleRock(Ll)) = {At(Ll), h s (L l)}

and
P2 = Pi — p(SampleRock(Ll)) = 20 — 3 = 17
Thus, the computation of a ( P i, SampleRock(Ll), si, pi) is determined according to
Eq. 5.3 as:
Ui = P(Refine(Pi, SampleRock(Ll), s i), S2 ,P 2 )
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N a v ig a te ( L l, L2'

L t( L l) j

T a k e P ic tu r e ( L l)

Figure 5-7:

it(L2)

Sam pleR ock(L 2)

.p ( L l|

Result of calling Refine(Pi, SampleRock(Ll), si).

The call to Refine(Pi, SampleRock(Ll), Si) will simply remove SampleRock(Ll)
from V\, along with its links, producing the PO PG V 2 shown in Figure 5-7. No
proposition nodes are removed since they are all either in gg or have incoming edges.
No other action nodes are removed since none of their precondition nodes have been
removed, and thus they are all still reachable in the graph.
The com putation of U\ = (/(% , &2 , /%) proceeds as before by first determ in
ing the available action, actions(%, &2, /%), which is the set { T a k e P ic tu r e (L l),
N av ig ate (L I, L2) }. Thus, Ui will be com puted as:

o;(P 2 , T a k e P ic tu re (L l), S2 , P2 ) + /3(T ak eP ictu re(L l), P2 )
^CP 2 ,a 2 ,P 2 ) = m a x {

(5.5)
« ( 7^2 , N avig ate(L l, L2), «2 ,^ 2 ) + /3(N avigate(L l, L2), P2 )

As before, these actions are considered one at a time, starting w ith T a k e P ic tu re ( L I ) .
Since T a k e P ic tu re (L I) satisfies the goal h p ( L l) , /3 (T ak eP ictu re(L l), P2 ) =
2. For the com putation of

0 (7 ^2 , T a k e P ic tu re

(LI), sg, P2 ), we will call:

S3 = (j(s 2 , T ak e P ictu re (L l)) = {A t(Ll), h s(L l), hp(Ll)}
and
Pa = P2 — /i(T a k e P ic tu re (L l)) = 17 — 2 = 15
70
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K p (L i)

=

,t(L l)) ----------------- > N a v ig a te ( L l, L2)

^ t(L 2 ))

> Sam pleR ock(L 2)

^s(L 2)j

Figure 5-8: P 3 : Result of calling Refine(P2 , T ak eP icture(L l), S2 ).

Thus, th e com putation of « ( 7 ^2 , T ak e P ictu re (L l), S2 , P2 ) is determined according to
Eq. 5.3 as:
U2 =

t/(Refine(T’2 ,T a k e P ic tu r e (L l),S 2 ),S 3 ,p 3 )

The call to Refine(T’2 , TakeP icture(L l), S2 ) will simply remove T akeP icture (LI)
from V 2 , along with its links, producing the PO PG V 3 shown in Figure 5-8. No
proposition nodes are removed since they are all either in

53

or have incoming edges.

No other action nodes are removed since none of their precondition nodes have been
removed, and thus they are all still reachable in th e graph.
From Figure 5-8 we can readily see th a t there are no further choices in V 3 about
w hat actions to take. Executing all of the remaining actions in

V 3,

N avigate (LI ,L2)

and SampleRock(L2) will require a resource level of /i(N a v ig a te (L l, L2)) +
/i(SampleRock(L2)) = 10 + 5 = 15. Since ps = 15, it is expected th a t there are

sufhcient resources to complete this plan.

W ithout going through the details, it

is easy to see th a t the the value of U2 is simply th e value of the remaining goal,
h s(L 2), which will be computed as /3(SampleRock(L2), p^) = K s(l 2 ) = 10, where
Pi = Pa -

/r(Navigate(Ll, L2)) — p(SanipleRock(L2)).

The algorithm would next backtrack to Eq. 5.5 and consider N av ig ate (LI ,L2) as
the next action to take in plan V 2 (i.e., the second step of th e initial plan). It would
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,t(L2)) ------> S am pleR ock(L 2)

fis(L2))

Figure 5-9: Vi. Result of calling Refine(7^2, N a vigate(L l, L2), S2 ).

thus compute:
a { V 2 , Navigate(L l, L2), S2 , P2 ) + /)(N avigate(L l, L2), P2 )

Since N a v ig a te (LI ,L2) does not directly satisfy any goals, /3(Navigate(Ll, L2), P2 )
0. For th e com putation of « (% , h a v ig a te (L l, L2), S2 , P2 ), we will call:
S4 = (t(s 2 , N avigate(L l, L2)) = {At(L2), h s (L l)}

and
Pi = P2 —p(N avigate(L l, L2)) = 17 — 10 = 7
Thus, the com putation of « (% , N avigate(L l, L2), S2 , P2 ) is determ ined according to
Eq. 5.3 as:
Ui = i7 (Refine(P 2 , N a vigate(L l, L2), S 2 ), S4 , p i )

The call to Refine(iPi, N avigate(L l, L2), Si) will first remove N avigate (LI ,L2)
from V i , along with its links. The proposition node At (LI) is next removed from V i ,
since it has no incoming links and is not in

S4.

Because At (LI) is a precondition of

T akeP icture ( L i ) , th a t action, along w ith its links, is also removed from

Finally,

since there are now no incoming links to the proposition nodes h p (L l), this node is
removed as well. The resulting plan, Vi, is shown in Figure 5-9.
Again it is not difhcult to see from Figure 5-9 th a t the estim ated value of this
refined plan,

f/4,

is simply K s(l 2) = 10. Since b o th parts of Eq. 5.5 have been com

puted, the algorithm would determ ine th a t th e estim ated value of V 2 , U{V 2 , S2 , P2 ) =
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m ax((f /2 + /3 (T ak eP ictu re(L l),p 2 )),

(^^4

+ /3(Navigate(Ll, L2), P2 ))) = max((10 +

2 ), (10 + 0)) = 12.

The algorithm would next backtrack to complete the com putation of the first
choice in Eq. 5.4 (i.e., if SampleRock(Ll) were selected to be the first action). This
is com puted as:
U ( V i , S i , p i ) > Ui + /?(SampleRock(Ll),pi)
>U

2

+ /3(TakePicture(Ll), P2 ) + /3(SampleRock(Ll), pi)

> /3(SampleRock(L2), pi) + /?(TakePicture(Ll), P2 ) + /9(SampleRock(Ll), pi)
>

K s (L2) +

K p (L 2 ) +

K s (L1)

>10 + 2 + 2
> 14
T h at is, at this point in the evaluation of "Pi, the algorithm has determ ined th a t this
plan can obtain at least a value of 14 with the given initial resources pi = 20. Note
th a t since this is the sum of the values of all of the goals in P i , we know th a t this is also
the maximum value th a t could be obtained by this plan. Thus the algorithm could
stop its analysis at this point, even w ithout considering the o th e r possible courses of
action through P i, since SampleRock(Ll) could be safely selected as the first plan
action to be executed. We do not, however, currently use shortcuts like this (although
it is planned for future work), and so we will continue describing th e plan analysis.
It is not difhcult to see th a t selecting T ak eP ictu re (L I) as the hrst action would
also lead to the value estim ate P ( P i, Si,Pi) = 14, since th e actions Tak eP icture (LI)
and SampleRock(Ll) do not interfere with one ano th er’s preconditions.

As such,

we will not describe the details of the com putation of the second p art of Eq. 5.4.
However, let us briefly look at the selection of N a v ig a te (LI ,L2) as the hrst action
to execute from P i, (i.e., the third part of Eq. 5.4), which would be com puted as:
o;(Pi, N a vigate(L l, L2), Si, pi) + /)(N a v ig a te (L l, L2), pi)
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it( L 2 )) ------ > Sam pleR ock(L 2)

^

Figure 5-10: Pg: Result of calling Refine(Pi, N avigate(L l, L2), Si).

Since N a v ig a te (LI, L2) does not directly satisfy any goals, /l(N avigate(L l, L2), pi)
0. For th e com putation of o;(Pi, N avigate(L l, L2), Si, pi), we will call:

Sg = (t ( s i , N avigate(L l, L2)) = {At(L2)}

and
Ps =

Pi

— p (N avigate(L l, L2)) = 20 — 10 = 10

Thus, the com putation of a ( P i, N avigate(L l, L2), si, pi) is determ ined according to
Eq. 5.3 as:
Pg = P(R efine(P i,N avigate(L l,L 2),S i),Sg,pg)

The call to Refine(Pi, N avigate(L l, L2), Si) will first remove N avigate (LI ,L2)
from P i , along w ith its links. The proposition node At (LI) is next removed from P i ,
since it has no incoming links and is not in Sg. Because At (LI) is a precondition of
both SainpleRock(Ll) and T ak eP icture ( L I ) , these actions, along with their links,
are also removed from P i. Finally, since there are no incoming links to the proposition
nodes h s ( L l) and h p (L l), these nodes are removed as well. The resulting plan, Pg,
is shown in Figure 5-10.
From Figure 5-10 we can easily see th a t the best value this plan could possibly
obtain is

1 4 s(l2)

=

10,

since the other two goals have been removed from the plan.

Thus, the algorithm will complete the com putation of Eq. 5.4 as:
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14 i f A = SampleRock(Ll)
(T(Pi, ai, Pi) = max < 14 i f A = T akeP icture(L l)
10 i / A = N avigate(L l, L2)

The agent could then select either SampleRock(Ll) or Tak eP icture (LI) as the
first action to perform, as both produce the maximum value for the plan. In this
case, selecting N avigate (LI ,L2) as first action for P i would be irrational, since it
precludes the accomplishment of some of the p lan ’s goals, and thus leads to a lower
estim ated value.

E x e c u tio n E xam p le 2
For our second example, we will again consider th e problem from Example 1, except
now we will assume th a t the available resources are not sufficient to satisfy all of the
p lan’s goals. Instead, for this example we will let pi = 16.
The algorithm would begin as in Example 1 by com puting the estim ated value of
the initial plan. P i. Since we are using the same initial plan, th e estim ate U (P i, si, pi),
is again described by (repeated from by Eq. 5.4):

a (P i, SampleRock(Ll), Si, pi) + /)(SampleRock(Ll), pi)
(/("PnSnPi) = max < Q;(Pi, T ak eP icture(L l), Si, pi) + /3(TakePicture(Ll), pi)

(5 6 )

o (P i, N avigate(L l, L2), 5 i,p i) + /)(N avigate(L l, L2),pi)

W hen considering SampleRock(Ll) as the first action, o ( P i , SampleRock(Ll), Si, pi)
will again be com puted as:
Ui = U (Refine(Pi, SampleRock(Ll), Si), S2 , P2 )
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T a k e P ic tu r e ( L l)

Figure 5-11:

lp(L

1 ))

Result of calling Refine('Pi, SampleRock(Ll), Si).

with S2 again being defined as:
S2 = cr(si, SampleRock(Ll)) = {At(Ll), hs(L l)}
but now p 2 is:
P2 = Pi

— /a(SampleRock(Ll)) = 16 —3 = 13

The call to Refine('Pi, SampleRock(Ll), si) will once again produce

shown in

Figure 5-11 (repeated from Figure 5-7). As before, this leads to the com putation of
U { V 2 , S2, P2)

as (repeated from Eq. 5.5):

a{V 2 , T a k e P ic tu re (L l), «2 , P2 ) + /3 (T akeP icture(L l), P2 )
(5.7)
a{V 2 , N avig ate(L l, L2), S2 , P2 ) + /?(M avigate(Ll, L2), pa)

Again following Example 1, when T a k e P ic tu re (L I) is considered as the next
action,

0

( ^ 2 , T a k e P ic tu re (L l), S2 , P2 ) will still be com puted as:
U2 = (7 (Refine(P 2 ,T a k e P ic tu re (L l), S2 ), S3 , Ps)

where:
S3 = cr(s2 , T a k e P ic tu re (L l)) = (A t(L l), h s(L l), hp(Ll)}
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.t(L l)) ----------------- > N a v ig a te ( L l, L2)

fet(L2)J

> Sam pleR ock(L 2)

|is(L 2)j

Figure 5-12: % : Result of calling Refine('P2 , T ak eP icture(L l), S2 ).

but now:
Ps = P2 —p(T akePictu re(L l)) = 13 — 2 = 11
The call to Refine('P2 , TakeP icture(L l), Sÿ) will once again produce the PO PG V 3
shown in Figure 5-12 (repeated from Figure 5-8).
Going a step further than we did in the first example, the algorithm would next
select N a v ig a te (LI,L2) as the next action (since there is no choice at this point),
and com pute (/('Pa, «3 , Ps) as:
( / ( P 3 ,a 3 ,Ps) = a ( P 3 ,N a v ig a te (L l,L 2 ),S 3 ,p 3 ) -b /)(N a v ig a te (L l,L 2 ) ,p 3 )

= ( / (Refine(P 3 , N avigate(L l, L2),

S 3 ) , S4,

P4 ) + 0

where:
S4 = cr(s3 , N avigate(L l, L2)) = |At(L2), hs(L l), hp(Ll)}

and
P4 = Ps —p (N avigate(L l, L2)) = 11 — 10 = 1
The call to Refine(P 3 , N avigate(L l, L2),

S3)

will produce the P O P G Pg shown in

Figure 5-13. The algorithm would try to continue, but since P4 = 1 and
min(SampleRock(L2 )) = 5, actions(Pg, S4 , p^) = 0, so P (P a , S3 , pa) = 0, making P 2 =
0

as well.
The algorithm would next backtrack to Eq. 5.7 and consider N avigate (LI ,L2)

as the next action to take in plan P 2 . As in Exam ple 1, it would again compute
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> Sam pleR ock(L 2) ----- ^

(is(L2))

fW

Figure 5-13: Pg: Result of calling Refine(P3 , M avigate(Ll, L2), S4 ).

a ( P 2 ,N a v ig a t e ( L l,L 2 ),S 2 ,P 2 ) as:
U4 = P(Refine(P 2 ,N a v ig a te (L l,L 2 ),S 2 ),S 5 ,p 5 )

where:
S5 = cr(s2 , N avigate(L l, L2)) = (At(L2), h s(L l)}

but:
Ps = P2 —p (N avigate(L l, L2)) = 13 — 10 = 3

The call to Refine(P 2 , N avigate(L l, L2), S2 ) will produce the PO PG P 7 shown in
Figure 5-14. The algorithm would try to continue, b u t since ps = 3 and
min(SampleRock(L2)) = 5, actions(P 7 , S5 , ps) = 0, so U4 = 0.

The algorithm would then determ ine that:

. U 2 + /3(TakePicture(Ll), P2 ) = 0 4 - 2 = 2
( /( P 2 ,a 2 ,P 2 ) = max '

U4 + /4(Mavigate(Ll, L2), P2 ) = 0 + 0 = 0

Backtracking to Eq. 5.6, since U (P 2 , S2 , P2) = 2, at this point th e algorithm would
know th at when p% = 16, the best value this plan could obtain w ith SampleRock(Ll)
as the first action is:
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t(L 2)) ------> S am pleR ock(L 2)

tis(L 2 )

Figure 5-14: Py: Result of calling Refine(P 2 , N av ig ate(L l, L2), Sg).

U { V i , s i , p i ) > Ui +/3(Sam pleRock(Ll),pi)
> P 2 + /?(T ak eP ictu re(L l), P2 ) + /?(SampleRock(Ll), pi)
>

P

2+

K p (L 2 ) +

f ih s ( L l)

> 0+ 2+2
> 4
As in Example 1, it is not difficult to see th a t selecting T a k e P ic tu re (LI) as
the first action would produce the same value for P ( P i, Si,P i), 4. However, we will
examine the selection of N avigate (LI ,L2) as the first action to execute from V\,
(i.e., the th ird p art of Eq. 5.6), which would again be com puted as:
a (P i, N av ig ate(L l, L2), Sp, pi) + /?(N avigate(L l, L2), pi)
The com putation of a ( P i, N av ig ate(L l, L2), Sp, pi) is com puted as:
Ps = P(Refine(Pp, N av ig ate(L l, L2), sp), sg, Pe)
where
Sg =

cr(sp,

N av ig ate(L l, L2)) = |A t(L2)}

and
Pe = Pi —p (N av ig ate(L l, L2)) = 16 — 10 =

6

The call to Refine(Pp, N avig ate(L l, L2), sp) will produce P O P G P 5 as shown in
Figure 5-15 (repeated from Figure 5-10). W ithout going through the details, it is
not difficult to see from Figure 5-15 th a t P (P s,sg ,p g ) =

1 4 s(l2 )

= 10, since pg >
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(L2)) ------> Sam pleR ock(L 2)

^

^ s(L ^

Figure 5-15: Pg: Result of calling Refine(Pi, N avigate(L l, L2), sp).

mm(SampleRock(L2)). Thus, the algorithm can now complete the com putation of

Eq. 5.6 as:
4

i f A = SampleRock(Ll)

(/(P i, sp,pp) = max < 4

i f A = Tak eP icture(L l)

10

i f A = N a v ig a te (LI, L2)

Thus, unlike our first example, in this case, selecting N a v ig a te (LI ,L2) as first
action for Pp is the rational choice, since it leads to highest value for the given
resources.

5.4

D iscussion

We conclude this chapter by examining the flexibility of our planning/ execution model
with respect to the various possible changes in the environment th a t we listed in
Section 5.2. First, sudden unreachability of goals, as well as uncertainty in resource
consumption by the agent’s actions, is captured by the model implicitly. Second, if
the values of some of the (still reachable) goals th a t th e agent had planned to achieve
have changed, the only thing th a t the agent should do is update th e value functions
associated with

the corresponding goalsin its plan. All the subsequent decisions will

implicitly take

this change into account. In particular, if one of the agent’sgoals,

g, becomes completely irrelevant (i.e., Vg =

0 ),

the agent could easily update its

PO PG by removing the node g, along w ith exactly those action nodes th a t are used
to “produce” this node g and are not used to produce any other goal. However, in
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the next chapter we show th a t the latter is not necessarily the best way to handle
such situations.
The only p art of the environmental dynamics th a t still seems to be problematic is
assigning a new goal to an agent (i.e., a goal th a t is not captured by the current plan
V). Such a goal can be either completely new to the m ulti-agent group, or one of the
goals th a t has been suspended by some other agent in the group. Clearly, a complete
re-planning for the extended set of goals will solve the problem, and in many domains
such a painful solution might be unavoidable. However, in the next chapter we argue
th a t, at least for some practical domains, we can extend the above model of planning
and execution in a way th a t re-planning can often be avoided.
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C h ap ter 6

P lan -B ased O p p ortun ism

The model for plan creation and execution described in the previous chapter pro
vides an agent with enormous flexibility in selecting its course of action. This flexi
bility would in tu rn allow agents operating in real-world domains to better adapt to
dynamic environments, especially in term s of the opportunistic satisfaction of sus
pended goals. In this chapter we discuss the way our model supports opportunistic
behavior of the agents.

6.1

M od el o f O pportunistic E xecu tion

Figure 6.1 summarizes the PO PG -based model of an agent’s planning and execution
cycle as described in C hapter 5.

Focusing on step 4e, we note th a t by taking a

particular action A from the plan P, the agent may suspend one or more of its goals,
namely those th a t are not achievable along all courses of action beginning with action
A. The suspended goals could be re-planned for in the next planning-execution cycle,
returned to the task broker agent B for re-allocation to another agent, or abandoned
completely.
As discussed in Section 5.2, however, conditions may change during execution
P o rtio n s of th e c o n te n t of th is c h a p te r have b e en p u b lis h e d in [L aw ton a n d D o m sh lak , 2003, 2004a,b;
D om shlak a n d L aw to n , 2003, 2004].
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L o o p forever:
1. C h e c k for a n d process new goal a ssig n m en ts from broker M, Gi C Ci, w here Ci is th e set
o f th e a g e n t A g s capabilities.
2. G e n e r a te a P O P G V th a t achieves Gi from th e c u rre n t s ta te , s.
3. F o r each goal g

Gi , a n n o ta te th e c o rre sp o n d in g no d es in V w ith Vg.

4. L o o p u n til (all g E G are satisfied) V (action s('P , s, p) = 0)
(a) E s tim a te th e value U ( V , s, p) of th e c u rre n t p la n V usin g th e value ite ra tio n process
in E q. 5.2.
(b ) C hoose a n a c tio n A E a c tio n s (+ , s, p) t h a t a c tu a lly provides U { V , s , p ) .
(c) P e rfo rm A, re su ltin g in th e new s ta te cr(s, A ) a n d som e re m a in in g a m o u n t of resource

/ <P.
(d )

S et V = Refine('P, A , s ) , p = p , s = a{ s. A) .

(e) S u sp en d all th e goals g t h a t are no longer re ac h ab le in P .
5. N o tify bro k er B of su c c ess/fa ilu re of achieving each goal g E G o

Figure 6-1: Basic planning and execution cycle of a single agent.

such th a t a suspended goal may indeed become achievable. In this context, an agent
would exhibit single-agent opportunism if it can detect and respond to events and
situations th a t may allow one of its suspended goals to be satisfied. In our model,
single-agent opportunism uses a form of predictive encoding [Patalano et ah, 1993],
in which the agent examines its remaining current plan to find other places where a
suspended goal may be achieved.
To support this behavior, an agent needs to be able to modify th e structure of its
current plan. Observe th a t nothing prevents us from enriching an existing PO PG V
with additional actions th a t might be inconsistent (i.e., cannot be merged together)
with each and all possible complete executions of V.

For example, consider the

(partial) PO PG V depicted in Figure 6-2(a). In Figure 6-2(b) this valid “seed” plan
V is extended to a new structure Ve A V hy adding th e action N av ig ate(L l, L3).
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>

NaTigate(Ll,L2) |---- =►

>

«avigate(L2, L3) |---- ^

i)

At(L2)

At(Ll)

Navigate(L2, L3)

At(L3)

Navigate(Ll, L3)

(b)

>

Mavigate(L2, L3) |---- 3- ^ ( L 3 ^

(d)

Figure 6-2; Extending the “seed” PO PG : (a) The initially constructed PO PG P;
(b) E P O P G Pg, resulting from the extension of P by the addition of an alternative
course of action N avigate(L l, L3); (c-d) The result of Refine on Pg and the actions
N a v ig a te(L l, L2) and Navigate(L2, L3), respectively.

In general, such an extension £ can be any valid P O P G such th a t the root nodes
(i.e., the nodes with no incoming edges) of £ are a subset of th e proposition nodes of
P (i.e., £ is grounded in P ). Further, this plan extension process can be performed
iteratively, allowing the plan to be extended as needed.
Clearly, the constructed plan Pg, which we will call an extended partial order plan
graph (EPO PG ), may not be a valid partial order plan, and this is actually the case
with the E P O PG depicted in Figure 6-2(b). However:
1.

It does contain at least one non-trivial, valid partial order plan, and

2.

At every execution state s, the agent will still choose an action providing it w ith
the maximal expected reward.

The first statem ent appears to be obvious, since any single goal-achieving action
84
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by itself is a valid partial order plan. However, the fact th a t (i) we start w ith a valid
“seed” p lan for a given set of goals, and (ii) nothing from this plan is ever removed
during th e extension process, further justifies this statem ent. Similarly, recall th a t
every extension £ is itself a valid PO PG . If the execution mechanism follows the
course of action defined by an extension, even if some of the actions from the initial
seed p lan are removed, the plan will still contain at least this one valid plan.
T he second statem ent is both less straightforward and very im portant, as maxi
mizing th e expected reward is the core p art of our execution model. The soundness
of this statem ent follows from the fact th at, using the Refine procedure, the process
of calculating U{Ve, s,p) via Eq. 5.2 exploits only valid to tal order sequences of ac
tions from Ve, even if Pg is not a valid partial order plan. As discussed in Section
5.3.2, this is because the procedure for estim ating a p lan’s value defined by Eq. 5.2
considers all valid total orders, while Refine prunes unreachable actions out of the
plan. The completeness follows from th e fact th a t the first param eter of [ /( P ,s ,p )
in Eq. 5.2 decreases monotonically w ith the nesting depth. We observe, therefore,
th a t com pleteness is preserved even if the constructed E P O PG Pg contains cyclic
dependencies.
In general, adapting a given plan to pursue additional goals can be com putationally
hard [Yang et ah, 1992]. However, an agent can examine and extend an existing
(E)PO PG Pg, since th a t structure is not required to represent a single valid plan.
Thus, predictively encoding suspended goals for possible opportunistic execution in
Pg can be performed much more efficiently th a n by updating a plan th a t must remain
consistent. More directly, suppose th a t after performing an action A, the procedure
Refine removes from the current E P O PG Pg an action A' because one (or more) of

A's precondition nodes have also been removed from Pg. Let us denote by P ( the
EPO PG resulting from the above refinement of Pg. If A was necessary for achieving
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S am p leR o ck (L l)

N a v ig a te ( L l,L 2 )

L t(Ll))

T a k e P ic tu r e ( L l)

it(L2)

Sam pleR ock(L2)

ip(Ll))

Figure 6-3: PO PG for the Rovers example (from Fig. 5-4).

some assigned goal g, then g will have to be suspended. However, if there exists a
P O P G V C Ve th a t achieves g, the agent could try to predictively re-encode such
a sub-plan V' into the refined EP O P G "P' using the EPO PG extension approach
described above, treating V' as the chosen extension S.
For example, consider the EP O P G presented in Figure 6-3 (repeated from Figure
5-4). Suppose th a t the agent performs the action N avigate(L l,L 2) before execut
ing T ak eP ictu re(L l). The goal hp(Ll) would be suspended, because th e sub-plan
V ' = {T a k e P ic tu re (L l)} has been pruned by the Refine procedure.

The remain

ing plan could be extended by re-grounding V' at any other appearance of a node
At(Ll) in the EPO PG . The plan execution procedure would autom atically reconsider

opportunistically achieving hp(Ll) if and when it encounters T ak eP icture(L l) again
in the future. Unfortunately, in this particular example, there are no such places in
our EPO PG , thus predictive encoding will be infeasible. As such, we need to seek
alternative ways to achieve hp(Ll), such as m ulti-agent opportunism .
Recall from Section 5.1 th a t our general approach to multi-agent opportunism
is to have the agents include extra goals in their plans, on the chance th a t some
other agent in the MAS might suspend one of them. If at runtim e an agent does
in fact suspend a goal th a t has been predictively encoded as an extra goal in some
other agent’s plan, the other agent would be in a position to opportunistically satisfy
the suspended goal. B ut how does an agent determ ine which extra goals should be
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included in it plan?
Consider, for instance, an MAS {Ai, • • • , A„} executing plans P i, • ■• ,Vn for the
goal sets G \ , - ■■ ,G „, respectively. Suppose th a t, at some point agent A, suspends
a goal g E G i, and notifies some of the other agents th a t it can no longer satisfy g.
Since we are assuming the agents in the MAS are cooperative (or at least benevolent),
we would like the other agents Aj (such th a t g E C j ) to at least consider whether
they can achieve g themselves and whether the corresponding changes in their course
of action would be feasible.
For some agent Aj, if g is not already reachable in Vj, and if Aj is capable
of minimal re-planning, then Aj could create a new sub-plan V ju st for achieving
g startin g from the current state. The (E)PO PG Vj could then be extended into
the E P O P G Ve to include V . While considering actions in the future, the P O P G
execution module of A j (Section 5.3.2) will implicitly adjust its course of action w ith
respect to this update. The suspended goal g will be opportunistically satisfied if
A j’s conditions and resources perm it.

A lthough we do examine this approach in

Section 6.2.3, recall th a t we have assumed th a t in general the agents are not capable
of re-planning, and thus must consider other options.
In the more general case, when the agents are not capable of re-planning, then the
plans V i , ■■■, V i - i i Vi +i , - - - ,

cannot be changed, and any opportunistic assistance

to Ai (if possible at all) must be based on them as they are. Notice, though, th a t even
w ithout re-planning, it might be the case th a t g is serendipitously present, and thus
potentially achievable, in one of the PO PG -represented plans Vj (e.g., as a side-effect
of A j ' s prim ary activities). To opportunistically adopt g as a new goal, A j needs only
to properly increase the value of g, updating th e value function Vg in V j . Again the
execution module of A j will implicitly adjust its intention w ith respect to this update
when considering future actions. Note th a t even if A j has not abandoned g, but has
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suspended it and predictively re-encoded it for possible opportunistic achievement in
the future, the node g will still be reachable in VeLet us consider some properties of this extension to our planning and execution
scheme to support multi-agent opportunism. First, because we are using predictive
encoding, the runtime com putational complexity of some agent Aj providing oppor
tunistic assistance to another agent A, is, as desired, kept low. In our model, updating
a value function Vg is all th a t is required to determine a potential opportunity for a
suspended goal g. This process is linear in the size of PO PG Vj in the worst case.
Note th a t here we are only referring to the additional com putation needed for oppor
tunism . It is true th a t the worst case com putational complexity of our action selection
mechanism is exponential in the size of the plan. However, the size of a P O P G is,
in practice, often quickly reduced by the execution mechanism as unusable courses of
action are removed. Also, in Section 9.3.1 we discuss various ways the efficiency of
the action selection mechanism can be improved.
Second, the value of g is autom atically compared to the values of other goals in G j .
As the choice of action in our scheme of execution is based on maximizing expected
value, and since the value a goal g, Vg, represents its contribution to the system (and
not ju st to the individual agent), achieving g will not come at the expense of other
goals in G j unless g is justifiably considered to contribute more to the MAS. Finally,
even if agent A is not itself capable of single-agent opportunism , it may still be able to
provide opportunistic support for other agents, as long as the goals suspended by these
other agents are still reachable in the PO PG of A. This is interesting because we had
initially considered multi-agent opportunism strictly as an extension of single-agent
opportunism.
Returning to the discussion on our approach to opportunistic execution, one may
rightfully say th a t if g were assigned as a goal to A«, it is not very likely th a t g would
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also ap p ear in the plan of another agent. (In our Mars rovers example, indeed, why
would a rover plan to sample rocks at a certain location if it was not assigned to so?)
It again appears as if multi-agent opportunism w ithout dynamic re-planning is not
very promising. However, this is not necessarily the case.
Observe th a t nothing in our scheme for planning and execution prevents agents
from planning for goals th at were not assigned to them, i.e., goals having zero value
from th e local perspective of these agents. Since the decision mechanism behind the
execution takes into account not only the value of the goals to be achieved, but also
the risk behind the various courses of action (encountered via cumulative resource
consum ption), achieving a goal with a zero value will automatically be postponed.
Similarly, if one of the goals th a t the agent has planned for becomes irrelevant, instead
of removing this goal from the plan, the agent could simply zero its value function.
Now, recall th a t in our model each agent is characterized by a set of capabilities
representing all the goals th a t can possibly be assigned to the agent. In general,
instead of planning for just the set of goals th a t have been actually assigned to the
agent, one can consider also planning for extra capabilities (goals) th a t have not
been assigned to the agent, or even planning for the whole set of capabilities, and
reasoning about the best course of action during execution, when the value of different
capabilities is known better th an during the off-line planning. This is, in fact, the
key idea behind our approach to m ulti-agent opportunism , as it allows the agents
to opportunistically satisfy goals th a t are suspended by other agents, since they are
already part of their current plan.
Clearly, one may rightfully say th a t the whole set of capabilities may be huge, and
even its explicit description may be intractable. A lthough we agree th a t in general
nothing prevents the set of capabilities from being orders of m agnitude larger th an
an average set of goals the agent is actually assigned, at least in some domains this
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does n o t seem to be the case. For instance, consider a group of planetary rovers th a t
are constructed to fulfill some tasks on Mars [Estlin and Gaines,

2 0 0 2 ].

At least at

this stage of planetary rovers development, the superset of goals th a t each rover can
be assigned is not very large, yet this domain poses many challenging research and
development issues. We d o , however, believe th a t in general it will be necessary for an
agent to select and plan for a subset of its capabilities. In Section 7.1 we consider two
dom ain-independent methods for selecting a specific subset of the opportunistically
“most promising” capabilities to plan for. These methods assume th a t the agents
will have very little shared knowledge about one another, and thus should provide a
baseline of w hat is possible.
If planning for capabilities is considered to be as feasible as planning for the actual
goals, technically nothing should be changed in th e scheme of planning and execution
described in Section 5.3. However, a plan generated to include extra capabilities,
especially for the whole set of an agent’s capabilities, can be far from efficient w ith
respect to ju st the actual goals th a t have been assigned to the agent. For instance,
suppose th a t a rover located at location LI has been assigned a single goal of sampling
the rocks at location LIOOO. If this particular rover is capable of sampling rocks at
any of the thousand locations LI, 1 2 , . . . , LIOOO, the constructed plan may take the
rover from LI to LIOOO through all the locations in between, as if preparing this
rover to perform the other rock samplings as well. At first view, this observation
seems to point to a serious drawback of planning for extra capabilities instead of just
for assigned goals. However, in Section

6 .2

we present several dom ain-independent

methods to improve the efficiency of plans by avoiding unnecessary actions.
Finally, consider the value estim ation process th a t an agent performs at every de
cision point. We have already discussed th a t com puting a precise value estim ation is
intractable for most, if not all, practically interesting domains. Therefore, we began
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our discussion with an approxim ate estim ation provided by Eq. 5.2, as this approx
im ation procedure dramatically reduces the branching factor of the value iteration
process. However, the complexity of calculating U{Ve, s,p) is still on th e order of the
num ber of alternative valid sequences of actions consistent with Ve, s, and p, which in
worst case is obviously exponential in the number of actions in Ve- Therefore, to ob
tain tru ly practical execution schemes one would have to examine various techniques
to lim it th e depth of value iteration with as little loss of decision accuracy as possible.
We believe th a t there are several ways to provide a good estim ate of U { V e , s , p),
which in tu rn could be used instead of Eq. 5.2 starting from a certain depth of the
value iteration process. For instance, the m ethod introduced by Dearden et al. [2002]
for off-line backpropagation of goal values to the internal nodes of a G raphplan-based
planning graph would serve as a good starting point.

In particular, it should be

possible to apply this m ethod to the non-leveled graphical structures such as PO PG
and EPO PG . Generally speaking, using this method, each action node A is associated
w ith a value function V a { p , s ) th a t provides an approxim ation of the combination of
a { V , A, s, p) and j3{A,p) from Eq. 5.3. While we have not fully explored this sort of

efficiency improvement, it is an im portant p art of our planned future work (Section
9.3.1).

6.2

M aking P O P G s M ore Efficient

In the previous section we noted th a t planning for extra goals can lead to inefficient
plans. This is because such plans may lead an agent to execute unneeded actions on
the chance th a t an extra goal would be suspended by another agent. To make the
plans more efficient, we need to find a way to create a plan th a t can opportunistically
satisfy extra goals as they arise (i.e., when they are suspended by other agents), yet
efficiently satisfy the assigned goals when no opportunities are present.
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In th is section we address this issue by considering three domain-independent
approaches for creating plan extensions.

Two of these approaches, planning with

shortcuts and predictive plan repair, operate during the off-line planning stage, while
the th ird , reactive plan repair, augments the current plan at runtim e when goals are
suspended. In Chapter 7 we present the results of an empirical evaluation of these
approaches.

6.2 .1

P la n n in g w ith S h ortcu ts

For planning with shortcuts, each agent first generates a plan for all of its assigned and
extra goals, and then augments the structure of th a t plan by adding “shortcuts” to
the assigned goals. Shortcuts are actions (or short sequences of actions) th a t bypass
the segments of the plan devoted strictly to support predictively encoded extra goals.
For example, given the plan in Figure 6-2(a), the action Navigate(L2,L3) added in
Figure 6-2(b) can be seen as such a shortcut to the goal At(L3).
We will begin by assuming th a t each agent A is assigned k goals by th e broker B,
and th a t A selects k' additional goals to plan for on the expectation th a t they may
lead to opportunistic execution. As in the basic approach (Section 6.1), A creates a
plan V for all of these k + k' goals. Since the external planner cannot differentiate
between the assigned and extra goals, it will produce a plan th a t satisfies all of the
goals in a manner th a t it considers “efficient”—often based on minimizing the number
of actions. We would, however, like the agents to be able to dynamically skip those
actions th a t do not contribute to achieving any of the goals th a t currently have a
positive value.
Consider, for example, the small P O P G s shown in Figure 6-4, where the circu
lar and rectangular nodes stand for proposition and action nodes, respectively, and
doubly-circled propositions stand for goals. Figure 6-4(a) shows a base plan for fc = 3
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0 B
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(b)

(c)

'D '< 9

(d)

Figure 6-4: Example POPGs: (a) Base plan; (b) Extended plan; (c) Extended plan
with shortcuts; (d) Base plan w ith repairs.
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assigned goals, while Figure 6-4(b) shows a plan V for these k and some extra k ’ goals.
The w hite nodes in Figure 6-4 represent the additional actions and conditions needed
to accomplish these k' = 2 extra goals, while the numbered black nodes correspond
to th e nodes in the base plan. Figure 6-4(c) shows the plan Vsj constructed from V
by autom atically adding shortcuts (shown as dark gray nodes) devoted to bypass the
actions only needed for achieving the extra goals.
A dding shortcut nodes to V in this way makes Vs an EPO PG as discussed in
6.1. T he real question is, however, how do we determine where to place the shortcut
actions? Our approach is to trace through a total order of the plan P , finding the
sta rt and end nodes of “skippable” sections. For each pair of start and end nodes,
we can generate a plan fragment th a t bypasses the corresponding section of the core
plan.
To formally specify the notion of skippable sections of a plan, assume th a t an
agent A is assigned k goals Ga = { 9 1 , 9 2 ^ ■■ ^Qk} (with V (g,) > 0 for 1 < i < fc), and
th a t it also selects an additional k' goals Gg = ( 9 k + i , 9 k + 2 , • • •, 9k+k' } (with E(gj) =

0

for k V 1 < i < k + k'). Further, let V be the plan generated for all k V k' goals,
and A = {« 1 , 0 2 , . . . , ün} be a to tal order of its n actions consistent w ith th e ordering
induced by the PO PG . For each pair of actions a«, aj G A , we say th a t a* < aj if
i < j. This sequence of actions is implicitly associated w ith a sequence of n + 1 states
{so, &i,.. -, 5 „}, such th a t sq is the initial state, and for
from state

1

< i < n, a, moves the agent

to state Sj. Let a{g) denote th e action th a t actually satisfies some goal

g G Gq U Ge, i.e., a(g) =

is the action such th a t 9 G Sm, but for 0 < z < m, g 0 a,.

Consider the assigned goals { gi,g 2 , ■■■ , 9 k } num bered according to their achievement
along the total order A. T h at is, for 1 < i < j < k, if a(gi) ^ a(g^), we know
< «(%)Suppose th a t for some pair of assigned goals g,, g,+i G Ga, we have an extra goal
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g G Ge, such th a t a(g,) < a{g) < a(gi+i). Let a (g,) = Oj and a(gi+i) = ai. To
allow bypassing the actions needed only for achieving g, we can first create a plan
fragm ent V ' with s'q = Sj (i.e., the initial state of "P' is the state produced by action
üj) and the goal conjunct G-p' = s/_i (i.e., the state immediately preceding action
ai), and then attach V ' to V, properly grounded at the appropriate proposition nodes
in Sj an d supporting the proposition nodes of S(_i. This will create an alternate
path around the skippable section, as illustrated in Figure 6-4(c) by the segments
with d ark gray nodes. Adding such shortcuts preserves the completeness of the plan
with respect to the assigned goals G a since the structure resulting from replacing the
actions aj+i, . .. ,a;_i in V with the plan fragment V is a valid partial order plan
th at, given an unbounded am ount of resources, achieves all the assigned goals GaGiven a PO PG th a t has been extended w ith shortcuts, the agent would execute
it in th e usual way as described in Section 5.3.2.

If during execution the agent

is notified by some other agent th a t one of the extra goals, g G Gg, predictively
encoded into its plan has been suspended, g ’s value would be adjusted appropriately
and the execution mechanism would autom atically decide whether to execute the
actions leading to satisfying g. Alternatively, if at runtim e the value of one of these
extra goals g remains zero, the execution mechanism would autom atically select the
shortcut path to follow, avoiding the actions used for satisfying g, since this would
be a lower cost path. In the unlikely event th a t the costs of the paths are equal, a
shortest-path heuristic could be used. This ensures the the extended plan performs
at least as well as the base plan.
Observe further th a t the to tal set of proposition nodes in Gp/ can be large, as it
corresponds to the entire state
all the propositions of

However, in general there is no need to plan for

since many of them may have no effect on the applicability

of the remaining part {a^,.. ., a„} of V. Therefore, w ithout loss of either soundness
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or completeness, we can assign Gpi to contain only the propositions of s;_i th a t act
as pre-conditions of some actions in { a/ , .. ., o„}. T hat is:
Gp' =

S(_i n prec(a)

(6.1)

a>ai

6.2 .2

P re d ictiv e P la n R epair

For predictive plan repair, we again assume th a t each agent A is assigned k non
zero-valued goals Ga = {gi, g2 , . . . , gfc}, and th a t it also selects an additional k' (zero
valued) goals Gg = {gk+i, 9 k+2 , ■■■,gk+k'}- Unlike in planning w ith shortcuts, how
ever, th e agent initially generates a plan V only for its k assigned goals G„, and then
expands V to include actions th a t accomplish the goals in Gg. For illustration, such
a plan V for achieving fc = 3 assigned goals is depicted in Figure 6-4(a). Figure

6-

4(d) shows an expansion Vr of V , achieved by augmenting V to include extra actions
(shown in borderless gray) to satisfy the additional k' = 2 goals. The proposition
nodes connected by double-ended arrows in this figure represent identical conditions.
Thus we can see th a t the repair returns the plan to the same state.
As with the formalism for planning w ith shortcuts, let A = {«i,

02,...,

a„} be a

total order of the actions of the current plan V . To expand V w ith respect to an
extra

goalg &Gg,the agent selects from its action set an action a th a t provides g

and has the best support
a=

in V among all such actions. T h at is:
argmax
a's.t.

< max {|sj H prec(a')|} >

5Geffects(a')

( 6 .2 )

J

where argmax{jF} returns the element e G domain for which jF(e) is maximal. Simidomain

larly, s, is the corresponding state supporting o, i.e.,:
Si = argmax {|sj fl prec(a)|}

(6.3)

Sj GSo, . . . ySn

To preserve the opportunistic nature, the agent should avoid predictive encoding of
extra goals having insufficient correlation w ith th e current plan. T h at is, the nature
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of opportunism is to take advantage of situations th a t already exist (or are likely to
exist) in an agent’s intentions. Adding a goal to an existing plan th a t would require
the agent to deviate from th a t plan significantly would not be opportunistic. For
instance, in our evaluation discussed in the next chapter, s, is required to meet some
fraction of a ’s preconditions (half, in our case, which was selected w ithout extensive
empirical testing), otherwise g is not considered to be a potential opportunity. O ther
measures, such as considering the difficulty of achieving certain preconditions for the
goal, could also be used. We have not, however, considered any in this research.
Given the core plan V, and an actio n /state pair a and Si as above, the agent
starts by creating a plan fragment V for s), = a, and Gp/ = prec(a). Let s' be the
state resulting from applying V in g,, and s" be the state resulting from applying a
in s'. Next, the agent creates another plan fragment V " for Sg = s" and Gp" = Si
(i.e., V " returns to the initial state for V'), and concatenates V , a, and V " . Again,
as with planning with shortcuts, the resulting “side-loop” Vr is attached to V by
linking it to the appropriate proposition nodes in a, (see Figure 6-4(d)). As w ith
planning w ith shortcuts, the resulting plan would be executed as usual by the agent.
If during execution the agent is notified by some other agent th a t one of the extra
goals, g G Gg, predictively encoded into its plan has been suspended, g ’s value would
be adjusted appropriately and the execution mechanism would decide whether or not
to follow the sub-plan Vr- Alternatively, if at runtim e the value of one of these extra
goals g remains zero, the “side-loop” Vr added for achieving g will autom atically
be pruned. Thus, if during the execution of Vr all the extra goals Gg rem ain zero
valued, the execution of Vr will be equivalent to executing the core plan V . Since
the execution mechanism always picks the most cost-effective course of action among
those achieving maximal expected value, this ensures th a t the extended plan performs
at least as well as the base plan.
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Finally, as with planning with shortcuts, Gpn = s* can be replaced with the
specification as in Eq. 6.1. However, as the extra goals G g are considered one by one,
the whole process of plan repair is incremental with respect to Gg. Therefore, Gpn as
described in Eq. 6.1 should be based on the current plan (i.e., the core plan with all
the previously considered repairs), and not on the core plan for the k assigned goals
only. This is necessary to ensure new plan repairs do not prevent previously added
repairs from satisfying their extra goals if the corresponding opportunities arise.

6.2 .3

R ea ctiv e P la n R epair

Planning with shortcuts and predictive plan repair are two forms of predictive en
coding th a t can be adopted by agents which are not capable an d /o r not allowed to
adjust their plans at execution time. If, however, some degree of online plan ad
justm ent is possible, the agents can adjust their intentions as they learn about the
suspended goals of other agents, w ithout having to “guess” and plan for any extra
goals in advance.
In this case, one may consider a reactive variant of predictive plan repair. Follow
ing the predictive plan repair approach, here again each agent generates a plan V for
its k assigned goals. Unlike in the purely offline approaches to predictive encoding,
however, the agents do not select any additional goals. R ather, when an agent is
notified about some other agent’s suspended goal, it uses the plan repair mechanism
described in Section 6.2.2 to fit the goal (if possible) in to the remaining portion of
its current plan.
A significant advantage of this approach is th a t the agents only plan for goals
th a t actually get suspended. They do not waste any effort preparing for goals on
the chance they might lead to opportunistic execution. R ather, they can focus their
resources on considering opportunities for goals th a t they know cannot otherwise be
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satisfied.

The reason we consider reactive plan repair in our analysis is two-fold.

First, th is approach corresponds to w hat we expect is the minimal form of online
re-planning, preserving the qualitative core of the plan generated off-line. Second, as
such, th is approach provides us with yet another reference point for evaluating the
attractiveness of purely offline forms of predictive encoding, the main interest of our
work here.

6.3

A ddressing th e C ritical Issues

We conclude this chapter w ith a discussion of how we have addressed the critical
knowledge-sharing and decision-making issues from C hapter 4 in our plan-based ap
proach to multi-agent opportunism. It is not difficult to see th a t these issues are
highly intertwined, in th a t a choice of how one of these issues should be solved will
influence how one or more of the other issues are addressed. For our approach, the
first issue we tackled was question 4, how the agents should decide when it is feasible
to provide opportunistic assistance.
We arrived at the decision process embodied in the PO PG execution mechanism by
assuming heterogeneous planning agents. Since we could not guarantee any particular
planning mechanism, we needed to limit our assumptions about th e plans these agents
would use. This led us to develop the P O P G representation, which focuses on the
information needed to make decisions about potential opportunities: partially ordered
actions with explicitly represented preconditions, effects, and resource requirements.
In defining the execution method, our interest was to provide a mechanism th a t
would enable an agent to select the next action at execution time th a t would most
likely lead to accomplishment of the most valuable goals, with an understanding th a t
the agent is situated in a dynamic environment. This provides an agent a consistent
(and transparent) way to decide w hether it should apply its resources toward one of
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its own goals or one of another agent th a t has been predictively encoded in the plan.
T he execution mechanism also provides the agent with a natural way to determine
when it m ust suspend a goal. As such, limiting when to request opportunistic assis
tance to ju st suspended goals was a straightforward decision. Interestingly, though,
the action selection procedure described in Section 5.3.2 could also be used to deter
mine which active goals in the current plan might benefit from requesting opportunis
tic assistance. T h at is, the plan value estim ation procedure defined by equations 5.2
and 5.3 could be used to identify “high-risk” goals, such as those with an expected
cost th a t is just below some threshold of the currently available resources. We have
not, however, pursued this idea, leaving it for future work.
O ur PO PG -based approach also quite naturally leads to satisfaction of suspended
goals as the response to opportunity recognition. In this case, opportunity recognition
is embodied in the action selection mechanism, which determines when conditions
are favorable to pursue actions supporting a predictively encoded goal of some other
agent. Similarly, the choice of action-taking as th e response to opportunity recognition
would seem to necessitate the use of goal-sharing as the m ethod of determining w hat
opportunity related information an agent should share.

As we show in the next

chapter, this is indeed an effective pairing given our MAS model.
The plan-based approach described here, however, is not limited to just satisfying
suspended goals for other agents in response to opportunities. The PO PG represen
tation would allow any condition th a t can be described as an effect of a plan action
to be viewed as a “goal” to be predictively encoded.

For example, suppose th a t

the condition ci = h a v e-ro ck -sa m p le (WP7) is a precondition for some other set of
actions in the plan, Vi, for agent A,, and is not itself an assigned goal. If A, could
identify th a t

is necessary for the achievement of a suspended assigned goal, gi, then

requesting opportunistic assistance for Ci would actually be cue sharing. Determine
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w hat preconditions to use for opportunity cues in a domain-independent manner is
not a simple m atter, however, and is thus also left for future work.
Finally, the use of a middle agent to determine which other agents to request
opportunistic assistance from is a direct consequence of our MAS model. T h at is, in
the approach described here the agents defer to the task broker, B, the decision of
which agent should receive requests. The broker, in turn, uses its local knowledge of
the capabilities of the agents in the MAS to select just those agents th a t can satisfy
a given suspended goal. Since we are assuming an open MAS, we m ust also consider
agents entering and leaving the system.

W hen a new agent joins the system, it

registers w ith the broker, and is included in the next cycle of planning and execution.
If th e new agent joins during an ongoing cycle, then some potential opportunities
might be missed (i.e., the new agent may posses some information another agent
could use), but missing opportunities is acceptable in our framework. W hen an agent
leaves the MAS gracefully, it tells the broker about the change, which in tu rn informs
the other agents in the MAS if they need to cancel any goals. Of course, if an agent
just “dies,” the broker never knows, and there is nothing th a t can be done. Any extra
goals th a t other agents may have been attem pting to opportunistically satisfy will
not get canceled. On the other hand, if the recently deceased agent was unable to
satisfy those goals, then having other agents try to satisfy them is a good idea.
In summary, our PO PG -based approach to multi-agent opportunism addresses the
critical issues from C hapter 4 as:
• When to request opportunistic assistance? Currently ju st for suspended goals,
but “high-risk” active goals could also be used.
• W hat opportunity-related inform ation should be shared? Currently goal-sharing,
but cue-sharing could also be supported.
• Which other agents should be sent requests? All agents w ith appropriate capa101
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bilities, deferred through the task broker.
W hen to provide opportunistic assistance? Determined by the PO PG plan exe
cution scheme, primarily by the approxim ate decision theoretic action selection
mechanism.
How to respond to potential opportunities? The suspended goal is satisfied. Sat
isfying unm et preconditions could be supported as well.
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C h ap ter 7

E m pirical E valuation

The previous chapters describe a plan-based model of multi-agent opportunism
th a t is applicable to open systems of heterogeneous agents. In this chapter we describe
our im plem entation of th a t model, along w ith the results of an empirical evaluation
of the model in the simulated m ulti-agent environment.

7.1

E xperim ental Setup

Suppose th at, as described in Section 6.1, an agent A, considers planning not only
for its assigned goals Gi, b u t also for a limited set of its other, opportunity-wise
“most promising,” capabilities.

Can we determ ine in a dom ain-independent way

how to select which extra capabilities to include? Can we generate enhanced plans
containing extra capabilities th a t allow the agents to take advantage of opportunities,
but without significant overhead if those opportunities never occur?
In an attem p t to address these questions, we have im plem ented an evaluation
testbed for MASs, in the form of a discrete-event simulation, using our planning
and execution scheme. The benchm ark problems we have used in the evaluation are
based on the Rovers example described in Section 2.1. The sim ulator is w ritten in
P o rtio n s of th e c o n te n t of th is c h a p te r have b e en p u b lis h e d in [L aw ton a n d D o m sh la k , 2004a,b; D o m sh la k
a n d L aw ton, 2004].
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Figure 7-1: Workspace partitioning for Rovers MAS. (Repeated from Fig. 2-1)
Common Lisp: the experiments were run on several Sun workstations (UltraSparc III
processors, running at either QOOMhz or 650Mhz).
As described in Section 2.1, the working area of the rovers consists of 25 waypoints,
arranged in a 5 x 5 grid (see Figure 7-1). Each rover can only operate w ithin a given
3 x 4 waypoint region of the grid. W ithin its assigned region, an agent can perform
various scientific tasks such as soil sampling, rock sampling, and taking pictures of
objects of interest if they are visible from the rover’s current location. To reduce the
problem ’s complexity th a t would be caused by a large num ber of potential goals, we
have limited the number of locations where scientific tasks can be performed to 13
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(those w ith a white background in Figure 7-1). Thus, there are to tal of 65 different
goals th a t can be assigned to the rovers by the broker, namely 13 rock samplings, 13
soil samplings, and 13 objects to be photographed, where each picture can be taken
at three different levels of quality.
T he evaluation was performed on problem instances involving teams of 4 agents,
{A 1-A 4 }, with partially overlapping capabilities: The working area of the team was
divided into 4 partially overlapping regions (see Figure 7-1), and each rover could
operate only within its designated area.

The scientific tasks th a t a rover A, can

perform constitute its set of capabilities Q .

These are restricted to tasks at the

waypoints within the agent’s region of operation.

As mentioned above, we have

restricted which waypoints will actually have goals associated w ith them , thus each
agent will be assigned goals at only 7 of the 12 waypoints in its designated region.
This way, each agent is capable of performing 35 of the 65 possible goals.
A 5 x 5 grid was selected because it is th e smallest grid th a t would allow symmetric
patterns of overlapping regions (and thus capabilities) such th a t there are waypoints
accessible by exactly 1, 2, 3 and all 4 agents. For example, WPl is accessible by only
agent Aq, WP5 can only be reached by agents Aq and A 2 , WPll is accessible ju st by
agents Aq, Ag and A 3 , and WP1 2 is the only waypoint th a t all agents can get to. The
symmetry in the region assignments is im portant because the goal assignments are
generated at random, and we did not want to skew the load of any the agents.
At the beginning of each planning/execution cycle, each agent A, is assigned a
set of goals Gi from its capabilities (i.e., Gi Ç Q ) such th a t no goals are assigned to
more than one agent (i.e., fj- G, = 0). A lthough this is a reasonable assum ption for
the Rovers domain, it is possible in other domains the goal assignments may indeed
overlap. However assuming the goals are uniquely assigned allows us to focus on the
effectiveness of planning for extra capabilities. The agents begin by planning for their
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Procedure: T02P0
Input: a valid total-order plan ( a i , . . . , a„)
O utput: an equivalent partial-order plan { A , 0 , C )
for i = n to 1 do
A d d Oj to A
for p G Preconditions{ai) do
C hoose k < i such that:

71 I such th a t [k < l < i ) f\{p e Negati veE f fects(ai))
A d d fflfc A Oi to C
end for
for p e N e g a t i v e E f fects(ai) do
for j = {i — 1) to 1 do
if p € Preconditions{aj) th en
A d d üj < Ui to O
en d if
end for
end for
end for
R etu rn ( A , 0 , E )

Figure 7-2: Modified T02PG algorithm (adapted from [Ambite and Knoblock, 2001]).

individual sets of goals using a domain-independent planning methodology. In our
experiments the agents used the FF planner [Hoffmann and Nebel, 2001], but any
“off-the-shelf” planner capable of producing plans for the IPC-2002 domains should
be applicable. Since the IPC-2002 required the planners to produce a totally ordered
plan, we used a version of Ambite and Knoblock’s [2001] T02P0 algorithm (Figure
7-2), modified to include proposition nodes as well as action nodes, to produce the
POPGs.
For the results reported here, an evaluation was performed on 100 randomly gener
ated problem instances where each agent was assigned k = 4 goals. Given a problem
instance for which the agents have generated individual plans [Pi,. . . , 7^4 , let EC{Vi)
be the expected amount of energy required for Aj to fulfill its plan P, completely.
Fach agent was allocated a fraction Si of E C (Vi), where Si is random ly chosen from a
uniform distribution within [0.5, 1.5]. In addition to the k assigned goals, each agent
was allowed to choose and plan for another k ' = 3 capabilities, basing its choice on the
knowledge available about the other agents. Recall th a t the idea is to select goals th a t
might get suspended by other agents at runtim e, thus predictively encoding potential
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opportunities. Since the focus of the evaluation has been on potential contributions of
exploiting severely limited shared knowledge, in our experiments we have considered
two different levels of such knowledge:
1. Individual Capabilities (CK ): The agents have complete knowledge about each
o th e r’s capabilities. Therefore, each agent A, chooses for itself k' goals from:

Ci =

[ J (Ci n
\ J

— Ci

i.e., from the capabilities th a t A, shares w ith other agents th a t are not already
in its set of assigned goals Ci.
2. Individual Coals (C K ): The agents have complete knowledge about the goals,
including their values, th a t have been assigned to every agent by the broker.
Thus, each agent Aj chooses for itself k' goals from:

a,
i.e., from the assigned goals th a t happen to be in the capabilities of A,, b u t are
not already in its set of assigned goals Gj.
It could be argued th a t the situation where the agents have no knowledge about
each other would provide the true baseline for this evaluation. If, as discussed in
Section 6.1, it was feasible for the agents to plan for their whole set of capabilities,
even this extreme case could allow the agents to assist one another opportunistically.
But as this is im practical due to the com putational demands, when the agents share
no knowledge about each other they would have to select a limited number of extra
goals to include in their plans by making (possibly domain-specific) assumptions
about one another’s capabilities. Alternatively, the agents could choose extra goals
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from th e ir capabilities entirely at random. While we certainly cannot dispute th a t
this would represent an extreme condition of “severely limited shared knowledge,”
we believe th a t in most situations in the cooperative MASs th a t we have assumed,
it is reasonable to expect th a t the agents would be able to determine each o th er’s
capabilities. Thus, we have used the C K condition as our baseline.
Given a particular level of shared knowledge (i.e., C K or G K ), the agents need
a way to select which of the candidate extra goals to predictively encode into their
plans th a t best exploits th a t knowledge. In Section 6.1 we indicated th a t we were
interested in domain-independent methods for selecting these extra goals. To th a t
end, for these experiments we have developed two separate choice functions, one for
selecting extra goals from each of the two agent capability subsets described above,
Ci and Gi- More accurately, the two functions, which we will refer to as CAPS^, and
G O A Ly, represent classes of functions for selecting extra goals in different ways. We
will explain each in turn.
F irst, let us consider the C K case, where the agents only share knowledge of
each o th er’s capabilities.
partition of Q, such th a t

Let UJ=i Cj (n is the number of agents) be a disjoint
consists of the capabilities of A, th a t are also p art of

C j

the capability sets of exactly j other agents in the system. The first n — 1 (in our
experiments, three) choice functions C A P S i , . .. C A P S „_ i correspond to randomly
choosing k' extra goals from

C

j , . . . ,

C f ~ ^ ,

respectively. An additional choice function

for the case of C K , denoted as CAPS^orm, picks k' extra goals from Ci at random,
where the random choice is not uniform, but normalized w ith respect to the above
partition of C,. The motivation behind this selection process is to attem p t to normalize
the chance th a t any given capability will be selected as an extra goal by only one
agent. Thus, greater weight is given to capabilities shared be fewer agents, while
capabilities shared by many agents have a lesser chance of being selected. Specifically,
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let

7

= YTjZi \Cl\/j- The probability of choosing g G Cj is given by l / y j -

N ext we consider the G K case, where every agent knows about the goals, along
w ith th e ir values, th a t have been assigned to one another. This level of knowledge is
b etter th a n in the C K case, since the agents can limit their selection to goals th a t
they know actually have a chance of being suspended by some other agent. We would
like th e G O A L y choice function to take advantage of this additional knowledge. One
obvious choice function, which we will call GOALmax, would have agent A, select
the k' capabilities with the largest values in

Gi-

These would be the goals th a t are

expected to make the greatest contribution to MAS. To compute GOALmax, each
agent Aj could sort Gi in descending order by value (i.e., Vg), and then select the first
k' goals from the sorted list. Two additional choice functions th a t we will consider,
GOALmin and G O Ahmed, correspond to choosing capabilities w ith the lowest and
m edian values in

Gi ,

respectively. GOALmin would be com puted by sorting

Gi

in

ascending order by value, and again selecting the first k' goals from the list. For
G O A Lm ed,

Gi

could be sorted in either order, selecting the middle (median) k' goals.

M edian is used instead of mean for this choice function because it guarantees at least
one of the k' goals will have the actual middle value.

7.2

Evaluation

For the purpose of this evaluation, a set of experiments with five separate cases was
conducted. The results are presented in Figures 7-4 and 7-3. We will first explain how
each experimental case was performed. We will then discuss the results presented in
the figures. Fach case was performed on the same 100 problem instances involving
team s of 4 agents with partially overlapping capabilities as shown in Figure 7-1. In
each problem instance the agents were assigned k = 4 goals. Fach of these goals
was assigned a constant value, Vg, random ly draw n from from a uniform distribution
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w ithin [1,100]. The performance measure was the total goal value obtained by the
MAS, com puted as the sum of the values of each goal satisfied. For the cases th a t
involved including extra goals in the plans, the agents selected an additional k' = 3
goals.
For th e first case (the control case), the agents created and executed plans for the
k assigned goals in each problem instance on their own, w ithout using m ulti-agent
opportunism . We will refer to this as the “No MAOpp” case. The results are shown
as the “No MAOpp” lines in Figs. 7-3 and 7-4. This case shows how well the MAS
performs under normal conditions, and thus serves as our baseline.
In th e second experimental case, which we call the “Basic” case, the agents created
and executed plans for the k + k ' assigned and extra goals using the basic methodology
described in Section 6.1. They did not use any of the plan enhancement techniques
described in Section 6.2.

A to tal of seven experimental runs were performed for

this case. For the first four Basic runs ( “Basic” in Fig. 7-3), the agents only shared
knowledge of one another’s capabilities (i.e., th e C K case). In these runs, the agents
selected the k' extra goals using the four C A P S^ choice functions. For the remaining
three Basic runs ( “Basic” in Fig. 7-4), the agents had knowledge of one ano th er’s
assigned goals (i.e., the G K case). In these runs, the agents selected the k' extra
goals using the three GOALy choice functions.
In the third experimental case, the agents again created and executed plans for the
same k + k' assigned and extra goals used in the “Basic” case. They then enhanced
those plans using the planning w ith shortcuts methodology described in Section

6 .2 .

We refer to this as the “S hortcut” case. As w ith the Basic case, seven experim ental
runs were performed for this case: four using the CAFSa, choice functions ( “Shortcut”
in Fig. 7-3) and three using the G OA Ly choice functions ( “S hortcut” in Fig. 7-4) to
select the extra goals.
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For th e fourth case, which we will refer to as the “P P R ” case, th e agents used the
predictive plan repair methodology to enhance their plans. T h at is, the agents created
initial plans for the same k assigned goals as used in the “Basic” and “S hortcut” cases,
and th e n enhanced those plans to include the same k' extra goals using the repair
procedure described in Section 6.2. Again, seven separate experimental runs were
perform ed in this set using the C A PS^ and GOALy choice functions to select the k'
extra goals ( “P P R ” in Figs. 7-3 and 7-4).
For th e fifth experimental case, which we will call the “R P R ” case, the agents used
the reactive plan repair mechanism from Section 6.2. T h at is, the agents initially
created plans for just the k assigned goals (again, the same k assigned goals as used
in th e previous cases). They repaired these plans at runtim e (if possible) to include
goals th a t had been actually suspended by other agents. Because this methodology
does not encode extra goals in the plans, the CA PSj, and G OA Ly choice functions
were not used. The results for this case are shown as the “R P R ” lines in Figs. 7-3
and 7-4.
The results of these experiments shown in Figs. 7-3 and 7-4 have been normalized
against the baseline case. No MAOpp. T h at is, the performance measure used for
these experiments was the to tal value obtained for satisfying the assigned goals over
all 100 problem instances. Since the values assigned to these goals have no units of
measure, it would not be meaningful to present the results in term s of these values.
The results presented are thus the to tal value obtained by a given experimental run
divided by the to tal value obtained by th e baseline case. No MAOpp.
In each of Figs. 7-3 and 7-4, the lower, light-colored horizontal line depicts the
results for the No MAOpp control case. Since this is our baseline case, its normalized
value is, by definition, 1.00. It is presented as a line instead of a set of bar graphs in
these figures since it really represents a single value (i.e., none of the choice functions

111

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1.08

V 1.04
IC A P S (I)
CAPS(2)
CAPS(3)
CAPS(norm )

g 1.00
E

No MAOpp
-R P R
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Basic

PPR

Shortcut

Figure 7-3: Normalized experimental results for capability-based selection.

were used in this case). Also, presenting it as a line spanning the entire graph makes
it easier to visually compare the performance of the other cases to th e baseline.
The results for the Basic, Shortcut, and P P R cases are presented as bar graphs
in Figs. 7-3 and 7-4. In Fig. 7-3, each of these cases is shown as a group of four bars:
one for each of the CAPS,^ choice functions. Similarly, in Fig. 7-4 each case is shown
as a group of three bars: one for each of the G OA L^ choice functions. The value
of each of these experimental runs, represented by the height of th e corresponding
bar (where taller is better), is relative to the No MAOpp case. Thus a value of 0.98
would indicate the performance of th a t run was

2%

worse th an th e performance of

the No MAOpp case. Similarly, a value of 1.02 would indicate a 2% improvement over
the baseline case. Finally, the upper, dark horizontal line in both graphs depicts the
results of the reactive plan repair (RPR) case. As w ith the No MAOpp case, since
no choice functions are used this result is really ju st a single value. It is thus easier
to present this as a line instead of a bar graph.
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Figure 7-4: Normalized experim ental results for goal-based selection.

The results of our experiments are also presented statistically in Table 7.1. Specif
ically, Table 7.1 presents three key statistics for each plan repair m ethod combined
w ith each choice function. The column labeled “Difference ± C l” presents the average
improvement and confidence interval (at 95% conhdence) of the given experim ental
run compared to not using opportunism (i.e.. No MAOpp). This statistic is com puted
as the arithm etic mean of the per-problem-instance differences. Since we are using
exactly the same problem instances, as well as the same random number seeds for
each run, this is a b etter calculation of improvement th an com puting the difference
of the average goal value of each run.
The column of Table 7.1 labeled “t-T est” presents the results of the paired two
sample t-Test for means. Given the null hypothesis, H q, th a t the two approaches (i.e.
not using opportunism and using m ulti-agent opportunism with the given technique)
are equivalent in th a t they will produce the same (average) to tal value, this statistic
represents the probability the results could have been obtained by chance if H q were
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true. Thus, when p is less than our confidence threshold (0.05 for these experiments,
representing 95% confidence in the results), we can safely reject H q. Finally, the
column of Table 7.1 labeled “% Difference” presents the average difference in the total
value obtained in the given experimental run as compared to not using opportunism.
Let us first consider the results of the Basic experimental case. From Figs. 7-3 and
7-4 we can see th a t adopting multi-agent opportunism was only m oderately effective
when th e agents knew about each oth er’s assigned goals (i.e., the G K case), while it
was actually harmful when the agents only knew about each other’s individual capa
bilities (the C K case). It should be noted, though, th a t we cannot claim statistical
significance for any of these results except the GOAL^aæ run (see Table 7.1). Because
of the high variance in these results, we performed a second set of Basic runs on 400
different problem instances. Because the problem instances were different, we cannot
do a direct comparison. However, these runs confirmed the same general results w ith
b etter statistical certainty: performance was generally slightly b etter in the G K case
(~3% improvement for GOAL^aæ, p < 0.000004; ~2% improvement for GOALmed,
p < 0.006; GOAL/ou, was statistically equivalent to the baseline), and generally worse
in the C K case ( ~ 2 % degradation for CAPSg, C A P S 3 , and CAPSnorm, P < 0.004;
C A P Si was statistically equivalent to the baseline).
At first glance, given the decision-theoretic nature of the execution module, this
is a somewhat unexpected result: Since each agent is attem pting to maximize its
(and thus the global) expected payoff, having more potentially valuable goals in a
plan should only increase its flexibility, guaranteeing an improvement in the expected
performance. Thus planning for extra goals, using either choice function, should lead
to performance at least as good as when planning for only the assigned goals. The
pitfall here is th a t this claim is sound only under an “all else being equal” assumption,
i.e., only if we compare two qualitatively identical plans. In the case of plan-based
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t-Test (p <)

% Difference

2 0 .2 0

0.634899357

0.76%

2 0 .2 0

0.184883010

2.13%

23^9

± 22.15

0.039436245

3.66%

C APSi

-5.54

± 19.44

0.577778057

- 0 .8 6 %

CAPSg

-13.27

± 1 9 .3 3

0.181609496

-2.06%

CAPSg

-14.35

± 17.64

0.113943304

-2.23%

C A PSnorm

-13.61

± 18.01

0.141788970

-2 .1 1 %

G O A L^jn

3A97

± 19.02

0.000493012

5.42%

GOAhjned

42bO

± 17.13

0.000004151

6.61%

G O A L m ax

53.34

± 1 7 .9 8

0.000000075

8.27%

CAPSi

2&06

± 1 7 .8 2

0.012783911

3.58%

CAPSg

20.33

± 1 8 .4 0

0.012783911

3.15%

CAPSs

1&06

± 17.94

0T56734775

2.03%

CA PSnorm

17.94

± 19.12

0.068872466

2.78%

G O A L m in

5P76

±1^63

0.000000003

8.03%

G OA Lm ed

4&02

±1A 63

0.000006048

&67%

GO A Ljnax

55.28

±1& 87

0.000000005

8.57%

CAPSi

27.55

± 17.52

0.002662352

±27%

CAPSg

35.76

± 14.87

0.000007932

5.55%

CAPS3

29.05

± 17.12

0.001239015

4.50%

C A P Snorm

2&46

± 1 6 .3 7

0.002947308

3.95%

43 A2

± 15.45

0.000000286

6.73%

M ethod

Choice

Basic

GOALmm

4.91

±

GOALjned

13.76

±

G O A Lm ax

Shortcut

PPR

RPR

Difference

± Cl

Table 7.1: Statistical Results for R overs experiments
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predictive encoding, however, achieving k assigned goals using a plan created for
these an d some other k' goals can be far more complicated (and thus more risky and
resource consuming) than achieving the k goals using a plan created only for them.
These initial results are, in fact, the reason w e examined the various plan efficiency
improvements described in Section

6 .2 .

We next consider the cases using the various plan enhancement techniques: Short
cut, P P R , and RPR. From Figures 7-3 and 7-4, as well as from Table 7.1, it is easy to
see th a t all three lead to an improvement in performance both over the baseline plan
execution mechanism with no opportunism (No MAOpp) and over our original (Basic)
approach to offline predictive encoding. Focusing first just on the results of the G K
runs shown in Figure 7-4, w e can see th a t none of the three advanced techniques seem
to dom inate the other two, despite the significant differences in th e way th a t they
enhance the agents’ plans. One difference, however, between these techniques is in the
tim e complexity of the corresponding planning and execution. In our experiments,
the average execution time each agent spent per problem instance was 7.57 minutes
with planning with shortcuts, 22.87 minutes with predictive plan repair, and only
0.43 minutes with reactive plan repairh The corresponding execution time values for
the runs w ithout plan enhancements were an average of 2.34 m inutes per problem in
stance when using the basic approach, and

0 .0 2

m inutes for the baseline NO MAOpp

case. The dram atically shorter execution tim e for the reactive plan repair approach
is not surprising, since the plans are modified only for goals th a t are known to be
suspended. This leads to smaller plans to execute, with fewer contingency branches
to consider, which in tu rn allows for faster execution. However, recall th a t reactive
^Since th ese e x p erim e n ts w ere ru n o n c o m p a ra b le , b u t n o t id en tica l c o m p u te rs , th e p recise re la tio n
b etw een these n u m b ers m ay slig h tly vary.

F u rth e r, since id en tica l c o m p u te rs w ere n o t a v ailable, a n d it

re q u ire d a p p ro x im ate ly 3 m o n th s to p e rfo rm th e se e x p e rim e n ts as p re se n te d h ere, it was im p ra c tic a l to
a tte m p t to use ju s t one c o m p u te r.
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plan repair is feasible only if some degree of online re-planning is allowed. Otherwise,
since we cannot show a statistically significant difference in performance between the
other tw o methods, our results favor the use of planning with shortcuts.
In some ways, the results obtained w ith plan enhancement techniques while ex
ploiting the less informative C K knowledge (see Figure 7-3) may be considered even
more impressive than the G K results. Recall th a t our Basic approach to m ulti-agent
opportunism actually produced a reduction in system performance as compared to
not adopting opportunism at all (see the Basic group of bars in Figure 7-3). The
results for C K with plan enhancements, however, show th a t we can significantly re
duce th e overhead involved in opportunistic planning, making adopting multi-agent
opportunism attractive even in cases of limited shared knowledge.
It should be noted, though, th a t the limited number of possible goals in our
experimental domain may make results for the C K runs appear more attractive than
they are. Recall th a t in this scenario each agent’s capability set contains only 35 goals.
It shares 30 of these capabilities w ith other agents. In scenarios where the number
of shared goals is greater, we would expect th a t the performance improvement due
to m ulti-agent opportunism based on knowledge of shared capabilities to be reduced.
But, our results also dem onstrate th a t using multi-agent opportunism in conjunction
w ith one of our plan enhancement techniques produces performance at least as good
as, and often b etter than, not using opportunism at all. Thus, even as the number of
shared goals increases, exploiting this knowledge can still lead to an improvement in
performance with only limited additional overhead.
As with the G K results, neither planning w ith shortcuts or predictive plan repair
was dominant when exploiting C K knowledge. Both produced m oderate performance
improvements compared to the baseline of not exploiting opportunities (an average
of ~3% for planning with shortcuts, and ~4% for predictive plan repair). B ut again.
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since we cannot show a statistically significant difference in performance between
these two methods, the difference in their execution tim e complexities (an average
of 12.77 minutes per problem instance for planning with shortcuts, 26.65 minutes
for predictive plan repair, and 2.35 minutes for the corresponding unenhanced basic
approach) suggests a preference for planning with shortcuts. Of course, if the agents
are able to re-plan at execution time, reactive plan repair would again be the preferred
choice.
It m ight be argued th at, even with our plan enhancement techniques, th e improve
ments obtained by using m ulti-agent opportunism may not be w orth the additional
com putational burden incurred. Indeed, Figure 7-4 shows th a t predictive encoding
results in ~7% average improvement over the baseline, non-opportunistic planning
and execution, while in Figure 7-3 the improvement is only ~4% on average. However,
notice th a t each problem instance has a to tal of 16 goals assigned to the system of 4
agents. The value of each goal is selected at random from the uniform distribution
between 1 and 100. Thus, the expected value of a goal is 50, and the expected to tal
value of the 16 goals (if all were satisfied) is 800. Hence, a 7% improvement means
an average increase of 56, or the equivalent of 1 goal th a t would have otherwise not
been accomplished. Even a 4% improvement would provide an average increase of
32, which would likely indicate the accomplishment of an additional, lesser-valued
goal th a t otherwise would have been unsatisfied. Our statistical analysis (Table 7.1)
verifies th a t such qualitative improvements do in fact take place, and th a t they are
statistically significant.
Finally, we must examine the im pact of the various choice functions, GOALj, and
CA PSy, on the performance of our experim ental system. T h at is, given a particular
level of knowledge (i.e., G K or C K ), which m ethod of exploiting th a t knowledge
results in the best system performance? We will examine the two different levels of
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shared knowledge in decreasing order of how informative they are.
F irst, consider the results achieved when the agents share knowledge of one an
o th er’s goals (i.e., GK), using the choice functions GOALmax, G OAL^m , and
G O A Lm ed- One may expect th a t predictive encoding of most the valuable potential

opportunities (i.e., GOAL^ax) will make multi-agent opportunistic execution more
effective. In fact the results depicted in Figure 7-4 appears to support this expecta
tion.
How^ever, if we examine the results presented in Table 7.1, we cannot make this
claim w ith statistical certainty for these experimental runs. This is because the confi
dence intervals of the “Difference” value actually overlap (due to the large variance in
the values), effectively making them statistically equivalent. We should note, though,
th a t we can claim with statistical certainty th a t all of the “Difference” values obtained
using th e various GOAL,^ choice functions are indeed improvements, since they are
all positive and the confidence interval is smaller th an the difference value for each of
them. This claim is further supported by the corresponding t-Test results.
For the experiments presented here, the evidence does appear to support the use
of GOALmax as the appropriate choice function for G K . We believe, however, th a t
in the general case of multi-agent opportunism , the attractiveness of some potential
opportunity g for an agent A, is captured by a more complex relationship. In fact,
given a lack of any domain-specific knowledge th a t would suggest favoring the most
highly valued goals, we would actually recommend selecting the more average valued
goals, which for our example domain is the GOALmed choice function.
Suppose th a t an agent is asked to estim ate some quantity th a t depends on a
random variable X , but the agent has only limited knowledge (or no knowledge at
all) about the properties of X . A dopting a Bayesian approach will lead the agent
to base its estim ation on the “most unbiased” assum ption about X (e.g., assuming
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uniform distribution in the face of zero knowledge about X ) .

Now, consider the

case of G K , where the agents know about one another’s assigned goals along with
their values, Vg. When we consider the approximate decision-theoretic behavior of
the agents when selecting their courses of action, the likelihood th a t an agent will
suspend a goal g with a large value Vg is expected to be relatively small. This is
because the agent assigned to achieve g will implicitly prioritize this goal. As such,
including g as an extra goal in some other agent’s plan would be expected to be
wasted effort.

For similar reasons, the likelihood th a t an agent will suspend one

of its least valuable goals is expected to be relatively high. However, even if some
agent does predictively encode such a goal, achieving it will be least beneficial to the
overall success of the MAS. Therefore, if the agents share no knowledge except the
assigned goals and their values, a Bayesian approach will lead them to select goals
th a t represent a balance between the their values and the likelihood th a t they will
be suspended. In our system, the GOALmed choice function provides this balance
because the goal values are uniformly distributed.

O ther value distributions may

require the use of a different measure of central tendency other th a n median. Notice
th a t in our experimental scenario, as the allocation of capabilities is sym m etric among
the agents, and the process of generating problem instances is completely unbiased,
following a Bayesian approach in this MAS should be the correct thing to do. While
our empirical results do not dem onstrate a clear dominance of GOALmed, they are
not inconsistent with th a t selection, in th a t the G O A Lm ed choice function led to w hat
we could characterize as an average improvement in system performance.
Now let us consider the results achieved when the agents only share knowledge of
one another’s capabilities, using the choice functions C A P S i , C A P S 2 , C A P S 3 , and
CAPSnorm- As with the case of G K , the results for C K shown in Figure 7-3 do not
indicate th a t one choice function dominates. Also as w ith G K , the statistical results
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for C K in Table 7.1 show th a t the choice functions are again essentially equivalent,
and th a t we can claim th a t the “Difference” values are indeed improvements for all
but two case (C A P S 3 and CAPSnorm when planning with shortcuts).
We can again follow a middle-ground approach to recommending which choice
function to use in the absence of domain-specific information. Consider th e partition
of agent A /s capabilities {Cf} defined in Section 7.1. Since A, has no knowledge
about th e value of the goals th a t have been assigned to the other agents, assuming
an identical value distribution over

is at least as good as any other

assum ption (and thus is preferred in the Bayesian approach due to its minimal bias).
Similarly, we can assume th a t for each agent A, all the elements in its capability
set Ci are equally likely to be assigned to A, as its actual goals.

However, this

assum ption implies th a t, for i <l < m < n - l , the elements of C™ are more likely to be
assigned to some agent (and thus more likely to be suspended!) th an th e elements
of C(. On the other hand, the actually assigned elements of

are also more likely

to be opportunistically accomplished by agents other th an A*, because th e likelihood
of a “collision” on Cj is lower th an it is on C%. In other words, while it is more
likely th a t a capability th a t is shared by many agents will be suspended by some
agent, it is also more likely th a t some other agent will be able to opportunistically
satisfy th a t goal. Similarly, since the capabilities shared by only a few agents are
less likely to be suspended, it is also less likely th a t some other will be able to
opportunistically satisfy those goals. Thus the choice function C A P S n -i /2 can be
arguably expected to lead to a b etter balance between the likelihood of a goal being
suspended and it being predictively encoded by some other agent. While our empirical
results again do not dem onstrate th a t C A P S 2 is the dom inant choice function, they
are not inconsistent w ith th a t selection. The results produced when using C A P S 2
were superior (albeit weakly) for predictive plan repair, and essentially average when
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planning with shortcuts.

7.3

Sum m ary

In this chapter we have described an empirical analysis of the approach to multi-agent
opportunism presented in Chapters 5 and

6.

In particular, in this study we have

focused on examining how to improve the performance of an MAS through m ulti
agent opportunism when the knowledge shared by the agents is severely limited.
O ur results dem onstrate th a t with careful enhancement to an agent’s core plans,
m ulti-agent opportunism does indeed produce results as least as good as, and often
b etter than, not using multi-agent opportunism . Further, we have argued th a t, in
the general case, the best way to exploit limited shared knowledge for selecting extra
goals is through a “middle-ground” approach th a t balances the chances a goal will be
suspended and the chances th a t another agent will be able to opportunistically satisfy
it. In the next chapter, we examine how our approach to multi-agent opportunism
may be used in systems of agents th a t differ from the MAS model th a t we have used
in this study.
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C h ap ter 8

O ther M u lti-A g en t S ystem s
In this chapter we discuss how our PO PG -based approach could be applied to other
types of multi-agent systems. Specifically, we will examine multi-agent opportunism
in an autonomous oceanographic sampling network MAS (as presented in Chapter
2 ),

and an aircraft maintenance inform ation system.

8.1

A uton om ou s O ceanographic Sam pling N etw orks

In Section 2.2, we introduced an example scenario for a specific type of autonomous
oceanographic sampling network (AOSN) th a t uses a multi-agent system for collecting
scientific d ata in the ocean.

We again point out th a t this is only one particular

example of how an MAS could be used to control an AOSN.
We base our example MAS on work th a t has been done in the CoDA project
[Turner and Turner, 1998]. CoDA focuses on how to self-organize, control, and re
organize large, heterogeneous systems of vehicles and instrum ent platform s to allow
them to be effective AOSNs. The project takes a cooperative distributed problem
solving (CDPS) approach to the problem in which a loosely-organized meta-level or
ganization (MLO) first self-organizes to discover the capabilities present in the AOSN.
It then analyzes the situation and AOSN and designs a task-level organization (TLO)
to actually carry out the mission. This organization could be a hierarchy, a team,
a consensus-based organization, or other organizations as the situation warrants. If
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later th ere is too much change in the situation for the TLO to continue effectively, a
new M LO forms, which creates a new TLO to fit the changed situation.
Here, we consider one type of organization th a t can be produced by CoDA’s MLO,
a hierarchy. To make the example more concrete, we will assume th a t the agents in
this hypothetical AOSN are controlled by the schema-based planner Orca [Turner,
1994]. T his type of MAS differs from the R overs example used throughout this dis
sertation in two im portant ways. First, the agents are not using a “classical” (i.e.,
STRIPS-based) planning system to derive there intentions. Rather, the planner uses
task decomposition to create a type of task network [Sacerdoti, 1977]. Second, the
example MAS is coordinated as a hierarchy, which is a collection of cooperative agents
organized into a network of manager and labor agents, instead of through a middle
agent.

We will address each of these differences in turn.

One should note, how

ever, th a t there is nothing about the AOSN domain th a t would prevent the agents
from using classical planning or from using a middle agent for coordination. Fur
ther, even w ithin the context of this specific MAS, other approaches to planning and
coordination could be used. Rather, we provide this discussion to dem onstrate how
the characteristics of the MAS exemplified in this case would affect the use of our
framework.
For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume th a t the A O SN agents will
operate in a manner similar to the agents in the MAS model described in C hapter
6.

Specifically, we will assume th a t they will request opportunistic assistance for sus

pended goals, will use goal-sharing as the opportunity cue selection method, and will
respond to potential opportunities by satisfying the suspended goals when possible,
notifying the other agents when done. Thus th e following discussion will address how
the agents can determine when they should provide opportunistic assistance, and how
requests for opportunistic assistance can be directed to the m ost appropriate agents.
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8.1.1

AOSN Planning

Since th e approach to planning used in the AOSN example is not based on classical
techniques, we cannot directly use our PO PG -based approach to multi-agent oppor
tunism w ith these agents. We are left with two options: we can either adapt our
PO PG evaluation mechanism to work with plans expressed as task networks, or we
can tran slate the task networks into POPG s.

Since there are existing techniques

for translating task networks into partial order plans, we believe the latter option
would be easier to accomplish (although still not trivial). As such, we will limit our
discussion to this topic.
Task networks represent plans as a hierarchical network of nodes. The root node is
a task node th a t represents the initial set of goals assigned to the agent. Task nodes
are decomposed into subtasks, which may be primitive action nodes or other task
nodes, possibly with constraints (e.g., ordering) relating the subtasks to one another.
Prim itive actions occur only as leaf nodes in the network. Task networks are generally
considered to be more expressive than the STRIPS-based operators used by POPG s,
in th a t they can represent recursive actions and complex constraints among the tasks
[Erol et al., 1994; Lotem and Nan, 2000]. Thus, it is not a simple m atter to translate
these plans into POPG s. Below we offer several options for how to address this issue.
If a task network expresses a complete plan, one in which all of the leaf nodes are
primitive actions with well-defined preconditions, effects and resource requirements,
there are two ways we can translate it into a PO PG . We should note th a t it is not
common for the schema-based plans used in our example AOSN to be complete. We
will, however, address this case first for the sake of other task decomposition planners
th a t may produce complete plans. Later we discuss w hat can be done with partially
decomposed task networks.
For the first m ethod for translating a task network into a PO PG , if we assume
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the plan is valid, then we know there is at least one to tal order of the actions. If
we can extract this total order of actions, then just as we did in our experimental
MAS described in Chapter 7, we can use our modified T0 2 P 0 algorithm [Ambite
and Knoblock, 2001] to create a POPG . Alternatively, when we do not know or do
not w ant to compute a to tal order of the actions, we could use a version of the
algorithm presented by Lotem and Nau [2000] for translating task networks into
STRIPS-based partial order plans, modified to explicitly include precondition and
effect propositions as nodes, and derive the qualitative part of the PO PG s from
those plans. The quantitative part of the plan would be specified with the values
of the assigned goals and the costs (resource requirements) of the primitive actions.
Dummy actions, which are used to represent internal (non-primitive) nodes from the
task network, would have no cost, as the cost of “performing” them is really ju st the
resource needs of the primitive actions needed to meet their preconditions.
A lim itation of the translation algorithm described above is th a t it only works on
non-recursive task networks. It can, however, be used on partially decomposed task
networks, allowing us to relax the above complete plan assumption. Task networks
may be only partially decomposed when using active planners (see Section 3.2.2)—
those th a t interleave planning and acting.

For instance, the planning component

of Orca uses delayed com m itm ent to decompose subtasks only when needed, in the
runtim e context in which they will be addressed [Turner, 1994]. Thus at any given
time its current plan may be represented by a partial task network.
As an example, suppose th a t one of the EAVEs (e.g., E A V E - A r i e l ) has been
assigned to sample a given volume of w ater (i.e., the b ack g ro u n d -su rv ey ta s k ), and
has decomposed th a t task into the (partial) task network shown in Figure 8-1. In this
network, the plain boxes represent tasks or subtasks th a t must be decomposed, while
the double-walled boxes represent prim itive actions. Solid edges represent decom-
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Figure 8-1: AOSN task network (partial) for sampling a volume of water.

position links, while dashed edges show ordering constraints. Following the m ethod
described by Lotem and Nau [2000], we can translate this task network into the (par
tial) PO PG shown in Figure 8-2

As in Figure 8-1, in Figure 8-2 the double-walled

boxes represent primitive actions. The plain boxes in this figure correspond to the
decomposed tasks in the task network, and are thus in effect dummy actions. The
elliptical nodes in Figure 8-2 represent the precondition and effect propositions of
the action nodes. Artificial “task-done” nodes are used to represent the effects and
preconditions of the dummy action nodes.
Once an agent translates its task network into a PO PG , it could then use this
structure to decide when it may provide opportunistic assistance.

T h at is, when

some agent. A,, notifies the MAS th a t it would like help in satisfying one of its sus^T his P O P G h a s a c tu a lly been sim plified, e lim in a tin g w h a t w ould b e re d u n d a n t Sample(X,Y,Z) n o d es.
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Figure 8-2: AOSN P O P G (partial) for sampling a volume of water.

pended goals, g,, some other agent, Ay, could examine its intentions— as represented
by its PO PG V j —to determine if g« E V j . For example, EAVE-Arista may request
opportunistic assistance in obtaining a sample from location { x l , y l , d l ) , which, as
shown in 8-2, EAVE-Arlel intends to obtain.
Unless it produces a complete (total order) plan, it is unlikely th a t an agent using
task decomposition to derive its plans will be able to make direct use of the PO PG
execution mechanism described in Section 5.3. It should, however, be able to incor
porate the plan evaluation mechanism (Equations 5.3 and 5.2) into its task selection
mechanism. For example, Orca uses a context-sensitive agenda manager to determine
which task should receive the focus of its attention. A mechanism like this could be
augmented to consider input from the P O P G evaluation when determining which task
should have priority. As the task network is expanded, though, the corresponding
P O P G would have to be updated accordingly in order to ensure the task selection
mechanism is working with current information.
A final consideration for applying our m ulti-agent opportunism approach to sys
tems using task decomposition is how to incorporate planning for and predictively

128

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

encoding extra goals into the task networks. The first question we must address is
how will the agents select which extra goals to include? As long as the agents have ac
cess to inform ation about each other’s capabilities, or better still about their assigned
goals, th ey should be able to select additional goals to plan for using the methods
described in C hapter 7. In the next section we discuss how this inform ation could be
obtained by the agents in this AOSN example. Of course, as we indicated in Section
6 .1 ,

an agent’s capability set may be huge, and even its explicit representation may

be intractable. However, as discussed in Section 7.2, as long as we are careful in how
we enhance the agents’ plans, we should still be able to exploit this knowledge for
m ulti-agent opportunism and produce results as good as, and hopefully b etter than,
not using it.
Once an agent selects a set of extra goals, they would have to be predictively
encoded into the agent’s plan. One way to do this would be to include them in the
root node along with the assigned goals, which would then be decomposed into a task
network as usual. The task network could be translated into a PO PG and used as
described above. An agent like Orca th a t interleaves planning and acting, however,
may never actually decompose the extra goals. This should not be a problem, though,
since the planner would begin to decompose an extra goal into sub-tasks when it
actually gets suspended by some other agent (i.e., when its value becomes > 0). The
existing task selection mechanism (augmented w ith the P O P G evaluation mechanism
as mentioned above) would then determ ine if and when taking action to satisfy the
suspended goal is feasible.

8.1 .2

A O S N C o o rd in a tio n

As we have seen from the Rovers example, th e MAS coordination mechanism can be
used to support m ulti-agent opportunism by allowing the agents to obtain inform ation
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about one another (e.g., their capabilities and assigned goals), and help direct requests
for opportunistic assistance to the appropriate agents. In the example AOSN MAS,
we can exploit the hierarchical organization for both of these purposes.
As discussed in the previous section, the agents need information about each
other’s capabilities and assigned goals in order to determine which extra tasks should
be planned for and predictively encoded. In a hierarchical organization, agents can
obtain inform ation of this type from their task managers. While the managers may
not have complete knowledge of the capabilities of the agents under their control (e.g.,
in our exam ple MAS much of th a t inform ation is lost when the MLO is dissolved),
they should at least know about the capabilities related to the goals currently assigned
to those agents. For example, consider the example AOSN organization from Section
2.2 shown in Figure 8-3 (repeated from Figure 2-3).

Note th a t, as mentioned in

Section 2.2, while we have used a hierarchy for the m anagement structure in this
example, it is not the only possible structure for an AOSN MAS. As long as the
agents can communicate information about their capabilities, goals and opportunity
cues through the network of managers, any organizational structure should suffice.
In the AOSN example, when considering its plans for the b a ck g ro u n d -su rv ey -ta sk ,
E A V E -A rial can ask the manager of this task w hat other agents are involved, as

well as w hat their capabilities are. The task manager (E A V E - A r ist a ) would inform
E A V E -A rial about the capabilities of itself and A U V -1, and it could even include

information about other assigned tasks (e.g., the r o c k - c o l l e c t i o n - t a s k of EA V EA r ist a ). E A V E -A rial might then decide to use this inform ation to include other

tasks (e.g., looking for unusual magnetic readings) to prepare for potential m ulti
agent opportunities. Interestingly, since some agents are their own task managers
(e.g., E A V E - A rista on the b a c k g r o u n d -su r v e y -ta sk ), they could exploit informa
tion they already possess about other agents, such as the capabilities of the agents
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Figure 8-3: Example of a hierarchical organization for the AOSN MAS.
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involved in the task they are managing, w ithout communication.
F urther, this scheme of querying task managers could also be used recursively,
where ta sk managers query higher-level managers for information about larger sub
coalitions. This capability would be im portant when agents with overlapping capabil
ities have been assigned to different subtasks. In such a case it would be necessary to

forward th e query to other task managers to ensure the agents w ith the appropriate
capabilities are informed of the need for opportunistic assistance. Alternatively, in
situations where a given task requires agents w ith similar or overlapping capabilities
(e.g., th e b ack grou n d -su rvey-task , where the agents all collect the same type of in
form ation from different volumes of water), the best information would be expected
to come from the immediate managers of groups of labor agents.
We can also exploit the organizational structure to distribute the opportunity cues.
Since we have assumed th a t we are using goal-sharing, the opportunity cues in this
example would be the suspended goals. W hen an agent suspends a particular goal, it
would be sent up the management chain as an opportunity cue. As cues come up the
chain, managers would determine which subordinate agents (or sub-groups) possess
the capabilities to address the cue (i.e., the suspended goal) and would send it to the
appropriate subordinates. Managers could determ ine which subordinates possess the
required capabilities and resources by examining the same knowledge they use when
allocating tasks to these agents. The agents receiving the cues would incorporate
them into their own opportunistic processing, if possible, as described in the previous
section.

8.2

Aircraft M aintenance Inform ation S y stem

Another domain we will consider is a m ulti-agent inform ation system, in which soft
ware agents collaborate to assist in aircraft m aintenance. This example has been
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Figure 8-4: Aircraft M aintenance MAS

loosely adapted from the multi-agent system described by Shehory et al. [1999],
which was designed to support aircraft maintenance at W arner Robins Air Force
Base. Briefly, our example repair process starts with a mechanic inspecting an air
craft for problems. When a problem is found, the mechanic inputs a description to a
user interface agent, which we will call the Mechanic Agent. This agent finds and con
tacts inform ation agents th a t m aintain databases on previous repairs (HistoryAgents)
and repair manuals (ManualAgents).
The information agents return docum ents describing previously performed repairs
for similar problems and manual pages related to the possible repairs. The MechanicAgent (probably through interaction w ith th e mechanic) would decide on the repair
to be made and contact a SupplyAgent to obtain the needed parts.

If the parts

are in stock, the SupplyAgent arranges to have the parts delivered to the mechanic.
Otherwise, the SupplyAgent would contact appropriate p art Vendor Agents, acquire
the needed parts, and then deliver them to the mechanic.

W hen the repair has

been completed, the mechanic docum ents the details of the actual repair made w ith
the Mechanic Agent, who files th a t docum ent w ith the local HistoryAgent for future
reference.
As in the Rovers example, the agents in this MAS, shown in Figure 8-4, find one
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another through the use of middle agents, such as matchmakers or brokers. This MAS
is a good example of an open multi-agent system, since the member agents are hetero
geneous and may change over time. In fact in this example the agents are likely to also
be geographically distributed over several repair bases. The agents in this MAS do
not have a p rio n knowledge of which other agents will service their requests, and may
never know about all of the other agents in the MAS. For example, a MechanicAgent
m ight find out which HistoryAgents had information relating to a given repair from
a m atchm aker, and then contact them directly with information requests. Similarly,
the MechanicAgents may never know of the existence of VendorAgents w ithin the
MAS, since they never use them directly.
As in the previous section, for the purposes of this discussion we will assume th a t
the A ircraft Repair agents will operate in a m anner similar to the agents in the MAS
model described in C hapter

6.

Specifically, we will assume th a t they will request

opportunistic assistance for suspended goals, will use goal-sharing as the opportunity
cue selection method, and will respond to potential opportunities by satisfying the
suspended goals when possible, notifying the other agents when done. Further, since
this MAS also uses middle agents, the questions of how agents find out about one
another’s capabilities and goals, as well as which agents should receive requests for
opportunistic assistance, could also be addressed as in our model MAS. Thus in the
following discussion we will address how the agents can determ ine when they should
provide opportunistic assistance. Specifically we will examine two key issues; how can
an agent exploit its current plans to determ ine if providing opportunistic assistance
is feasible, and how can it prepare its plans for supporting multi-agent opportunism .
An agent in this system (e.g., a MechanicAgent) would likely use query planning
[Ambite and Knoblock, 2000] in order to assemble the needed information from the
various agents. Query planning involves determ ining a (partially ordered) sequence of
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d ata retrieval and data manipulation actions to satisfy a user’s (or in this case, agent’s)
inform ation request.

This type of planning allows for information from different

sources to be integrated in order to satisfy complex queries.
It has been shown [Ambite and Knoblock, 2000] th a t query planning can be done
using classical operators, where the plan actions are often database-like operations
(e.g., retrieve, join, union, etc.) with inform ation items acting as preconditions and
effects. As such, it should be possible to represent an information agent’s plans us
ing PO PG s, as long as we assume the information-based preconditions and effects
can be represented propositionally. Knoblock [1996] has used functional predicates—
predicates defined by functions th a t com pute some variables given th e values of other
variables— to represent query plan preconditions in classical plans. Functional pred
icates can represent plan conditions w ith enough detail for planners to reason over
them, while still being abstract enough to represent inform ation being gathered from
different sources. Thus it is likely th a t a query-planning agent could make direct
use of the approach discussed in C hapters

6

and 7 to exploit its plans for supporting

multi-agent opportunism , with the possible exception of one im portant issue: resource
usage.
The resource needs of plan actions, along w ith goal values, are used in our approach
to enable an agent to determine its “best course of action.” T h at is, these values are
used to allow an agent to both decide when it should suspend one of its own goals,
as well as to determine when it should attem p t to opportunistically satisfy another
agent’s suspended goal. In an inform ation system, the “cost” of an action may be
expressed simply as the expected am ount of tim e needed to execute it, or possibly
in m onetary term s (i.e., a charge for accessing some inform ation servers). In some
domains, the cost of assembling needed inform ation m ight be considered negligible,
such as when the system ’s users own all the resources. In other domains, gathering
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inform ation may have the potential to be extremely expensive, as when an aircraft
m ust go into a hostile region to gather intelligence, or when a doctor must perform a
biopsy to gather information for a diagnosis.
W hen there are resource needs associated with the actions of an information query
plan, it should be possible to make direct use of the PO PG execution mechanism
described in Section 5.3. It should also be possible to use the m ethod for determining
when to suspend goals, as well as the mechanisms for determining when providing
opportunistic assistance are feasible, which are discussed in Section 6.1.
For example, consider the (partial) query plan shown in Figure 8-5, which might
be used by a MechanicAgent to obtain a plan for repairing a particular problem
instance, F16-Rudder-123. The MechanicAgent must first obtain a recom mendation
for m aking the repair, which it can get from either a HistoryAgent or a hum an
planner. The agent may know (perhaps from past experience) th a t it takes an average
of 5 m inutes to obtain a response from a HistoryAgent, and 24 hours to obtain a
response from a hum an planner. If time is considered a valuable resource, then the
rational choice for the agent is to query the HistoryAgent first to obtain the repair
recommendation.
Consider the situation, however, when the HistoryAgent is queried b u t cannot
retu rn a recommendation, and the MechanicAgent has only been allocated a limited
am ount of time (e.g., 2 hours) to come up w ith a repair plan. In this case, using our
P O P G execution scheme would allow the agent to recognize th a t this plan is likely
to fail (because is has insufficient resources). While it might be best for the agent
to handled this failure by reconsidering its intentions, if, as in the R overs example,
we assume th a t the agents cannot re-plan at runtim e, this failure would cause the
agent to suspend the associated goal. This in tu rn would lead the agent to request
opportunistic assistance for the suspended goal. Similarly, an agent receiving notih-
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I fe

Figure 8-5: Example A ircraft Repair Query Plan (PO PG )
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cation of this suspended goal could examine its current plans to determ ine if it might
be able to satisfy the goal opportunistically, and use our course of action selection
mechanism to determine if it has the resources to help. Since we are assuming the
agents in our MAS are cooperative, we would expect them to provide this assistance
when possible.
There may be situations, however, where the cost of an action in a query plan
is considered negligible. For example, a MechanicAgent executing the query plan in
Figure 8-5 may not know (or care) how long information retrieval may take. It is still
possible, though, for an agent to use a P O P G ’s unmet preconditions to determine
when it should suspend a plan and request opportunistic assistance. While we have
generally assumed throughout this dissertation th a t plan actions always succeed, ac
tion failure is actually quite likely to occur in real-world systems. The result of action
failure is th a t one or more conditions will not be achieved. W hen these conditions
are preconditions of some future actions leading to a goal, these future actions cannot
be performed. Either alternative actions will have to be performed to provide the
needed preconditions, or the goal will have to be suspended.
Continuing with the example P O P G shown in Figure 8-5, suppose th a t neither
the HistoryAgent nor the hum an planner returns a repair recom m endation (perhaps
because of a communication failure). In this case, the r e p a ir -r e c (F 1 6 -R u d d e r -1 2 3 )
condition will not be met, so the goal r e p a ir -p la n (F 1 6 -R u d d e r -1 2 3 ) will have to
be suspended, and the agent may request opportunistic assistance w ith achieving this
goal. The agent might use the goal itself as the opportunity cue (i.e., goal sharing), as
we had assumed above. The agent may, however, be able to use cue sharing or mixed
sharing as discussed in Section 4.2.1. T h at is, since the agent knows the specific
condition th a t is impeding its p lan’s progress (i.e., r e p a ir - r e c ( F 1 6 -R u d d e r - 1 2 3 )) ,
it may request opportunistic assistance in satisfying ju st this condition (cue sharing).
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or it m ay include both this condition and the suspended goal in its request (mixed
sharing). Since the conditions in inform ation query plans can themselves be viewed
as inform ation or knowledge goals [Ambite and Knoblock, 2000; Ram and Hunter,
1992], agents using such plans are more likely to be able to utilize cue sharing or
mixed sharing. This is because inform ation held by one agent is, in general, more
easily communicated to and utilized by another agent than “physical” preconditions
(e.g., being at some location or possessing some object).
Although it may be straightforward to use unmet precondition to determ ine when
to suspend a goal (and thus when to request opportunistic assistance), a lack of
explicit resource needs in a query plan would make it difficult for an agent to use our
plan evaluation mechanism (Section 5.3) to determine its best course of action. T h at
is, if there is some risk of having insufficient resources (e.g., time) to satisfy all goals
in a query plan, but those resources are not explicitly represented or known, it would
not be possible for an agent to select a course of action th a t minimizes this risk. On
the other hand, if the cost of executing a query plan is considered negligible, then any
valid to tal order of the partially-ordered actions in a PO PG would be equivalent. In
this case, an agent would always choose to opportunistically satisfy another agent’s
suspended goal (or interm ediate precondition), since it can only increase the overall
benefit to the MAS.
This brings us to our final consideration for multi-agent opportunism in query
plans: W hen would an opportunity for one agent to help satisfy another ag en t’s
goals even occur? T h at is, when would an agent’s plan already have a condition
included th a t may be a goal or other precondition for another agent? It is true th a t
some opportunities might occur naturally when two agents generate plans for similar
activities (e.g., two agents may request the same pages from the M anualAgent). In
this case, the approach described in this section would indeed be able to exploit
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these opportunities. But, in general such natural opportunities cannot be relied on,
and so our efforts must be focused on artificially increasing the number of potential
opportunities.
In th e approach described in C hapters 6 and 7, we used the concept of planning
for capabilities to predictively encode goals at planning tim e in one agent’s plan
th a t m ight be suspended by another agent. If the agents had clear knowledge of
each o th e r’s information needs, such as the specific repairs they are working on, they
could potentially make effective use of planning for capabilities. A situation where
this would be beneficial is when the inform ation servers charge for queries, and the
rates are b etter for volume queries (e.g., the CARFAX service [CARFAX], which
provides histories of used cars, charges one price for a single query, but only a few
dollars more for unlimited queries). In this situation, the overall cost to th e system
could be reduced by the opportunistic aggregation of queries to certain inform ation
servers.
In the type of information system exemplified by our Aircraft M aintenance MAS,
it appears unlikely, however, th a t a dom ain-independent approach to planning for ca
pabilities would help increase the number of potential opportunities, for two key rea
sons. First, w ithout domain-specific guidance, the sheer number of different possible
queries would likely prevent an agent from correctly guessing which extra conditions
would be helpful to some other agent— after all, an aircraft has a lot of parts to repair.
Second, in the given MAS structure (Figure 8-4), the agents all have access to the
same information providers. Thus if one agent cannot satisfy its inform ation needs
w ith the information agents in the system, it is unlikely th a t another agent will be
able to obtain this information even if it did have the foresight to predictively encode
the appropriate information goal. This would not be the case, however, if the agents
making information queries had access to different inform ation providing agents, or
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if they used different methods for generating information query plans. Similarly, in
the case of an open MAS, if a new information-providing agent joins the system after
some agent suspends a goal, the change in the makeup of the MAS may also be an
opportunity to provide the needed information.
So if planning-time predictive encoding will not benefit our information agents,
and n atu ral opportunities are unlikely to occur, it is likely th a t the agents will have
to make the best use of runtim e opportunities. T hat is, if the agents are capable
of re-planning at runtime, then a form of reactive plan repair (Section 6.2.3) could
be used to modify an agent’s plans when it learns about another agent’s suspended
goals. It is not unreasonable to expect th a t query-planning agents could perform
runtim e re-planning, since responding to information queries is essentially an interac
tive process. For example, if the MechanicAgent executing the plan shown in Figure
8-5 finds out some other agent is missing some manual pages for the repair plan it
is trying to obtain, the MechanicAgent may be able to augm ent its query to the
M anualAgent to include the additional pages (on the hope th a t they are now avail
able). A final possibility would be for the agents to store their “recent” query plans
on the expectation th a t information they have already obtained might be useful to
some other agent in the system. This would be useful when an inform ation providing
agent becomes unavailable. Note th a t unlike our previous approach, this would not
exploit opportunities based on an agent’s future intentions, b u t rather on its current
knowledge.

8.3

Sum m ary

In this chapter we have shown how our PO PG -based approach to multi-agent op
portunism could be applied to other types of MASs, dem onstrating th a t w ith some
straightforward extensions this approach can be used in environments other th a n the
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one for which it was designed. Specifically, in the context of an oceanographic sam
pling network, we have discussed the changes th a t could be employed to utilize our
approach when faced with a non-classical planning system, and when the agent’s ac
tions are coordinated with something other th a n middle agents (e.g., a management
hierarchy). Similarly, in the context of an aircraft maintenance information system,
we have described how query planners could exploit a PO PG -based approach even
when th e resource needs of the plan actions are not available, and when planning for
capabilities may not be feasible. These discussions show th a t the general applicability
of our approach is indeed promising.
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C h ap ter 9

C onclusion
In this chapter we briefly summarize our framework for m ulti-agent opportunism
and discuss several key areas for future research. We conclude by arguing th a t our
framework answers the thesis questions presented in C hapter 1.

9.1

Framework Sum m ary

As we discussed in the introduction, multi-agent opportunism is the ability for agents
to opportunistically assist one another to accomplish their goals. T h at is, agents
must be able to recognize and respond to potential opportunities for the goals of
other agents in the MAS.
In order to recognize a potential opportunity for another agent, an agent m ust
have some knowledge about the other agents in the MAS. There are two ways agents
can obtain this necessary information about each other; they can infer it, or the
agents can explicitly share it. As inferring this inform ation is likely to be too difficult
in an open system of heterogeneous agents, we have focused our study on explicit
information sharing. More specifically, we have determ ined th a t an agent designer
must address these three key issues:
• For which task or goals should an agent request opportunistic assistance?
The agents should limit this to ju st those tasks or goals (suspended or active)
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w hich other agents are likely to be able to help satisfy. Determining this requires
th e agent to undertake a cost/benefit decision process.
• E xactly what opportunity-related information should the agents explicitly
share? The agents should share the information th a t will best enable the other
agents to recognize environmental cues th a t would indicate a potential oppor
tunity. This may include the goals themselves, cues the requesting agents has
determ ined for itself, or a m ixture of both.
• W ith which other agents should an agent share this opportunity-related
information? An agent should share this information w ith the other agents th a t
are most likely to have the capabilities to help satisfy the goal. Determining
this will, in general, make use of the system ’s existing coordination mechanism.
We have discussed how this could be done when the agents coordinate their
activities using middle agents or through a simple hierarchy. O ther coordination
mechanisms are considered in Section 9.3.
For an agent to respond to a potential opportunity, it must be able to determine
w hat an appropriate response might be, and when th a t response is even feasible. To
provide agents with this ability, an agent designer must address these two issues;
• How can an agent decide if it should provide opportunistic assistance?
An agent should consider its current intentions— the actions it is already plan
ning to take—to determine if they may provide a potential opportunity. The
agent should also use its intentions to consider the potential im pact th a t pro
viding opportunistic assistance may have on its own goals. As we are working
with planning agents, this decision process will often be a form of plan analysis.
• How should an agent respond to a potential opportunity for another agent?
The response may be to simply notify the other agent of the potential opportu144
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nity, or to take some action on the other agent’s behalf. An agent may decide to
take some action using only local information (e.g., following a standard oper
ating procedure), or it may need to coordinate its actions w ith the other agent.
T he costs and benefits of this response should be included when deciding when
to provide opportunistic assistance (described above).
Addressing the five key issues described above is critical to exploiting opportunities
in a m ulti-agent system. However, ju st understanding these issues is not sufficient
for knowing the feasibility or potential benefits of multi-agent opportunism in a realworld system. As such, we have also examined a specific approach to multi-agent
opportunism for a particular class of MAS. This particular class includes systems of
heterogeneous agents th a t use classical planning to determine their intentions, and
th a t are coordinated using middle agents. By including this specific approach, we are
able to dem onstrate how our key issues can be addressed in a concrete setting. We
are also able to provide an empirical analysis of the potential im pact th a t exploiting
m ulti-agent opportunism may have on a system ’s performance.
For our specific approach, we have introduced a simple yet flexible model for plan
ning and execution based on the abstract plan representation Partial Order Plan
Graphs (POPG s).

PO PG s provide explicit representations of plan preconditions,

effects, and resource requirements, all of which are needed when reasoning about po
tential opportunities. This model separates the qualitative and quantitative parts of
the planning problem, and is well suited for systems where online re-planning cannot
or should not considered. The plan execution scheme embodied in this model tran s
parently allows an agent to determ ine when it should pursue potential opportunities
for the suspended goals of other agents in the system. It also allows the agents to
determine when they should suspend goals they are unlikely to be able to satisfy, and
thus when they should request opportunistic assistance.
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In o rder for systems of planning agents to exploit potential opportunities for one
an o th er’s goals, the agents’ plans must contain actions th a t may lead to conditions
favorable for producing potential opportunities. While these conditions may occur
naturally, it would be more beneficial if these plans could be augmented to improve
the chances of providing opportunistically favorable conditions. It is critical, however,
th a t th e plan enhancements do not interfere with an agent’s course of action when
pursuing opportunities for other agents is not needed.
To improve the chances of providing potential multi-agent opportunities, our spe
cific approach uses the notion of planning fo r capabilities to augment each agent’s
plans. T h a t is, the agents in our example system select additional goal conditions
from th eir own capability sets to include in their plans, in the expectation th a t these
goals m ight be suspended by some other agent in the system. The selection process
used depends upon the information about the agents th a t is currently available. It
may be simply the overlapping capabilities of the various agents, or it may be the
actual goals th a t the have been assigned to the agents. Planning for capabilities is
a type of predictive encoding, a passive approach to single-agent opportunism . Using
such an approach allows the agent to pre-com pute potential opportunity cues, rely
ing on the normal runtime plan execution mechanism to recognize their presence and
determ ine if pursuing them is appropriate in the given context.
Augmenting an agent’s plan to include additional goals, however, may lead to
inefficiencies with respect to the agent’s assigned goals.

As mentioned above, we

need to avoid interfering with the agent’s regular course of action when it does not
need to pursue potential opportunities. As such, we have examined three techniques
for plan enhancement th a t allow the agents to avoid performing unneeded actions.
In particular, we have considered two post-planning m ethods of enriching the core
structure of a plan: one th a t adds “shortcuts” bypassing the segments of the plan
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devoted strictly to support predictively encoded extra goals, and one th a t predictively
repairs th e core plan to include subplans achieving the extra goals. We have also
exam ined an online approach th a t assumes the agents possess limited runtim e plan
repair capabilities. Using this approach, the agent attem pts to enhance its core plan
only at th e time it learns of a goal suspended by another agent.
In order to quantify the potential im pact of our specific approach to m ulti-agent
opportunism , we have conducted an empirical evaluation of a simulated MAS th a t
incorporates our ideas. Through this study we have shown th a t w ith limited shared
inform ation, and even with no re-planning or plan repair capabilities, systems of
heterogeneous agents can indeed assist one another opportunistically in accomplishing
their goals. W hen the agents cannot do online re-planning, and the degree of shared
inform ation is limited to just the overlapping capabilities of each agents, the system
performance improvement ranged from ^2% to ~5% .

Further, when the agents

know w hat goals have been assigned to the other agents, the system performance
improvement was even better, ranging from ~5% to ~8% . Thus we can conclude th a t
multi-agent opportunism is feasible, and can indeed improve the overall performance
of this class of multi-agent system.

9.2

R elated Work

As we indicated in Section 3.3, to the best of our knowledge, there are no other re
search efforts th a t have studied or are currently studying multi-agent opportunism.
In this section we review several research areas th a t are related to multi-agent oppor
tunism in various way, and compare them to our approach.

Oliveira and Garrido [1995] have posited the idea of using cognitive cooperation
facilitators (CCFs) to detect cooperation opportunities among agents with similar but
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com plem entary interests (i.e., goals). CCFs are similar to matchmakers [Klusch and
Sycara, 2001], in th a t agents register their interests with them and they establish
connections. Unlike matchmakers, CCFs are proactive in establishing connections
between agents with similar interests. They also require the agents to register their
interests (in the form of goals) instead of their capabilities.
W hile CCFs could be used to support multi-agent opportunism , the idea was
never sufficiently developed to provide a complete model. T h at is, th e prim ary role of
CCFs was to identify potential opportunities among pairs (or perhaps small groups)
of agents to cooperate on similar goals and notify those agents. The agents were
then expected to negotiate among themselves how they could potentially help one
another satisfy their goals. The authors did not specify how these negotiations could
be accomplished, or even how the agents could determine if cooperation was, in fact,
beneficial. T hat is, the CCF approach only addressed how to recognize potential
opportunities, not how to respond to them.
Beyond the incompleteness of the model, there are two other im portant diffi
culties w ith this approach. First, the requirements for agents to register their goals,
which may change frequently, would likely lead to significant communication overhead
keeping the CCFs updated. Second, the determ ination of similar but complementary
goals is not well specified, and is likely to be highly domain specific, requiring tailored
CCFs.
However, while the use of specialized CCF agents may not be directly usable in
a model of multi-agent opportunism , it provides some insights. For example, if an
interest-matching mechanism could be specified, then a m atchm aker or broker agent
could be modified to infer interests from m atch requests and notify interested parties
of potential collaboration opportunities. This capability could potentially enhance
the opportunity recognition capabilities of the model described in C hapter 6.
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B erennji and Vengerof [1999] use a coordination mechanism in which the agents
exchange task information to achieve b etter system coherence.

The experimental

dom ain used is a modified Tile world [Pollack and Ringuette, 1990] environment. The
tasks in this system were referred to as opportunities because they would appear as
“goal tiles” at random locations and disappear after a random am ount of time. At
each tim e step, the agents would negotiate among themselves to determine how each
of the tasks should be allocated, and then each of the agents would move toward their
ta sk ’s location.
A lthough this approach is not m ulti-agent opportunism as we have defined it, it
may be able to achieve some of the same high-level goals. For instance, such an
approach would be able to improve the overall system performance in a dynamic
environm ent by taking advantage of the opportunistic appearance of goals. Similarly,
this approach specifically attem pts to improve the coordination of th e agents, going
so far as to attem pt to optimize their actions.
This approach does not, however, meet our key assumptions.

Specifically, the

agents are assumed to be homogeneous in th a t they are all capable of performing
any task. In fact it goes further in assuming th a t all of the tasks are of the same
type, differing only in their value. Similarly, this approach requires th a t all of the
agents share all of their task-related inform ation w ith one another. As we have dis
cussed throughout this dissertation, clearly homogeneous agents w ith complete (or
even nearly complete) shared knowledge can opportunistically assist one another w ith
their goals. Our model shows th a t even w ith limited shared knowledge, systems of
agents with heterogeneous capabilities can also do this.

In Section 4.2.1 we discussed how an agent could conceivably infer another agent’s
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goals, plans, or even opportunity cues, to allow it to recognize potential opportunities
for th e other agent. This is as opposed to the explicit sharing of opportunity-related
inform ation th a t is used in our framework. B usetta et al. [2001] have developed an
approach in which agents assist one another by “overhearing” the communication
messages of other agents, and offering suggestions to improve an agent’s plan, in the
form of new information or additional actions. It is opportunistic in th a t the service
providing agents are given information or commands from suggester agents th a t are
not already available to them. The service providing agents are free to incorporate
or ignore the suggestions.
To make this approach possible, the suggester agents must have a model of the
service providing agents, as well as a representation of their m ental attitu d e [Busetta
et ah, 2001]. The authors accomplish this having the service providing agents pub
licize their “public behavior model” which includes their current beliefs, goals, and
plans. As we have discussed, it is unrealistic to expect th a t this degree of shared
knowledge would be available in an open system of heterogeneous agents. As such,
this approach is not a general model of m ulti-agent opportunism.

The area of multi-agent plan merging, which has been used by several researchers
to improve coordination in an MAS, is also related to multi-agent opportunism. For
instance, von M artial [1992] has created a taxonom y of m ulti-agent plan relations
th a t identify both negative and positive interactions between two agent plans, along
w ith a basic model of how to merge the plans to achieve coordinated actions. The
negative relations identify actions w ithin the plans th a t might lead to conflicts, such
as an overlapping use of resources or the negation by one agent of the effects of
another agent’s actions. Negative relations were generally addressed by adjusting the
ordering or timing of the affected actions. The positive relations identify redundant
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and subsum ing actions in the plans, where one agent is already performing actions
th a t produce effects needed in the other agent’s plan. In cases like these, only one of
the agents needs to perform the overlapping action(s).
An additional positive relation identified by von M artial is the favor relation,
where one agent can satisfy the goal of another agent if th a t goal can easily be in
corporated into its current plan. This relation is closest to our idea of m ulti-agent
opportunism , as it can be used to identify situations where agents may be able to help
one another in a more cost-effective way. In fact the reactive plan repair mechanism
described in Section 6.2.3 essentially exploits a favor relation. In von M artial’s model,
however, the identification of favor relations in plans, as well as the means to incor
porate additional goals into the current plan, requires domain-specific information.
Further, the model does not address using this relation to help satisfy suspended goals
of another agent, although it should be possible to do so.
Similarly, Durfee and Lesser [1987] developed the P artial Global Planning (PG P)
approach to enable agents to plan coordinated actions.

Decker and Lesser [1998]

later extended P G P into the Generalized P artial Global Planning (G PG P) approach.
W here P G P primarily addressed conflicts between plans, G PG P also included von
M artial’s positive plan relations.

Both approaches provide a mechanism to allow

agents to exchange their individual plans, identify parts of the plans th a t might
require coordination, and propose plan modifications to achieve th a t coordination.
Each agent would use the exchanged plan inform ation to create a partial global plan
to represent its own view of the global plan th a t encompassed the actions of other
agents as well as its own.
P G P and G PG P were designed to support cooperative distributed problem solving
(GDPS), where the agents collectively try to satisfy some common goals through their
individual actions. This is in contrast to th e MAS model th a t we have assumed.
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described in Section 5.2, th a t characterizes the system as a loosely-coupled collection
of agents acting independently to satisfy their assigned goals. We have adopted this
model because it makes few assumptions about the amount and type of knowledge
the agents share. This allows us to make claims about the feasibility of multi-agent
opportunism th a t are more general than if we assumed a CDPS model.
More recently, the work of Cox and Durfee [2003] has focused on finding synergies
among multi-agent plans. Synergies are essentially von M artial’s positive relations,
with a particular emphasis on subsuming and overlapping effects (instead of just
actions) th a t would lead to plan merges. Cox and Durfee’s approach exploits hierar
chical plans, where the plan is represented as a hierarchy of steps. Leaf nodes in the
hierarchy are primitive actions, while interior nodes are abstract steps. The use of
hierarchical plans allows this approach to find synergies at higher levels of abstraction
th an other plan merging mechanisms th a t focus on individual actions.
Finally, M. de Weerdt [2000] has developed a resource logic for multi-agent plan
merging th a t allows agents to coordinate their plans by exchanging excess resources.
In de W eerdt’s formalism, resources are an abstraction th a t encompass both the
traditional notion of resources as well as the classical planning notion of preconditions
and effects. De W eerdt has also proposed an auction-based mechanism th a t would
enable agents to find needed resources for the coordination of their plans. It is not
clear how the agents identify w hat resources they are lacking, though.
Each of these approaches does, in its own way, improve the overall coordination
of the MAS by eliminating conflicts or finding synergies among the agents’ plans.
However, none of them is adequate for providing a general model of multi-agent
opportunism, for two key reasons. First, they each require the agents in the MAS
to commit to changes in their plans. The very nature of opportunism implies th a t
agents should assist one another as situations arise, not by formally com mitting to
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applying its resources to the satisfaction of another agent’s goals. While our own
plan-based approach (Chapter 6) provides multi-agent opportunism by incorporating
extra goals into the agents’ plans, the agents do not commit to these goals. Rather,
the ex tra goals are pursued only they are determined to be needed and advantageous
to the MAS.
Second, the plan merging approaches require the agents to exchange their plans,
either w ith one another or with a central coordinator agent, so th a t they can be
com pared and merged. This requires the agents to share a great deal of inform ation
w ith one another, which we are explicitly trying to avoid. Further, for plan merging
to take advantage of runtime opportunities, the exchange of plan-related inform ation
would have to occur any time an agent changes its intentions (e.g., when a goal is
suspended). This would be a communication-intensive process. It would also be com
putationally expensive, as plan merging is exponential in the general case [Cox and
Durfee, 2003], and thus doing it repeatedly would likely be intractable.

The area of coalition form ation in MASs also has some bearing on multi-agent op
portunism . Much of the research in this area has focused on finding optimal coalitions
among self-interested agents, often using game theoretic approaches [Kraus, 1997]. In
such systems, agents form coalitions only when it will increase their own payoff. The
MAS must then be designed to provide incentives for agents to cooperate, leading to
b etter overall system performance [Kraus, 1997; Shehory and Kraus, 1998].
While opportunism has generally been ignored in this area of research, it is not
unrealistic to expect th a t given the appropriate incentive (e.g., expectation of a re
ward), self-interested agents would also be able to support multi-agent opportunism ,
using the mechanisms from our model. However, while it is less likely in a cooperative
MAS, there is an increased risk th a t a self-interested agent would opportunistically
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take advantage of knowledge it obtains from another agent seeking assistance, a tactic
the business world calls poaching [Clemons and H itt, 2004].
Some of the work in this area, though, has looked into coalition form ation in
open system s of cooperative agents. For example, Shehory and Kraus [1998] have
exam ined the selection of optimal coalitions in MASs coordinated using a m atch
maker, where tasks arrive dynamically. This work is interesting since the approach is
able to opportunistically reallocate tasks when new tasks arrive, by restructuring the
coalitions when necessary. They do not, however, address any other mechanism for
agents to help one another with their assigned tasks, although it is conceivable th a t
a suspended task could be treated as a new task, leading to opportunistic reallocation.

Finally we consider agents organized using models of teamwork, which refer to the
formal coordination models th a t assume a small group of agents are coordinating their
activities in support of a set of shared goals. We discuss these models as a contrast
to our approach. T h at is, it is very likely th a t a team of agents could support m ulti
agent opportunism , essentially because of the am ount of knowledge in common they
are generally presumed to possess. However, this assum ption is not realistic for the
open real-world MAS we are considering.
One of the earliest formalisms for team coordination is jo in t intentions theory [Co
hen and Levesque, 1990; Jennings, 1995], in which agents agree to cooperate on a joint
goal and on how th a t goal will be jointly satisfied (i.e., w hat role each agent will play
in a common plan). In a similar m ethod called shared plans [Grosz and Sidner, 1990],
and later collaborative plans [Grosz and Kraus, 1996], the agents are not required to
commit to explicit joint commitments, but do operate from an understanding of the
common plan to be executed and their roles w ithin it.
Tambe [1997] has taken these approaches a step further by combining and ex-
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tending them into the S T E A M formalism. This formal model of teamwork requires
the agents to use both joint intentions and shared plans. The model also includes a
protocol for establishing the intentions, selecting the plans, and establishing roles of
each agent within the plans.
Given the amount of common knowledge the agents using one of these models must
have, it should be straightforward to extend them to support m ulti-agent opportunism
(although, to the best of our knowledge, this has not been tried).

For instance,

when using STEAM, one agent knowing the role th a t another agent is filling in
the team is sufficient for the first agent to know the other agent’s assigned tasks.
Thus, opportunities can readily be recognized for other agents in the team , as well
for shared team goals, and the appropriate agent notified. However, as mentioned
above, teamwork is not a general model for multi-agent opportunism for the types of
MAS we have assumed. This is because the agent teams m ust posses a great deal of
shared inform ation to operate, which cannot be relied upon in real-world systems of
heterogeneous agents.

9.3

Future Work

In C hapter 8, we discussed in depth several areas of future research in the context
of applying our PO PG -based approach to multi-agent opportunism to other types of
multi-agent systems. In this section we will address some other areas identified in
this dissertation as targets for our future research efforts.

9.3.1

P O P G C o m p lex ity

One drawback of our PO PG -based plan execution scheme is the com putational com
plexity of the action selection mechanism. Since this mechanism must consider essen
tially all possible to tal orderings of the remaining actions in the PO PG to determ ine
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SampleRock(Ll)
[cost=3]

hs(Ll)

TakePicture(Ll)
[cost=2]

hp(Ll)

[V=5]

A t(L l)

[V=10]

Figure 9-1; P artial PO PG w ith costs and values.

the best course of action, its com putational complexity is exponential in worst case.
In our example Rovers MAS the plans tended to be somewhat “linear,” in th a t there
was usually only one or two possible actions to choose from at any given decision
point. This fact tended to attenuate the complexity problem somewhat, making our
experiments tractable on plans w ith 25-30 actions for up to 8 goals. Requiring several
seconds to minutes to select the next action may be acceptable in domains like our
Rovers example because the plans are at such a high level of abstraction. B ut in other

domains stricter real-time constraints may make the use of our execution mechanism
im practical. As such, we are particularly interested in reducing the com putational
complexity of our execution mechanism.
Interestingly, much of the com putation done for action selection is redundant.
Consider, for example, the partial PO PG shown in Figure 9-1, which is a simplified
version of the example shown in Figure 5-4. Assume for a moment th a t this is a
subgraph of some larger POGP, and th a t it appears at the tail of the plan. As long
as our resource p > 5, the evaluation of this section of this plan will determ ine th a t a
value of 15 can be obtained. It will, however, have to consider both orderings of the
actions Sam pleRock(Ll) and T a k e P ic tu r e (LI) to determ ine this. Even worse, this
subplan may have to be evaluated many times during the evaluation of its subsuming
PO PG , and in general as long as p > 5 the value will always be 15.
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We would like to use a caching scheme, similar to the back-propagation mechanism
used in [Dearden et ah, 2002], th a t would reduce the redundancy in the computation.
Specifically, we would like to associate with each node a caching function T : (u, p)
V. T h a t is, at each node, for a given level of resources p and in a given state a, there
will be a cached value V . In our above example, if we ignore the state for the moment
(i.e., let cr = any), then the function JF associated with the node At (LI) would be;

0,

^(p) = < 10,
15,

p<2
2 < p< 5
p> 5

It should be possible to build this cache function dynamically. T h at is, if during
the norm al action selection evaluation of a given node n, the current state and resource
level is not represented in JF, then the evaluation continues as if caching was not being
used. W hen a value is determine, JF would be updated.
A lthough we did spend some time trying to implement a caching scheme in our
simulated example MAS, the details of capturing and matching states and resources
turned out to be a bit trickier th an one would expect. Clearly one would not want to
associate complete state descriptions, as they can be very large (leading to a trade-off
between space and time). B ut we were unable to find a reasonable representation in
the short time we spent on the problem. As reducing the time complexity of action
selection could be a significant improvement to our approach, it is high on our list of
future work.

9.3.2

A ctiv e G oals

Throughout this research project we have focused on the use of suspended goals as a
way to determine when to request opportunistic assistance. This is not particularly
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surprising, considering suspended goals have often been a focus in research into op
portunism (e.g., [Birnbaum and Collins, 1984; Francis, 1997; Hammond et ah, 1993;
P atalano et ah, 1991; Simina and Kolodner, 1995; Pryor, 1996]). Further, they offer
an easy indication of when an agent needs help—when it has a goal it knows it may
not be able to satisfy itself.
As we mentioned in Section 4.1, an agent may also benefit from opportunistic
assistance w ith its currently active goals. In th a t section we discussed an example
from the AOSN domain in which the C O N V E X - m o o r i n g requests help from the
other agents in detecting convective overturns. Such examples are likely to occur in
many MASs. However, it is likely th a t identifying them will require domain-specific
knowledge.
Our PO PG -based approach to m ulti-agent opportunism provides two possibilities
for a domain-independent m ethod of identifying which active goals could benefit from
opportunistic assistance.

First, as was mentioned in Section 6.3, an agent could

identify “high-risk” goals as those w ith an expected cost th a t is just below some
threshold of the currently available resources.

The expected cost of a particular

goal can be computed as the sum of the expected costs of all of the actions in the
current P O P G th a t must be executed to satisfy the goal. Determining w hat a good
threshold would be, or even if requesting opportunistic assistance for active goals
would be beneficial, are issues th a t could readily be explored in our current simulated
environment.
Similarly, an agent could request opportunistic assistance for an active goal based
upon its value relative to the other assigned goals. For example, an agent may benefit
from opportunistic assistance with unusually highly-valued goals, such as those with
a value greater than the sum of all of the other assigned goals. While identifying
such goals may be a simple m atter, determ ining the types of relationships among the
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goals values th a t would benefit from requesting opportunistic assistance would clearly
require further analysis. Our existing experimental environment would allow us to
study th is idea.

9.3 .3

C u e Sharing

In the approach described in this dissertation, we have focused on using suspended
goals for the opportunity-related information th a t the agents share with one another
when requesting opportunistic assistance. This was a natural choice in our case, since
the PO PG -based planning and execution mechanism can readily be extended through
planning for capabilities to prepare the agents for potential opportunities.
As mentioned in Sections 6.3 and 8.2, however, our PO PG -based approach could
also be used to support cue sharing as the means for determining opportunity-related
information. As discussed in Section 6.3, the most direct way to use cue sharing
would be if an unm et precondition of some agent’s suspended goal is in the capability
sets of other agents in the MAS. Borrowing the example from th a t section, suppose
th a t the condition Ci = h av e-ro ck -sam p le (WP7) is a precondition for some other
set of actions in the plan, Vi, for agent A,, and is not itself an assigned goal. If A,
could identify th a t ci is necessary for the achievement of a suspended assigned goal,
Qi, then requesting opportunistic assistance for Ci would be cue sharing.
Note th a t we can still use our resource-based decision process to determine when
to suspend a goal with this type of cue sharing. T h at is, when we suspend some goal
g

because of insufficient resources, we are also suspending the sequence of actions A

from the agent’s plan V th a t would lead to satisfying g. If c is a precondition of
some action a, E A, it must also be in the effects of some other action Uj E V . The
opportunistic satisfaction of c may mean th a t the agent will now not have to execute
üj,

freeing up resources th a t could allow it to resume trying to satisfy g.
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Similarly, as discussed in Section 8.2, we can also use cue sharing when a goal is
suspended specifically because of some unm et precondition. This might be helpful
when resources are not a limiting factor in plan execution, or simply when plan actions
fail to produce their expected effects.
The difficulty for both of these situations is in determining w hat conditions should
be used for opportunity cues. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, we wish the agent to select
those conditions th a t are most likely to lead to the suspended goal’s satisfaction th a t
are also conditions th a t other agents can help satisfy.
For instance, consider again the above example where agent A, has determined
th a t condition C\ is necessary for the achievement of suspended goal g\. Unlike the
above discussion, it is not actually necessary for ci to be in the capability set of some
other agent in the MAS. Rather, ci only has to be an effect of some action in another
agent’s plan to potentially be opportunistically satisfied. B ut, if it is not part of any
known capability sets, it would be difficult for A, to determine which, if any, other
agent could help satisfy ci.
In th e information systems case the problem is a bit easier, since an unm et con
dition is a description of information the agent does not possess. If th a t condition is
critical to satisfying the goal, then the condition is a good candidate for opportunistic
assistance from other agents. Further, the infrastructure of a distributed information
system must necessarily provide a way to locate agents th a t can provide given types
of information. Thus if an agent can find another source for the inform ation needs of
an unm et condition, it should use it as an opportunity cue.
In general, however, identifying conditions th a t would make good opportunity
cues in multi-agent opportunism is likely to be more complicated. It is possible th a t
a form of diagnosis may be needed to determ ine exactly w hat conditions are impeding
progress towards a particular goal, with further reasoning being required to determ ine
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if the o th er agents in the MAS can help satisfy it. Since finding a domain-independent
mechanism to support cue sharing would greatly enhance our framework for m ulti
agent opportunism , it is an area we intend to study further.

9.3 .4

O th er C oord in ation M echan ism s

In our PO PG -based approach to multi-agent opportunism, the MAS coordination
mechanism is used for the discovery and distribution of information. In term s of
discovery, the coordination mechanism is used to determine the capabilities of other
agents in the MAS, and when possible, the goals th a t have been assigned to them.
This inform ation is used to decide which extra capabilities should be predictively
encoded in each agent’s plans. As for distribution, the coordination mechanism is
used to determine which agents are capable of providing opportunistic assistance
for suspended goals. In our specific approach, we chose to use a middle agent to
coordinate the activities of the other agents. The experiments described in Chapter
7 indicate th a t this mechanism does allow the agents to obtain sufficient inform ation
about one another to make m ulti-agent opportunism feasible.
We would like to extend the experiments described in C hapter 7 by considering the
performance im pact of multi-agent opportunism when compared to using th e middle
agent to re-allocate suspend goals to some other agent in the MAS. The middle agent
is in a good position to select another agent for the suspended goal, since it knows
about each agent’s capabilities, and in principle has some idea of each agent’s current
work load. We do, however, still expect m ulti-agent opportunism to result in b etter
performance th an this approach, for two key reasons.
First, if we m aintain our assum ption th a t the agents are not capable of runtim e
re-planning (otherwise this would ju st be reactive plan repair), then the broker would
have to include the suspended goal in the next cycle of goal assignments. This would
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mean th a t either some agent would be assigned more than the expected k goals, or
th a t som e other goal th a t would otherwise have been assigned during th a t cycle would
itself be delayed. If the choice is to assign more than k goals to some agent A, then
because th e agents are already resource bound, it is likely th a t A will again not be
able to satisfy all of its assigned goals, leading to more goals being suspended. Unless
the broker is able to balance the load of the extra goal assignments, this could lead to
a cascade of suspended goals, causing the system ’s performance to degrade. If instead
the m iddle agent delays some goal in the current cycle, even if it prioritizes the goals
by value, there is a possibility of starvation of some goals, meaning th a t no attem pt
at all will be made to satisfy them (even opportunistically).
Our second reason for expecting poorer performance when using the middle agent
to reallocate a suspended goal to another agent is th a t it will limit the potential
for opportunistic satisfaction. T h at is, the middle agent will select a single other
agent to attem p t to satisfy the suspended goal. By not informing other agents of the
suspended goal, opportunities for satisfying th a t goal in a more cost effective way
may be missed.
We would also like to examine m ulti-agent opportunism in the context of other
MAS coordination mechanisms. We would expect th a t each coordination mechanism
would have its own strengths and weakness in term s of supporting opportunism , even
going beyond information the discovery and distribution. It is exactly these issues
th a t we would like to explore.
For instance, the contract-net protocol (CNP) [Smith, 1980] is inherently oppor
tunistic in the way goals can be dynamically re-allocated at runtime. T h at is, suppose
some agent, Ai, determines th a t it m ust suspend one of its goals, g, th a t it had con
tracted to satisfy for some value, Vg. Using th e normal CNP mechanisms, Ai can
solicit bids from the other agents to determ ine if any of them could satisfy g. If some
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other agent, Ag, provides a bid to satisfy g at a cost less th an Vg, then g can be
opportunistically satisfied by Ag.
CN P alone, however, does not provide a complete model of multi-agent oppor
tunism . As we can see above, it does provide a mechanism for agents to determine
which other agents in the MAS to share their opportunity-related information with.
Similarly, the decision process th a t agents use to compute their bids for a given goal
does allow them to determine if they should attem p t to provide opportunistic assis
tance. B ut CNP does not specify how the agents compute their bids, and so we do not
know if th e agents are basing their decisions on their current intentions. If we assume
th a t they use planning to make this decision, then it is reasonable to expect th a t
they could try to opportunistically incorporate goals suspended by other agents into
their current intentions, perhaps using a m ethod like reactive plan repair described
in Section 6.2.3. This would require the agents to be capable of runtim e re-planning.
While this does violate one of our key assumptions, it is not unreasonable in the
context of CNP.
B ut even if the agents do compute bids for new goals based on their current inten
tions, w ithout modification CNP does not allow th e agents to attem p t to incorporate
a goal into their plans for possible opportunistic satisfaction. T h at is, just as w ith the
plan-merging and coalition formation mechanisms described in Section 6.2.3, CNP
requires agents to commit to satisfying their goals. As such, the agents do not, in
general, have the flexibility to provide assistance on a truly opportunistic basis— if
and when conditions permit. R ather, they agree to commit their resources and actions
to satisfying the given goal. Further, it is possible th a t agents w ith losing bids may
encounter opportunities to satisfy a suspended goal. But, since only the single agent
with the winning bid commits to a given goal, these other potential opportunities
would be missed.
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Also, CNP alone does not provide a way for the agents to determine when (for
which goals) they should request opportunistic assistance, nor does it provide any
m ethod for the agents to determine exactly w hat opportunity-related information
they should share. If, as above, we assume we are working with a system of planning
agents, then just as with our POPG -based approach the agents could use their plans
to make these decisions. If we further assume th a t the agents use their plans to request
opportunistic assistance for their suspended goals, then CNP does provide a way for
the agents to determine when it would be cost effective to make th a t request. As
described in the example above, if through the bidding process an agent determines
th a t one or more other agents can possibly satisfy its suspended goal, g, for a cost
less th a n the goal’s value, Vg, then the agent should make the request for assistance.
In addition to analytically considering other MAS coordination mechanisms, we
would also like to empirically examine multi-agent opportunism in the context of these
other mechanisms. For example, in our existing experimental environment we could
examine agents th a t use CNP for coordination, as described above, or a hierarchy as
discussed in Section 8.1.1 For a hierarchy, unlike the approach described in Section
8.1.1, initially we would use a classical planner to keep the changes to the agents
manageable.
Of particular interest, though, would be to consider the im pact of multi-agent
opportunism on agents coordinated using models of teamwork (e.g., [Tambe, 1997;
Grosz and Kraus, 1996; Cohen and Levesque, 1990]). Our belief is th a t since the
agents in these models already possess a great deal of shared information, they could
more easily exploit multi-agent opportunities. If fact it may even be feasible for team s
of agents to infer potential opportunities for one another. The focus of the research
described in this dissertation has been on finding the low-end of shared inform ation
th a t still leads to performance improvements due to multi-agent opportunism . An
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exam ination of teamwork models could provide us with a b etter idea of the high-end,
since th e agents already share so much information.

9.4

F inal Rem arks

In this dissertation we have presented a framework for multi-agent opportunism th a t
is applicable to open systems of heterogeneous planning agents. Our prim ary thesis
question for this framework was simply: Can multi-agent opportunism be effective in
systems o f heterogeneous agents with little or no shared knowledge? T h at is, can open,
real-world multi-agent systems benefit from being able to recognize and respond to
opportunities for each other’s goals? Or will the lack of shared inform ation be too
restrictive to allow cost-effective opportunistic assistance?
The analysis of our framework described in C hapter 7 specifically addresses this
question. In th a t analysis, we examined the im pact of multi-agent opportunism on a
specific, but broadly representative, class of multi-agent systems. Our results indicate
th a t even when the agents know only about the capabilities of other agents in the
system, and even when no runtim e re-planning is possible, multi-agent opportunism
is indeed effective in improving the overall system performance. Further, when the
agents are b etter informed with knowledge about w hat goals have been assigned to the
other agents in the system, multi-agent opportunism is able to produce even b etter
improvements in the system ’s performance. Alternatively, our results also indicate
th a t, unless the agents are capable of runtim e re-planning, at least some a priori
shared information is needed to make m ulti-agent opportunism effective.
A second, related question th a t we have explored is: Are agents that are capable
0/

opportumtzea /or t/iemgekes oko capab/e, asmg t/ie same mecAamsms,

0/

recogatzmg aad respoadmg to opportuatties /o r ot/ier ageats, gtrea t/iat tAeg /laae

adegaate A;aow/edge 0 / eac/t ot/ierP
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If one were to only consider the abstract p art of our framework (Chapter 4), the
answer to this question would be trivially yes. T hat is, if we assume th a t an agent
is capable of recognizing and responding to potential opportunities for its own goals,
it is not difficult to expect th a t they could also recognize and respond to potential
opportunities for the goals of other agents given adequate knowledge of these goals.
But through our specific POPG -based approach, we have gone a step further in
th a t we have dem onstrated in a concrete setting th a t agents can indeed use the
same mechanism to recognize and respond to potential opportunities independent of
w hether they are for another agent’s goal or one of their own. Through our specific
approach we are also able to describe w hat is m eant by “adequate knowledge” for a
particular class of MAS. Further, and perhaps more interesting, we have shown th a t
under some circumstances, multi-agent opportunism can be effective even when the
agents are not capable of single-agent opportunism .
Finally, the contributions of our framework for m ulti-agent opportunism are both
theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, our framework provides an analysis
of the critical issues th a t must be addressed in order to successfully exploit opportuni
ties in a multi-agent system. These issues involve the type and degree of knowledge the
agents must share, as well as the decision-making capabilities they must possess. This
analysis provides MAS designers and developers im portant guidance to incorporate
multi-agent opportunism into their own systems. It also provides the fundam ental
underpinnings of our own specific approach to multi-agent opportunism.
On the practical side, we have developed, implemented, and evaluated a spe
cific approach to m ulti-agent opportunism for a particular class of multi-agent sys
tem. Our approach enables systems of planning agents coordinated through a middle
agent to opportunistically assist one another achieve their goals, thus improving the
overall system performance. We have achieved this by combining a particular form of
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single-agent opportunism known as predictive encoding with an approxim ate decisiontheoretic planning mechanism th a t allows the agents to make critical informationsharing decisions.

The planning mechanism uses an abstract plan representation

known as Partial Order Plan Graphs (POPGs) th a t we developed specifically to sup
port m ulti-agent opportunism. While the PO PG representation was designed for this
research project, it is still general enough to represent the features of most (if not all)
techniques used in the area of classical (i.e., STRIPS-based) AI domain-independent
planning.
We believe the contributions made by this approach are im portant for two key
reasons.

First, it should be applicable to many existing MASs.

This is because

we have leveraged well-understood technologies from both AI planning and single
agent opportunism , and also because middle agents are widely used in coordinating
m ulti-agent systems. Second, our approach dem onstrates th a t MASs can benefit from
multi-agent opportunism even when the agents share little or no common knowledge of
such things as plans, goals, and capabilities. This is because we have started from an
assum ption th a t the agents will be heterogeneous, implying th a t they would possess
little or no shared knowledge. Our results thus provide a baseline, dem onstrating th a t
performance improvements can still be achieved even w ith this restrictive assumption.
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